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Decision 93363 JUL 22 1981

BEFORE THE PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

In the Matter of the Application) of SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON) COMPANY for Authority to Modify) its ENERGY COST ADJUSTMENT BILLING) FACTORS in Accordance with the) Energy Cost Adjustment Clause as) Modified by Interim Decision) No. 91277.

Application 59499 (Filed March 5, 1980)

ORIGINAL

(See Decision 91805 for appearances.)

Additional Appearances

Michel Peter Florio and John W. Blethen, Attorneys at Law, for Toward Utility Rate Normalization (TURN), interested party.

FINAL ORDER

I. Introduction

By Application (A.) 59499 Southern California Edison Company (Edison) requested an increase in its Energy Cost Adjustment Clause (ECAC) billing factors and responded to a Commission directive regarding an incentive procedure applicable to coal plant operating performance. Hearings were bifurcated: the rate relief portion of Edison's request was heard first and addressed in Decision (D.) 91805 issued May 20, 1980; the coal plant matter was the subject of hearings on May 7 and 8, 1980, and June 3 and 4, 1980. This decision concludes the coal plant incentive procedure portion of the proceeding. A.59499 ALJ/km/ks

The coal plants emerged as a major ECAC issue in a previous Edison ECAC proceeding, A.58393. In that case the Commission staff (staff) offered evidence and argument in support of its position that Edison's coal plants could reasonably attain an annual capacity factor of 60%. Consequently, staff recommended that the ECAC balancing account balance be adjusted as if the 60% factor had been achieved, and that a 60% factor be applied as a minimum in future proceedings. For the record period the staff's recommendation would have disallowed about S32 million in fuel expense as coal is a cheaper form of energy than other fossil fuels. Edison offered evidence and argument in support of its position that it had prudently operated its coal plants, the capacity factors were reasonable under the circumstances, and no adjustment was necessary.

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This Commission addressed these issues in D.90488. We observed that ratemaking procedures had effectively shifted the risk and opportunity associated with such plants from shareholders to ratepayers. The staff proposal would have restored some incentive to Edison, but would not have balanced risk and opportunity. We were also concerned with the reasonableness of the underlying assumption - that the 60% capacity factor could be attained and sustained.

Accordingly we directed that the incentive procedure be the subject of further examination. We ordered as follows:

- "4. Edison shall prepare as part of its ECAC application for rates to become effective November, 1979, a proposed system of incentives for improved operation of its coal-fired power plants and shall recommend standards on which to base the incentives.
- "5. In cooperation with the staff, Edison shall select and retain an independent consultant to assess, evaluate, and report on Edison's coal plant operating practices and the standard of performance that can be expected of these plants." (D.90488.)

The staff's proposed adjustment to the balancing account was not adopted.

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The matter was subsequently deferred from Edison's next ECAC proceeding to this application by D.90967 (modified by D.91416). In that same decision we also deferred about \$35 million of Edison's requested rate relief, pending completion of the coal plant studies.

In October 1979, System Development Corporation (SDC) was awarded a study contract "to assess, evaluate and analyze the design and operations of the Mohave Units 1 and 2 and Four Corners Units 4 and 5 generating stations and, based on this analysis, to recommend standards of performance that could be expected from the plants." The resulting report was received in this proceeding.

In addition to the consultant's report, evidence was offered by Edison and staff. The California Farm Bureau Federation (Farm Bureau) and Toward Utility Rate Normalization (TURN) also participated by way of cross-examination and briefs. On March 9, 1981, TURN filed a "Request for Reimbursement" for its "attorney's fees and other reasonable costs" in this proceeding. Edison and staff filed replies.

II. <u>Issues Presented</u>

The issues remaining in this proceeding are the following:

- Should this Commission adopt an incentive procedure applicable to Edison's coal plant operations?
- 2. If we find that such a procedure is appropriate, what should be its terms?
- 3. Should Edison be allowed to recover the deferred \$35 million in fuel costs?

Depending on the resolution of these issues we take up the matter of TURN's request for attorney fees.

III. <u>Summarv</u>

This decision considers the need for an incentive procedure applicable to Edison's coal plant operations and finds it compelling. The specific procedure adopted is substantially as proposed by the consultant and supported by staff. It provides for a set of standards surrounded by a null zone. So long as performance falls within the null zone Edison receives dollar-for-dollar recovery of its fuel costs. If performance is above or below the zone, then rewards or penalties accrue. The rewards or penalties are based on the current price of fuel. The procedure provides for maximum limits and a sharing of rewards or penalties between the utility and its ratepayers. Appendix B is taken from the consultant's study and illustrates how the formula operates. A precise schedule for implementing the procedure is adopted.

Process

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Edison is found to have been reasonable in its past coal plant operations. It is allowed to recover about \$35 million in deferred fuel expenses.

IV. The Need for an Incentive Procedure

The following description of Edison's coal plant operations is extracted from the staff report, Exhibit 31:

> "Edison operates the Mohave Power Plant which began operation in 1971. This plant is unique because of its large size, two 790 MW units, and because it uses slurry coal for fuel. The coal is transported 275 miles through the use of a slurry pipeline from a mine near Kayenta, Arizona to the plant located near Bullhead City, Arizona. Mohave not only pioncered the use of slurry coal but it is still the only large coal-fired plant using this fuel.

"In the eight years since Mohave has been in operation, major problems that have caused outages and affected performance have occurred with hardware such as pulverizers, centrifuges, boilers, condenser tubes and the main steam leads. Labor problems and environmental regulations have also contributed to lowered performance.

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"At the time of the design and construction of Mohave, experience with large coal-fired power plants in the 800 MW range was extremely limited. Equipment design was based in most cases on upscaling equipment used in smaller plants which had proven reliability. In many instances, this reasoning did not prove to be satisfactory. Also, because of the use of slurry coal, it was necessary to design some completely new types of equipment which had unproven reliability. During the years that Mohave has been in operation, Edison has been active in redesigning, upgrading, modifying and rebuilding equipment that proved deficient and has been working to resolve other nonhardware problems that restricted productivity.

- "The Four Corners Power Plant, operated by the Arizona Public Service Company (APS), is located on the Navajo Indian Reservation, 20 miles west of Farmington, New Mexico. Edison owns 48% of two 800 MW units, which have been in operation since 1970. The plant, which like Mohave is unique because of its large size, has its coal supplied from a nearby strip mine.
- "In nine years of operation, Four Corners has had many hardware and non-hardware problems similar to those experienced at Mohave. As in the case of Mohave, equipment problems were related to the upscaling of designs used in smaller plants and the operating utility, APS, has been actively upgrading its equipment. However, Four Corners has problems concerning location and geology that are unique. Four Corners is located entirely on the Navajo Indian Reservation which places certain constraints on operation of the plant and restricts expansion. Perhaps the most serious of all problems has been the fact that significant subsidence has occurred in different areas of the plant. This has caused severe turbine vibration and also affected other equipment, causing loss of productivity. The problem has been temporarily arrested by pressure grouting into the voids under the plant."

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These conditions led to the original staff recommendation that an incentive feature be incorporated into the ratemaking treatment of Edison's fuel costs.

Edison argues that no incentive is necessary. It contends that sufficient incentives already exist for it to maximize the output of these plants, referring to the prospect of ECAC review and general corporate policy. It cites its past reasonable operations and improvements as proof that ratepayer interests are sufficiently protected.

Edison warns that certain adverse consequences could occur on account of an incentive procedure. It warns that the operation of the incentive provisions could distort management judgment:

> "...any short-term objective that carries the possibility of financial penalties or rewards can cause the emphasis to be on potential short-term benefits. This could have an impact upon plant operations that is not in the best interest of the Edison ratepayers and shareholders in the long run."

Edison also warns that investors might perceive an incentive procedure as an increased element of risk, affecting Edison's ability to attract capital. It argues:

> "Thus the resultant shift in risk to the investor in event of the adoption of an incentive plan would represent a substantial increase in risk for the future, compared with risks of this type in the past due to the increased and increasing differential between the price of fuel oil and coal."

It observes that to the extent "risks go beyond matters involving management control" the procedures would "lose considerable effectiveness as incentive devices."

In support of an incentive procedure staff states as follows:

"Under conventional rate making, autility's rates were set based on an estimated fuel cost. If poor efficiency or plant reliability caused that fuel cost to be higher than estimated, the utility's earnings were reduced. If, on the other hand, the utility were able to operate its plants in such a way as to require less fuel than estimated, the utility's earnings were increased. Under conventional rate making, the utility bore the risk that its plant would prove unreliable or inefficient. As compensation for this risk, the utility had the opportunity for increasing its earnings through more efficient operations. As the cost of energy grew, however, this risk became more than the utility could manage. Consequently, ECAC transfers the risk from the utility to the ratepayer except for imprudent actions.

"The proposed Incentive Program, by operating in a similar fashion to conventional rate making, is designed to transfer a portion of the risk assumed by the ratepayer back to the utility. In previous ECAC applications, the staff has attempted to prove that the utility was imprudent and negligent in the operation of its coal-fired power plants and should, therefore, be penalized for the plant's poor performance. The theory that the utility should share a portion of the risk for the operation of its power plants removes the necessity for the Commission to find the utility negligent or imprudent before assessing a penalty."

Staff points out that there has been no disallowance for managerial imprudence regarding the coal plants since the inception of ECAC.

The Farm Bureau also advocates an incentive procedure. It argues that existing incentives are inadequate and there are "persuasive reasons" for incentives for utilities to minimize fuel costs, referring to the dominant role of fuel costs in total operating expenses. It believes that "incentives to economize can produce results" and should be adopted. A.59499 ALJ/km/ks *

TURN also supports an incentive procedure, but is very critical of some of the features of the method proposed by SDC. The criticisms are discussed herein.

We are persuaded that an incentive procedure applied to Edison's coal plant operations should be adopted.

Our interest in incentives is reflected in D.92496, the final decision in the generic ECAC proceeding, Order Instituting Investigation (OII) 56:

> "In deciding the scope of ECAC we start from the basic proposition that balancing account treatment reduces the incentive to control costs by reducing the risk to the utility, by providing dollar-for-dollar recovery of reasonable costs. Thus, so long as costs are managed within the zone of reasonableness, the utility is made whole. Balancing account treatment also eliminates entirely the opportunity for the utility to profit from successfully managing expenses. For these reasons we can say unequivocally that we prefer general rate case type recovery."

We modified ECAC in several important respects to incorporate more incentives.

A procedure such as suggested by staff in this proceeding provides an opportunity to introduce meaningful incentives into utility operations. As discussed herein Edison will not only have a restored stake in its coal plant operations, but also an enhanced interest in minimizing fuel oil costs. The benefits of such a procedure far outweigh the alleged detriments.

Edison's argument that existing incentives are adequate does not recognize the nature of utility operations. The prudency test is very hard to apply to matters as complex and difficult as

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plant reliability and efficiency. Neither our staff nor third parties are equipped to evaluate utility plant operations at other than a superficial level. The "imprudency" that affects a plant today may have occurred ten years before, in the design or construction of the plant. Decisions that are inherently management's should reasonably be associated with risk and opportunity. We are encouraged enough about the advantages of an incentive procedure that we will direct our staff to proceed with similar measures for other plants of each of the utilities.

With regards to Edison's anxiety regarding investment community response, we note that the adopted method is based on a comprehensive study of coal plant operations and reflects a painstaking effort to develop a balanced procedure. The problems with the alternate - traditional ECAC treatment - are exemplified by the deferred \$35 million and the associated prudency issues discussed herein. We believe that the financial markets can understand the merits of the forward-looking incentive procedure.

Terms of the Procedure

A. Summary of SDC's Proposal

The specific procedure proposed by SDC is distilled from extensive examination and analysis of Edison's coal plant operations. The resulting formula appears intimidating but is straightforward in its application. The proposed terms are summarized as follows:

Specific standards of performance as recommended:

Mohave Units 1 and 2 (790 MW Gross) Gross Capacity Factor (GCF) 61% Gross Heat Rate (CHR) 10,250 Btu/kWh	(4-year average) (Annual average)
Four Corners Units 4 and 5 (800 MW Gross) Gross Capacity Factor (GCF) 59% Gross Heat Rate (GHR) 9,400 Btu/kWh	(4-year average) (Annual average)

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These performance standards are applied by use of a formula that converts actual unit gross heat rate and gross capacity factor to dollars of reward or penalty. A basis for imposing a maximum annual reward or penalty as well as a minimum performance deviation from the standard, below which the reward or penalty is zero, is proposed. The system also provides for "qualitative modifiers" that allow for conditions beyond the control of the utility (such as earthquakes).

The formula is set out in Appendix A.

The features of the formula include the following:

- a. The amount of reward or penalty is computed for each unit, based on these variables:
 - Unit gross heat rate for year.
 - Unit average gross capacity factor for past four years.
 - Cost of coal (\$/10⁶ Btu) for past year.
 - Cost of oil (\$/10⁵ Btu) for past year.
 - Average heat rate of oil-fired plants in Edison for past year.
 - Unit gross heat rate standard.
 - Unit gross capacity factor standard.
 - Gross maximum capacity of unit.
- b. A four-year average of gross capacity factor is used to represent unit performance, computed from the most recent four years of data. For phasing in the procedure the standard is imputed as follows:

lst year - (3 years at standard + lst year's data)/4

2nd year - (2 years at standard + 2 years' data)/4 3rd year - (1 year at standard + 3 years' data)/4

4th year - 4 years' data/4

c. A one-year average gross heat rate will be used to represent unit performance, computed for the past year.

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- d. The formula is applied annually.
- e. The incentive system should be started for each unit following its major overhaul, adjusting the start time to include 28 weeks of planned outage over the following 4 years.
- f. A "null zone" provides a band of performance about the standard to eliminate rewards or penalties for small deviations from the standard, while giving the utility some flexibility in scheduling appropriate corrective actions without severe penalty. Maximum limits establish the upper amount of reward or penalty to be assessed and ensures that the utility will receive substantial penalties for poor performance without financial jeopardy. Limit levels (based on 50% and 98% probability intervals about the standard) are as follows:

Minimum

Mohave - Gross Capacity Factor ± 3% - Gross Heat Rate ± 200 Btu/kWh Four Corners - Gross Capacity Factor ± 3% - Gross Heat Rate ± 100 Btu/kWh

Maximum

Mohave - Gross Capacity Factor <u>+</u> 10% - Gross Heat Rate <u>+</u> 1,000 Btu/kWh

Four Corners - Gross Capacity Factor ± 12% - Gross Heat Rate ± 450 Btu/kWh A.59499 ALJ/km

For performance within the minimum limits, no rewards or penalties will be assessed. When one performance measure is outside the minimum limits, the measure inside the limits will be assumed to be at the standard and a reward or penalty computed on the measure outside the standard only.

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g. Qualitative modifiers and categories of events which could occur in the future and under which the provisions of the incentive system might be temporarily suspended or modified are proposed, including:

- Regulatory constraints (e.g., environmental, safety, ratemaking).
- Labor relations (e.g., strikes, sabotage, union slowdown).
- Coal quality.
- Natural disasters (e.g., flood, earthquake, lightning).
- Catastrophic failures (e.g., boiler explosion, major fire).
- Reduced demand (e.g., unit no longer base-loaded, transmission system limitations).

Various parties object to particular features of these proposals.

B. Standards of Performance

Staff and Farm Bureau support the consultant's proposed performance standards. TURN proposes major modifications.

TURN contends that:

"The proposed gross capacity factor standards are several percentage points less than can be reasonably expected on a sustained basis, according to findings made by the consultant. <u>In the case of Four Corners, the proposed</u> <u>standard is actually less than the past</u> <u>operating performance.</u>" (Emphasis in original.)

It recommends that higher standards be imposed.

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TURN relies on SDC calculations regarding performance improvements attainable through hardware and nonhardware changes in plant operations. It argues that the proposed standards assume correction of only 60% of identified "management deficiencies," removing the incentive for Edison to correct the remaining 40%, or resulting in artificially low standards. TURN contends that:

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"Adoption of the lower standards, when in fact the plants are evidently capable of achieving the higher standards, is unjust <u>and</u> removes incentive to improve."

It proposes that the applicable capacity factor standards should be: Mohave - 63.75%, Four Corners - 61.4%.

Staff supports SDC's proposed standards. It argues that TURN's comparison of the Four Corners past performance to the proposed standard is misleading - that for the more recent five years (1975-79) the gross capacity factor was only 55.45%. Thus, the proposed standard of 59% requires a substantial improvement.

Staff points out that the higher standards proposed by TURN were considered by SDC and rejected:

"To appreciate why SDC did not utilize these ultimate standards, it is necessary to understand that some non-hardware remedies mentioned by SDC represent newest state-ofthe-art innovations. Some of them would require great expenditures of time and money and the use of computers. While some costly and computerized remedies, such as a material inventory control system and a preventive maintenance system, are to be implemented, it did not seem reasonable to SDC to base its standards on the utilization of all available non-hardware betterments."

Staff characterizes the more stringent standards "as a useful resource and checklist during any future consideration of changes in incentive system standards." Edison asserts that the standards "cannot be imposed without consideration of the costs involved in achieving the standards," quoting SDC as follows:

> "...if the standards are too high, their achievement may require added expenses, in operating and maintenance funds, exceeding the fuel cost savings realized thereby. This results not in the overall savings which the standards were designed to produce, but in an overall increase in costs."

Edison's improvements are "based upon a determination of costeffectiveness." It contends that TURN ignores this type of consideration.

Farm Bureau also supports the proposed standards. It describes TURN's proposal as based on:

"...the consultant's estimates of the maximum sustainable performance after full implementation of both hardware and non-hardware improvements. It is unreasonable to use them as a standard because not all of the non-hardware improvements can be achieved by the commencement of the incentive formula. Also, it assumes perfect implementation and continuation of management procedures which would be unreasonable to assume. Finally, it sets the standard at a level the consultant said not even the best management can exceed on a permanent basis; it would make an illusion of the concept that rewards as well as penalties should be possible."

Farm Bureau characterizes this approach as "clearly contrary to the position already expressed by the Commission that an incentive program must offer rewards as well as penalties."

We find that Farm Bureau has accurately expressed our reservations regarding TURN's position on performance standards. As discussed earlier, our intention is to adopt a procedure that balances risk and opportunity for the utility. This necessarily requires a standard that can be attained, sustained, and <u>exceeded</u>. TURN seems to have in mind something more like the original staff proposal that allowed for only penalties.

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C. Null Zone

Staff, Edison, and Farm Bureau support the "null zone" as an integral part of the incentive procedure. TURN opposes its inclusion.

TURN states that:

"The problem with the deadband is that it is <u>assumed</u> to be equitable, based on the assumption that actual performance will be equally distributed on either side of the standard, within the deadband, so that cash-flows back and forth will be equal and can therefore be equitably eliminated.

"There is, however, no reason to believe that this assumption will turn out to be true. On the contrary, judging from past history, it is far more likely that performance will be below standard than above. For continual performance below standard a net ratepayer subsidy of the utility will occur. In that case the actual effect of the deadband would be to effectively lower the standards by 3 percentage points."

TURN suggests that the null zone be postponed until operation of the procedure proves the zone equitable.

Staff defends the null zone as allowing "the utility reasonable target areas on which to base its efforts to avoid penalties and attain rewards." It characterizes TURN's objections as due to

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TURN's misconception of the purpose of the incentive procedure. Staff criticizes TURN's "facile" assumption that the plants will always operate at the low end of the null zone as "highly unlikely."

Edison supports the null zone as "clearly essential to allow the utility some flexibility in scheduling corrective actions." The null zone eliminates cash flows back and forth between the company and the ratepayer for small departures from the standard and frees the utility "to use its best judgment for making near-term improvements that would benefit the ratepayer over the long term."

We are not persuaded by TURN's argument. In fact we are confused that it can argue first, that the proposed standards are too low, then that "it is far more likely that performance will be below standard than above." Why? The "past history" is an odd reference since TURN had earlier argued that past performance exceeded the standards.

If TURN means to imply that Edison management will simply be satisfied by continued performance at the low end of the zone, this implication is rebutted by simple logic. Continued operation at the low end of the zone leaves no margin for unplanned outages.

The major benefit of the null zone is that it overcomes the short-term, long-term problem raised by Edison as an argument against an incentive procedure. It also provides a measure of safety for this first attempt at such a procedure. We caution all parties that the standards should be reexamined periodically and changed as conditions and experience indicate. However, three consecutive years of performance at the low end of the null zone would not necessarily prove that the null zone operates counterproductively. It might just as well prove that the standards are set too high.

No party has directly questioned the exact boundaries of the null zone. SDC states that "The minimum limits have been chosen at the 50% probability interval for the mean about the standard." This is a reasonable basis for setting the zone.

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Regarding the actual operation of the procedure, SDC and Edison recommend that when one of a unit's standards (gross capacity factor or gross heat rate) falls within the null zone and the other standard falls outside the null zone, the standard of performance will be imputed for the operating result falling within the null zone.

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Staff stated that it is not categorically opposed to this approach, but cautioned that such imputation would tend to reduce the penalty. We note that this approach would also tend to reduce any reward. In this decision, we adopt a weighting factor which has the effect of sharing both the penalties and rewards with the ratepayer. We see no need to adopt an additional mechanism that will lessen either the positive or negative impact of the incentives on the company. The proposal to impute a specific operating result which differs from the actual result will only serve to weaken the incentive we seek to establish. Therefore, we do not adopt the recommendation of SDC and Edison on this matter.

D. Maximum Limits

Staff supports SDC's proposed maximum limits on rewards and penalties. Edison proposes a maximum limit of \$10 million. Farm Bureau supports Edison's limit. TURN opposes Edison.

SDC's proposed limit is based on "the utility's performance at the bounds of the 98% confidence intervals about the respective standards of approximately the gross capacity factor and gross heat rate." As fuel prices increase, the incentive limit increases. In its final report SDC calculated a hypothetical limit of \$15 million for one unit of Mohave, based on reasonable assumptions regarding oil and coal prices. "As oil prices become larger relative to coal, capacity factor increases its importance relative to heat rate in determining the limit. On the other hand, if in the future the cost of energy rises more rapidly than that of oil, the heat rate contribution will increase."

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Edison argues that a maximum limit should expressed in terms of dollars, not performance. It argues that:

"...even at the lower outside performance limit of the standard, the ratepayer is benefiting from the coal-fired generation as compared to their total cost if an oil unit had been installed instead of these coal units. On this basis it does not seem prudent to allow a large positive or negative monetary adjustment to potentially occur. If instead a reasonable limit of \$10 million was established, for either positive or negative monetary adjustments, then both ratepayer and shareholder would receive potential benefit without either being substantially adversed as they could be if the limit were set too high."

Edison warns that:

"...the mere fact that an incentive is adopted without such maximum dollar limitations adopted beforehand will have a detrimental effect on the attractiveness of the Company's stock to the investment community and may very well adversely affect the Company's bond and preferred stock ratings."

Edison refers to limitations built into an incentive-type clause in Michigan as supporting its position.

Farm Bureau supports Edison. It offers several criticisms of the SDC position:

"First, the consultant's maximum limits will escalate quickly in dollar amounts if oil prices increase. Second, the penalty/reward has no relationship to Edison's financial ability to absorb its impact. Third, Staff has not evaluated the impact on Edison's cost of capital of instituting a program with a potential penalty of \$60 million. Finally, Edison's financial witness showed that if penalties were imposed as large as permitted by staff, Edison would be unable to raise capital and to construct new plant necessary to meet growing demand and to replace expensive oil fired generation."

Farm Bureau suggests there is no point imposing a penalty that hurts ratepayers as well as Edison.

Staff argues that Edison's limit is based on speculative and tentative assumptions. It characterizes Edison's proposal as only a \$5 million limit, because of tax consequences. Staff states:

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"...the real possibility of improving performance and removing from the ratepayer the entire financial risk associated with poor coal plant operation, makes the option of accepting SDC's penalty limits, as proposed, the more prudent choice at this time."

Staff observes that a fixed dollar limit is "not realistic" because of changes in the costs of fuel and suggests that "the proper time to consider fixed dollar limits is in that ECAC proceeding wherein possibly excessive penalties (or rewards) first become manifest."

TURN objects to Edison's proposed limit. It argues that if the penalty is not "significant" or "substantial", there is no incentive to improve. TURN contends that Edison's limit is actually less than the minimum penalty if each unit operated only slightly outside the null zone. It states that Edison "deserves" to pay penalties if it does not correct the identified "management deficiencies." TURN takes the example of 1979, a "bad year" for the coal plants, and calculates a penalty of only \$11 million to demonstrate that "one bad year does not cause a large penalty." It suggests that the elimination of the limit might deter Edison from postponing planned outages in order to accomplish short-term gains.

We are satisfied that SDC's proposed maximum limits are reasonable and should be adopted. We are concerned that Edison's proposal would seriously undermine the operation of the incentive procedure by greatly reducing the applicability of the formula. If one unit suffered a prolonged outage, the effect could be to exceed the limit just with that one unit, thereby rendering the procedure inoperative in regard to the other units. The procedure should provide an incentive for all realistically attainable improvements in performance. E. Fuel Costs

Staff, Farm Bureau, and TURN support SDC's proposed method of calculating fuel costs for purposes of the penalty or reward. Edison offers its own proposal.

Edison argues that:

"...rather than using a one-year average price for coal and oil, the price should represent a four-year average for purposes of calculating deviations from the capacity factor standard. Again this would tend more to quantify any penalty or reward in terms of the actual impact on the ratepayer resulting from the deviation from the standard reflecting the fact that a four-year average GCF is used in the incentive formula."

It agrees that a one-year standard is appropriate for the heat rate. Staff characterizes Edison's position as intended "to assure a lower scale of penalties." Staff argues that more current prices provide a more effective incentive and states:

> "In order to secure not only an effective economic incentive, but also a readily available monetary figure, the Staff recommends that the specific fuel cost figure utilized in an incentive calculation be the same current fuel cost being utilized for the ECAC period then under consideration."

This "simplified" calculation is consistent with the proposed heat rate price differential calculation.

Farm Bureau suggests that "current prices are a more appropriate signal to management regarding current and future decisions." It observes that neither proposal "guarantees that the exact economic effect of other-than-standard performance will be calculated." Farm Bureau "prefers" the SDC proposal "because it gives Edison the best signal of the value of maintenance expenditures."

TURN observes that Edison's proposal "results in decreased penalty (or reward) to the utility if the oil/coal price differential increases from year to year." TURN argues: "...under the proposed incentive formula one cannot separate the capacity factor effect from the heat rate effect. The effects are interdependent, as evidenced by the presence in the formula of the third term, which depends on both heat rate and capacity factor deviations." (Emphasis in original.)

Thus, it concludes that Edison's proposal does not fit into the formula and must be rejected.

We agree that more current prices are most appropriately applied to the formula. Although the four-year average is used in making the initial calculation, at any time the opportunity for improvement is immediate and prospective. The prices used should reflect this opportunity. SDC's proposed method reasonably achieves this purpose and is adopted.

F. Weighting Factor

The formula includes a "weighting factor" (WF), intended to account for the following:

- "1. Rewards and penalties are equal for comparable deviations on either side of the standard. Rewards and penalties should be shared between the rate payer and the utility.
- "2. The higher the setting of the standard capacity factor, the higher the reward for each unit of capacity factor improvement. Because it is harder to go from 65 to 67 GCF than from 55 to 57%, the reward for the improvement from a higher level should be greater. Therefore, the reward per unit of improvement should increase as the standard is set higher.
- "3. In steam plants capacity factors range from 0 to 80% and never achieve 100%. We call this level CF MAX."

The WF is the ratio of the standard to the maximum. The specific factors are: Mohave - .7625; Four Corners - .7375. Staff, Edison, and Farm Bureau support the inclusion of the WF. TURN opposes its use.

TURN again states its major premise:

"Judging from past history, we do not have to worry about the utility exceeding the standard. While TURN appreciates the CPUC Staff's concern that ratepayers share in any potential rewards, TURN is frankly far more concerned about ratepayers 'sharing' millions of dollars of penalties for which they are not responsible."

This statement is apparently based on the assumption that its own proposed standards are adopted, for if they are not, TURN warns that:

> "...then the effect of the 'Weighting Factor' would be to decrease the amount of the inequitable reward whenever the utility performed above the artifically low standard."

TURN points out that the WF apparently originated with the staff and is appropriately characterized as a policy judgment. It suggests that if the factor is adopted, it be uniform for all the plants and clearly identified as a policy judgment.

Staff states that the WF reflects its view of the object of the incentive procedure:

"...to use the threat of monetary penalties and the promise of rewards as a means of concentrating and intensifying SCE's efforts to upgrade performance at its coal stations."

within the context that:

"The Staff wants the penalty sanction to be credible and not of such a magnitude that the Commission would be reluctant to exact it for fear of crippling SCE financially."

It supports the WF as a policy judgment that equitably apportions burdens and benefits.

Edison agrees with staff on this issue. It states that one of the criteria for evaluating the incentive procedure is that "rewards and penalties on Edison must both benefit the customer base." Absent a WF, Edison argues that "the ratepayers will not benefit at all from any improvement in operating performance above the standards -

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all benefits in terms of lower fuel costs would go to the utility." Edison contends that if ratepayers should share in the benefits, they should also share in the penalties.

Farm Bureau also supports staff. While expressing some reservations regarding the stated rationale for the WF, Farm Bureau argues:


"...the desirability of some weighting factor is clear. First it cannot be said that all deviation from the standard can be blamed on or credited to management. A weighting factor effectively assigns some portion of the deviation to factors beyond management's control. The factor is also necessary to insure that customers will benefit from above-standard performance; without it, all the rewards of above-standard performance would go to the shareholders only."

Farm Bureau suggests that the amount of the factor is a matter of judgment.

We find that a WF is appropriate and that the specific factor proposed by SDC is reasonable. We can say without hesitation that this is a policy judgment intended to provide some direct sharing of rewards and penalties.

We disagree with Edison's statement that ratepayers would not benefit from rewards. Such sufficiently high performance would at least contribute positively to Edison's cost of capital, providing a real benefit, even if difficult to quantify. However, the WF allows a more direct sharing.

Sharing is appropriate because, as stated by Farm Bureau, rewards or penalties cannot necessarily be credited to or blamed on management. The adopted incentive procedure is intended to allow the possibility for penalties without imprudence proved or presumed. In this respect TURN's statement that "the utility is not liable for penalties caused by circumstances outside of the utility's control" is simply wrong.



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We make one other observation about TURN's position on this issue. It assumes that performance will be low (below 60%) if the higher standards are adopted and high (above 60%) if the lower standards are adopted. This is a compelling argument in support of the lower standards.

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G. Qualitative Modifiers

SDC proposes "qualitative modifiers" to allow for modification of the incentive procedure on account of conditions beyond the control of the utility. It cites as examples:

- a. Regulatory restraints.
- b. Stoppages due to labor disputes.
- c. Degradation of coal quality.
- d. Natural disasters, sabotage, war.
- e. Availability of cheaper baseload power.
- f. Special conditions relating to catastrophic outages.

Two methods of adjusting the incentive system are proposed. Every party apparently agrees that these factors are reasonably recognized. However, Edison proposes to go further than SDC. The other parties oppose Edison.

Edison offers a list of 12 proposed qualitative modifiers to be included in its tariff. In addition to the six proposed by SDC, Edison suggests:

- 1. Catastrophic failures.
- 2. Coal quantity restrictions.
- 3. Environmental constraints.
- 4. Reduced demand.
- 5. Restrictions imposed by other coal plant participants.
- 6. Transmission restrictions.

It would offer appropriate adjustments based on all these modifiers, to be reviewed in the ECAC proceeding. A.59499 ALJ/km/ks/el

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Staff vigorously opposes Edison. It argues that:

"A public utility's tariff is the locus for rules and terms of service as between the utility and its customers.

"Not only would the enumeration of qualitative modifiers tend to clutter up the tariff, it also would lend a false assurance to SCE about such provisions. Qualitative modifiers deal with a wide range of events that usually are beyond control. However, aside from natural disasters or events wholly attributable to nature, each instance where the qualitative modifier proviso would be invoked, would require a specific review by the Commission, within the context of an ECAC proceeding, as to how much effect should be attributed to the modifier. etc. Moreover, SDC's listing of qualitative modifiers or conditions is never presented as an exhaustive, exclusive list. Their enumeration in SDC's reports serves the useful purpose of conveying the types of events that could be 'outside utility control.' However,. 'to cast them in stone,' as it were, by enumerating them in a tariff would only raise more controversy than it would solve, since the concept is essentially generic and should not be viewed as a means of certifying just how and when the concept will be applied."

TURN and Farm Bureau agree that the tariff should not provide for such modifiers. Farm Bureau emphasizes that the burden of proof is on Edison to support any adjustments.

We find that the staff has reasonably stated the problems with Edison's proposal. The same problems exist with respect to the SDC proposal. Such modifiers as "regulatory restraints", "degradation of coal quality", and "availability of cheaper baseload power" raise serious questions. The phrase "regulatory restraints" is overbroad and could lead to endless debate in hearings. This proposed modifier also does not recognize that even some safety regulatory constraints could flow from the failure of management to take necessary remedial action. "Degradition of coal quality" is a problem within

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the control of management. Quality of coal is specified in either case. If delivered coal does not meet contract or market specifications, management should seek relief in the form of damages from the supplier. Even more important, management can exercise greater control in its acceptance of coal shipments. In order for the modifier "Availability of cheaper baseload power" to come into play, one must assume that all oil and natural gas has been backed out of Edison's supply system. Edison is primarily reliant on oil and gas today and will continue to rely significantly on these resources for at least another 15 years. There seems little value to indicating this modifier might be used in the incentives program when there is no realistic prospect of its occurrence.

A principal motivation for adopting an incentives plan is the difficulty of evaluating the prudence of the company's management of these plants. Little will have been gained if we merely shift the issue to a determination of those matters over which management could have exerted some control ... This does not mean that under no circumstances should the Commission consider the impact of events on the operation of the plants. Rather, we will not establish a procedure by which review of such events is encouraged. Instead such events must be raised on a case-by-case basis. A heavy burden of proof will rest on the proponent of a "modifying event" to show that the event was beyond the ability of management to control or foresee and that no remedial action could have been taken to mitigate the effect of the event. We shall also require any person who intends to raise the occurrence of an event as a factor in applying of the incentive plan to advise this Commission of such intent within 90 days of the occurrence of the event.

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H. Initialization

SDC's proposed phasing in of the procedure was developed in response to the following constraints:

"Include no performance data from years prior to the installation of the system.

"Do not bias the system to favor ratepayers or stockholders.

"Allow assessment of incentive in first year of operation.

"Adjust system to permit computation of incentive on a calendar year basis."

Staff supports SDC's solution. Edison proposes slight modification. TURN is strongly critical.

Edison seeks a delay in the application of the gross heat rate standard until after both units at Mohave and both units at Four Corners return to service after their scheduled overhaul or betterment outage. Edison argues that such a delay is reasonable because the standard is calculated on the basis of both units at a generating station.

Staff supports SDC's recommendation that each unit "initialize" after its major overhaul or betterment outage in the 1980-82 period. It argues that:

> "Any prolonging of the time during which performance at the standards is credited to the utility should be discouraged. Merely because the Gross Heat Rate Standard for a coal plant station is derived from a consideration of its two individual units, a delaying of the act of comparing the initial unit's actual heat rate with that standard is ill-advised, given the delayed starting dates already provided."

Farm Bureau agrees that "it would be preferable to accelerate" the impact of the incentive procedure beyond Edison's suggestion.

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We are not convinced that any further delay in the application of the procedure is required, in which case we decline to adopt Edison's proposal. We are eager to put the procedure to work, as a possible model for other power plants. Unnecessary delay simply bends the learning curve.

TURN complains about the "Start-Up Subsidy" that it says occurs because of the imputation of the standard during the initialization period. It offers a computation based on the assumption that Edison will operate the plants below the standard for the first three years as the extent of the subsidy and to demonstrate that "the utility will suffer no penalty for several years even if performance is below standard." TURN offers three alternatives:

- "1. Apply the standards retroactively.
- "2. Apply the national average retroactively.
- "3. Use a one-year average in year one, a two-year average in year two, and a three-year average in year three."

Any of these is supported as fair.

Staff and Edison oppose TURN. Staff states:

"A retroactive imputation of standards or of a national average would be patently unfair. Also ill-advised is the use of averages based only on results actually experienced. Such a methodology would tip the scales toward a reward situation for the utility since performance would likely be on an upswing for the first two years after a major overhaul outage."

Staff points out this circumstance would occur only once in the life of the procedure, to the advantage of the utility. Edison's arguments are similar.

Farm Bureau objects to the use of "only one-year" results, but states that "use of a three-year average in the third year would be an acceptable and fair method of accelerating the impact of the incentives," in order to avoid further delay. A.59499 ALJ/km /ks

We are satisfied that SDC's proposal is reasonable and should be adopted. We are not convinced that TURN's criticism has merit.

We see no point in applying the standards retroactively, except as the basis for assessing a penalty against Edison. The same result appears intended by the use of the national average. Such retroactive consideration is discussed further in that portion of this decision relating to a penalty for past performance. The use of a one-, two-, or three-year average is unnecessary and inconsistent with the underlying assumption that a four-year average is required to provide for recognition of the cyclical nature of overhaul schedules and the gradual deterioration of operating performance between overhauls.

TURN also objects to the scheduled initialization of Mohave Unit 1 - four weeks prior to the completion of the betterment outage, rather than eight weeks as provided for each of the other units. TURN argues that "if the other three units can be initialized eight weeks prior to completion of the betterment outage, then so can Mohave Unit 1." It suggests that 16 weeks might be appropriate to reflect actual downtime.

Edison argues that:

"TURN apparently fails to understand the reason for this treatment of Mohave Unit 1. The idea is to start each unit under the incentive formula upon completion of its betterment overhaul, back dated by the normal amount of time scheduled for outages. In the case of Mohave Unit 1, the normal amount of time scheduled for its overhaul in 1980 was four weeks."

The schedule reflects this "normalized" sort of treatment.

We are satisfied that SDC's proposal is reasonable. There is no suggestion that Edison prolonged the downtime. We see no basis for tilting the procedure toward a penalty at the outset. It would

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be unfair to burden Edison now for a betterment outage that was presumably scheduled without regard to the initialization of this incentive procedure. Perhaps TURN might have been able to press this point with more vigor (or might have abandoned it entirely) if it had chosen to cross-examine the SDC witness.

I. Conclusion

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The foregoing discussion reflects obvious satisfaction with the work product of the staff and SDC in this matter. This decision only hints at the wealth of technical detail provided in the record and the considerations underlying their recommendations. We are very pleased to be able to proceed to such an important task upon such a sound foundation.

VI. Deferred Fuel Costs

By D.91416 dated March 4, 1980 (modifying D.90967), this Commission provided that a portion of Edison's ECAC relief in the amount of about \$35 million should be deferred as a result of low capacity factors at its coal plants, pending a determination of the reasonableness of those capacity factors. The decision further provides that the Commission may allow recovery of all or part of the \$35 million in a future ECAC proceeding if justified by further investigation. Edison requests authority to recover the deferred \$35 million. Staff and Farm Bureau support Edison. TURN is opposed.

Edison recites the historical operation of the coal plants. It points out that its choice was between coal or oil and gas, and that the change in differential fuel costs was not foreseen at the time the plants were built. "Naturally, the economics prevailing at the time affected design concepts and the selection of equipment." If assumptions had been more accurate, greater availability and reliability could have been built in.

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It characterizes performance expectations as "overly optimistic", but considered reasonable by the industry at the time. It cites the lack of real experience with plants of comparable type and size and some of the innovative features of the facilities as circumstances contributing to the unrealistic predictions of plant performance.^{1/}

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It describes the coal plants as "highly advantageous" to the ratepayers in terms of reduced fuel costs, despite their failure to live up to original projections.

Edison offered the testimony of its Manager Steam Generation, R. S. Currie, regarding operation of Mohave and Four Corners. He discussed past maintenance programs and current maintenance and construction programs intended to increase capacity factors, as well as administrative measures taken to improve performance.

At the request of the presiding administrative law judge. Edison presented evidence regarding its expenditures at Mohave and Four Corners in excess of expenses reflected in rates. Edison showed that for the period 1976 to 1979, its share of operation and maintenance expense for these plants was \$27.1 million higher than reflected in base rates. For 1980 Edison estimated that such expenses would amount to an additional \$17.7 million, a total of \$44.8 million. For the period 1976 through 1979 Edison showed that it spent \$37 million for capacity improvement programs at Mohave and \$16 million at Four Corners.

TURN argues that past performance of the coal plant:

"...has been unreasonable both because performance has been far below the national average and, more importantly, because the consultant has found that management deficiency has caused capacity factors to average more than 6 percentage points below a reasonable level over the last 5 years."

Its allegation of management deficiency is based entirely on SDC's findings regarding management of the plants.

1/ The design goal was 90% availability factor. This was reduced to 84% in 1975 and then to 77% in 1977.

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Regarding the national average, TURN cites several different sources of net capacity factor information and concludes: "No matter how you slice it, Edison's performance has been far below national average and has resulted in many millions of dollars of replacement fuel costs." We are not persuaded of the relevance of any such comparison.

- A comparison to the national average can be useful to determine whether a prospective performance standard is being set in the proper range. We have established standards of 61% and 59% capacity factor. For plants with boilers manufactured by the same companies that manufactured the boilers in Edison's coal plants. Babcock and Wilcox and Combustion Engineering, the national average capacity factor is slightly above 56%. For all coal plants of the type at issue, the national average is 63-66%. Thus, it appears that our performance standard is in the proper range. To use the national average to impose a penalty on the company for past performance would, we believe, be grossly unfair to the company.

Regarding the alleged management deficiencies TURN admits that "the consultant has taken no position regarding reasonableness of past performance." However, it points out that the consultant has identified "deficiencies associated with planning, home office support, personnel, delays, documentation and information management, operation and management procedures, and other related items," and argues that ratepayers should not pay resulting replacement fuel costs. TURN contends that:

"...management deficiency has been cirectly responsible for decreased catacity factors at Monave and Four Corners of about 6 percentage points for the last five years." (Emphasis in original.).

It argues that an additional \$7 million should be disallowed. Edison contends that TURN distorts the record. It suggests that TURN fails to understand the method used by the consultant to derive its standards. It claims that the nonhardware programs serve to sustain performance between overhaul cycles and cannot improve performance beyond the hardware capability of the plants.

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Staff agrees with Edison that the effect of nonhardware recommendations cannot be considered apart from hardware improvements. It states that there is no evidence that if Edison were to forgo all hardware improvements, that the percentage increases in capacity factor computed by TURN could be attained by merely nonhardware improvements.

Staff also disputes TURN's equating of nonhardware improvements recommended by the consultant with imprudence. It points out that the improvements "deal with subtle areas" and argues that imprudence should not be found simply because management procedures were later judged not to have been effective.

We are not persuaded that the consultant's proposed nonhardware improvement programs support a finding of past imprudence. We are satisfied that Edison has recognized the low performance of these plants and has acted reasonably in trying to improve them. The record shows that it has expended substantial dollars unrecognized in rates to improve the plants - more than the proposed penalty. TURN supports improvements, but it offers no financing. The ratepayer is more reasonably served if the money is available to improve the plants:

TURN's position illustrates the sort of problem that supports the adoption of the incentive procedure. It keeps score of the misses but gives no credit for the effort. There is no recognition of the trial and error process over time that yielded the current set of assumed solutions. The incentive procedure frees us from this kind of hindsight.

VII. TURN'S Attorney Fees

As indicated above, TURN filed a "Request for Reimbursement" of its attorney fees and reasonable costs in this proceeding. Based on the disposition of the issues we find that TURN made no "substantial contribution" for Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1979 (PURPA) purposes as defined by our rules. Each position of TURN was either rejected or had been proposed by staff. 'Therefore its request is denied. A.59499 ALJ/km

Findings of Fact

1. Edison participates in the Mohave and Four Corners coal plants.

2. During their years of operation the Mohave and Four Corners plants have each experienced major problems that have resulted in unsatisfactory performance.

3. In Edison's ECAC application, A.58393, staff proposed that a 60% capacity factor be imputed to past performance and applied in future proceedings. Staff proposed that \$32 million be disallowed.

4. In D.90488 we declined to adopt the staff recommendation, but directed that a consultant be retained to report on Edison's coal plants as a basis for an incentive procedure.

5. By D.90967 we deferred \$35 million from Edison's requested ECAC relief pending completion of the coal plant studies.

6. SDC was retained to perform the study.

7. SDC proposed a comprehensive incentive procedure in addition to standards of performance for the coal plants.

8. Existing ratemaking procedures do not provide sufficient incentives for efficient plant operations.

9. The prudency test is very difficult to apply to matters as complex and difficult as plant reliability and efficiency.

10. An incentive procedure should provide for a balance between risk and opportunity.

11. SDC's proposed standards of performance achieve a balance between risk and opportunity.

12. A null zone built into the incentive procedure avoids the problem of short-term inducements to act contrary to long-term interests.

13. The null zone eliminates trivial cash flows back and forth for small departures from the standard.

14. The null zone should be set at the 50% probability interval for the mean about the standard.

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15. There should be no imputation of standards in the event that one of a unit's measures falls within the null zone and one falls outside.

16. The maximum limit of rewards or penalties should be set at the bounds of the 98% confidence intervals about the respective standards.

17. As fuel prices increase, the incentive limit increases.

18. A \$10 million limit would unduly restrict the application of the incentive procedure.

19. Current fuel prices relate to the immediate opportunity for plant performance improvement and should be the basis of rewards or penalties.

20. A Weighting Factor provides a basis for sharing rewards and penalties.

21. SDC's proposed Weighting Factor provides a fair basis for sharing.

22. Use of qualitative modifiers should be limited, should be subject to a heavy burden of proof, and should not be included in the tariff.

23. Unnecessary delay in initialization of the procedure is unwarranted.

24. SDC's proposed phasing-in procedure is consistent with the purpose of the incentive procedure.

25. The "national average" for performance of coal plants is useful in evaluating the proper range of a prospective standard but should not be used as a basis to penalize past performance.

26. Mohave Unit 1 is reasonably initialized based on a normal betterment outage, consistently with other units.

27. Edison's past coal plant operations have shown Edison's awareness of low performance and its willingness to try to improve capacity factors.

28. Edison has spent substantial dollars in excess of expenses reflected in base rates in its efforts to raise performance.

29. SDC's proposed nonhardware improvement programs do not support a finding of past imprudence.

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30. TURN has not made a substantial contribution to the resolution of any PURPA issue in this matter. Conclusions of Law

1. A coal plant performance incentive procedure is reasonably adopted for Edison's coal plants.

2. The procedure proposed by SDC is reasonable.

3. Edison's past coal plant operations have been prudent.

4. The effective date of this order should be the date of signature in order to proceed with implementation of the procedure.

IT IS ORDERED that:

1. Southern California Edison Company (Edison) shall incorporate into its tariffs as part of its Energy Cost Adjustment Clause (ECAC) the incentive procedure proposed by System Development Corporation in this proceeding and that in future annual ECAC review filings it shall report on the application of the procedure to its coal plants. 2. Edison may include in its ECAC balancing account the \$35 million previously disallowed as energy expenses, plus applicable interest.

This order is effective today. Dated ________, at San Francisco, California.

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APPENDIX A

Formula: $I = K_1 \Delta GCF + K_2 \Delta GHR + K_2 \Delta GCF \Delta GHR$ Where: I = Dollar amount of reward (- values) or penalty (+ values) $K_1 = \left[(CC) (GHR_5) - (CO) (GHR_0) \right] \left[\frac{\text{Period Hours}}{1000} \times GMC \times SHR \times WF \right]$ <_ = (CC) (GCF_S) | Period Hours x GMC x SHR x WF | <2 = (CC) | Period Hours x SMC x SHR x WF | Period Hours x GMC x SHR x WF = 2955 (normal year Mohave Units 1 & 2) = 2953 (leap year Mohave Units 1 \$ 2) = 2480_3 (normal year Four Corners Units = \$ 5) = 2487.5 (leap year Four Corners Units 4 & 5) GMC = Gross maximum capacity = 790 MW Mohave Units 1 & 2: 800 MW Four Corners 4 and 5 SHR = SCE share of units = _56 Mohave:= _48 Four Corners WF = Weighting factor to provide for reward sharing between rate paver and utility and to account for fact unit cannot operate at 100% gross capacity factor * CFS/CF_{MAX} * Standard GCF/upper limit of sustained CF for that type unit = $\frac{.61}{.80}$ = .7525 (Mohave); = $\frac{.59}{.80}$ = .7375 (Four Corners) (Annual Average) CC = Cost Coal (\$/105 Btu) for Unit CO = Cost Dil (\$/106 Btu) for SCE System (Annual Average) S^{HR}_{O} = Gross Heat rate for SCE oil fired plants (Annual Average) GHR_S = Gross Heat rate standard = 10,250 Btu/KWH (Mohave); = 9400 Btu/KWH (Four Corners) GCF_S = Gross Capacity factor standard = .51 (Mohave): = .59 (Four Corners) AGCF. AGHR = Variance from standard GCF and GHR; respectively

APPENDIX B Page 1

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APPENDIX C - DERIVATION AND APPLICATION OF REWARD/PENALTY AND PERFORMANCE LIMIT EQUATIONS

C.1 EXCESS FUEL COST OR SAVINGS FORMULATION


The basic relationship of excess fuel cost or savings can be formulated as follows:

Annual Fuel Cost [®]	<u>Coal Cost</u> KWH	x	Number of KWH Coal is Burned Annually	*	011 Cost KAH	x	Number of KWH Dil is Burned Annually
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There are several assumptions involved in the above relation. Namely:

- a. Fuel cost refers strictly to purchase cost of coal and oil. Goal and oil cost in dollars per KWH is directly proportional to the purchase cost in dollars per million Btu's, the proportionality constants being the average heat rates of coal and oil respectively.
- 5. The unit will only utilize coal as long as it is operating. When the unit is temporarily not operating (for whatever reason), another unit will burn oil in its place.

The above relation can now be restated as:



This can easily be put in terms of megawatt hours (MWH), since:

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Number of KWH Coal is Burned Annually	Unit Gross Capacity Factor	<u>10³ KWH</u> x MWH x	Unit Capacity (MWH)
Number of KWH Oil is Burned Annually	l - Unit Gros ≖ Capacity Factor	$\frac{10^3 \text{ km}}{\text{x} \text{ mm}}$ x	Unit Capacity ((MwH)

In mathematical notation, these concepts can be incorporated directly as follows:

 $Y = (CC)(GHR_C)(GCF) + (CO)(GHR_O)(1 - GCF) \times F_1$ (C-1)

Where:

Y	■ Average Annual Fuel Cost (Dollars)
22	=- Average Plant Cost of Coal (Dollars/105 Btu)
CO	= Average System Cost of Oil (Dollars/10 ⁵ Btu)
GCF	 Average Annual Gross Capacity Factor of Generating Unit
	\dots (0 < GCF < 1.0)
GHRC	 Average Gross Heat Rate of Coal (Btu/KWH)
GHRO	Average Gross Heat Rate of 011 (Stu/KWH)
Fl	= Factor Required to Convert from KWH to MWH and Annualize the Result = GMC $\times \frac{\text{Period Hours}}{1000}$
GMC	 Gross Maximum Generating Capacity (Megawatts)

The expression for the effect a change in gross heat rate and capacity factor (from the standards) would have on fuel costs can be obtained as follows:

Let GCF_S be the generating unit's gross capacity factor standard, and GHR_S be the gross heat rate standard for coal. Also, let Y_S be the annual fuel cost if standards GHR_S and GCF_S are achieved. Further, let Y be change in fuel cost for deviations \triangle GCF = (GCF - GCF_S) and \triangle GHR = (GHR_C - GHR_S) from the respective gross capacity factor and heat rate standards.

A.59499 /ALJ/jn APPENDIX B Page 3 System Development Corporation Then $Y_S + Y$ is the resulting fuel cost when GCF = GCF_S + GCF_s and GHR_c = GHR_s + Δ GHR_s Thus, substituting into equation (C-1):

 $Y_{S} + \Delta Y = [(CC) (GHR_{S} + \Delta GHR) (GCF_{S} - \Delta SCF) + (CD) (GHR_{O}) (1 - (GCF_{S} + \Delta GCF)] \times F_{1}$

$$Y_{S} = [(CC) (SHR_{S}) (GCF_{S}) + (CO) (SHR_{O}) (1 - SCF_{S})] \times F_{1}$$

But also:

 $\Delta Y = (Y_S^+ \Delta Y) - Y_S$

• •

So that subtracting the second equation from the first gives:

$$\Delta Y = \left\{ \begin{bmatrix} (CC) & (GHR_{\uparrow}) - (CO) & (GHR_{O}) \end{bmatrix} \Delta GCF + (CC) & (GCF_{S}) \Delta GHR + (CC) & (C$$

This can be written simply as:

$$\Delta Y = k_1 \Delta GCF + k_2 \Delta GHR + k_3 \Delta GCF \Delta GHR \qquad (C-2)$$

Where:

	ΔY	x	Change in Average Annual Fuel Cost (Dollars)
	∆ gcf	E	(GCF - GCF _S) = Average Annual Deviation in Gross Capacity Factor from the Standard ($0 < GCF_S < 1.0$)
•	∆ GHR	£	(GHR _C - GHR _S) = Average Annual Deviation in Coal Gross ⁽ Heat Rate from the Standard (Btu/KWH)

And:

$$\begin{cases} k_1 &= \left[(CC) (GHR_S) - (CO) (GHR_0) \right] \times F_1 & (C-3) \\ k_2 &= (CC) \times (GCF_S) \times F_1 \\ k_3 &= (CC) \times F_1 \end{cases}$$

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F1 Period Hours x GMC (Gross Maximum Generating Capacity in Meqawatts)

All other variables are as previously defined (also see Glossary of Symbols at end of Appendix C).

In the event both \triangle GCF < 0 and \triangle GHR>0, neither of the standards are met, and the fuel cost will be greater than if the standards had been met. Also, when both \triangle GCF >0 and \triangle GHR<0, the standards are exceeded and the fuel cost will be less than if the standards had merely been met. It is assumed that the ratio of oil cost to coal cost always exceeds the ratio of coal heat rate to oil heat rate. The case of neither standard being met will result in excessive fuel cost. The case of both standards being exceeded will result in fuel cost savings. Applying this to equations (C-2) and (C-3) gives:

 $\Delta Y > 0$ represents excessive fuel costs.

AY <0 represents savings in fuel costs.

3.2 FORMULATION OF INCENTIVE EQUATION

It is reasonable to base the incentive system of rewards and penalties on savings in fuel costs or excess fuel costs respectively, when deviations from capacity factor and heat rate standards occur. The reward/benalty equation is thus based on Equation (C-2), a linear representation of fuel cost changes, with a modification to include two weighting factors. The first weighting factor, called SHR, prorates the equation to reflect Edison's share of the 'generating unit in terms of its investment as a fraction of the total worth of the unit.

Thus:

SHR	=	0.48 (Four Corners)	
SHR	z	0.56 (Mohave)	(C-4)

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The second weighting factor reflects the fact that there is some capacity factor less than 100% (CFMAX) at which the generating unit could realistically be expected to operate, under the most optimum conditions, averaged over either a smoothing period or annually. The plant can never be expected to do better than CFMAX on a long-term average basis.

incorporating the above factors, the incentive equation is written as:

 $I = \Delta Y \times (SHR) \times (WF)$ (C-5)

Where:

:	= Dollar Amount of Reward of I - O	
1	= Dollar Amount of Penalty if I D	
Ŷ	Average Savings or Excess Fuel Cost in Dolla	rs as Given by
	Equation (C-2)	
SHR	= Edison's Prorated Share of Plant from EQ (C-	4).
wF		
CEMAX	 Maximum Capacity Factor Above Which no Coal- be Expected to Operate. Averaged Over a Long 	

It follows from Equations (C-2) and (C-5) that the incentive equation can be written as:

$$I = K_1 \Delta GCF + K_2 \Delta GHR + K_2 \Delta GCF \Delta GHR$$
(C-5)

Where:

$$\frac{K_1}{K_2} = \begin{bmatrix} CC \times GHR_5 + CO \times GHR_0 \end{bmatrix} \times F_1 \times SHR \times WF$$

$$\frac{K_2}{K_3} = CC \times GCF_5 \times F_1 \times SHR \times WF$$

$$\frac{K_3}{K_3} = CC \times F_1 \times SHR \times WF$$

and all other variables are as previously defined.

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Example: What would the reward or penalty be if. in a given four-year period. gross capacity factor drops an average of 5% (on a basis of 100) below its standard, and annual gross heat rate increases (degrades) by 1000 Btu/KWH above its standard for an 800 MW unit? Assume that:

CC	ب	Average Annual Plant Cost of Coal * (\$1.0/Btu x 10 ⁶)
CO		Average Annual System Cost of Dil = (\$5.0/Btu x 10 ⁵)
GHRS	*	Gross Heat Rate Standard for Coal = 9,500 Btu/KWH
SHRO	Ħ	Average Annual Gross Heat Rate for Oil = 10,000 Stu/XWH
GCF	×	Capacity Factor Standard = 0.60
CEMAX	4	Maximum Capacity Factor Realizable = 0.80
Share	T	Edison Share of Plant = 0.48
WE	a	$\frac{.50}{.80} = .75$
Period Hrs	=	8,750
	•	

Solution: Substitution of the above variables into EQ (C-7) gives:

K1	• • • • • • •	$[(1.0) (9.500) - (5.0) (10.000)] \times F_1 \times .48 \times .75 = -14.580 F_1$
×2	*	1.0 x .60 x F_1 x .48 x .75 = .215 F_1
к ₃	2	1.0 x Fi x .48 x .75 = .35 Fi .

$$F_1 = \frac{Period Bours}{1000} \times GMC = 8.750 \times 800 = 7008$$

The above is substituted into (C-5):

٠. I = (-14580) (7008) \$\triangle GCF + (.215) (7008) \$\triangle GHR + (.35) (7008) A GCF A GHR

From the conditions of the problem:

GCF - GCF_{S = -.05} l A GCF A GHR GHRC - GHRS = +1000 π,

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30:

 $= (-102.177 + 10^5) (-.05) + (1513.728) (1000) + (2522.88) (-.05) (1000)$

Ι

(51109 x 10⁶) + (11514 x 10⁵) - (1175 x 10⁵) = \$61497 x 10⁵

Since the result is positive (representing a measure of excess fuel cost), a penalty of S5.5 million is assessed. If cross capacity factor had increased by 5% and heat rate had improved (dropped) by 1000 Stu/KWH, a reward would have been allowed in the amount of S6.75 million instead of a penalty. reflecting a measure of fuel savings which would have been indicated by a minus sign (-) in the answer.

C.3 CALCULATION OF MAXIMUM INCENTIVE LIMITS

The incentive system provides for financial rewards or penalties based on utility performance. However, it is not desirable to permit this monetary incentive to grow without limit. The recommended approach to setting a monetary limit is based on the utility's performance at the bounds of the 98% confidence intervals about the respective standards of approximating the gross capacity factor and gross heat rate. Changes in performance at these points are put into the incentive equation. The resulting dollar values of incentive are the limits on both rewards and penalties, respectively.

<u>Example</u>: What would be the upper limit on incentive if the cross heat rate standard was 10.250 Btu/KWH and the 98% confidence interval was \pm 1000 Btu/KWH? The gross capacity factor standard is 51%, and the 98% confidence interval + 10%.

Assume also:

CC	#	Average	Annual	Plant	Cost	of Co	≈ (s	(\$1.0/8tg x 10 ⁵)
co	¥	Average	Annual	System	n Cost	of 0	41 ÷	$($5.50/3tu \times 10^5)$

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SHRO		Average Annual Gross	. Reat Rate of Dil = 10,000 Stu/K
CFMAX SHR	=		ctor Realizable + 0.80
W.		- <u>51</u> 7625	
SHC	*	*~~	ating Capacity = 790 MW
Period	Hours *		
Solution:	Substitution (C-7) gives:	of the above variab	les into the incentive equation
ĸı	= [(CC) (= [(1.00) = =.01911	GHR _S) - (CO) (GHR _O)] (10,250) - (5.50) ((F _l) x 10 ⁶	x SHR x WF x F1 10.000)] x .55 x .7525 x F1
- ^x 2	× (00) = × 00.1 =	(GCFS) x SHR x WF .51 x .56 x .7625 x	< F1 F1 = 126047(F1)
κ3	≂ Er x SH	R X WF = .4270 (F1)	
Also:		÷	
F ₁ = G	$10 \times \frac{\text{Period H}}{1000}$	$\frac{0000}{2} = 790 \times \frac{8760}{1000} = 7$	5920.4
Therefore:			
	=01911	x 5920.4 x 10 ⁶ = -10	32.249 × 105
K1 K2 K3	= .26047 ;	x 6920.4 x 10 ⁶ = -13 x 6920.4 = 1802.556 x 6920.4 = 2955.011	32.249 x 105

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The next step is to substitute these values into the incentive equation (C-6):

 $I = K_1 \triangle GCF + K_2 \triangle GHR + K_3 \triangle GCF \triangle GHR$ (C-8)

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From the conditions of the problem

△ GCF = .71 - .51 = .10 △ GHR = 9250 - 10,250 = -1000

Hence:

- $I = (-132.249 \times 10^{5}) (.10) + (1802.556) (-1000) + (2955.011) (.10) (-1000) + (-13.225 \times 10^{6} 1.803 \times 10^{6} .295 \times 10^{5})$
- $I = 15.324 \times 10^5$ in Absolute Value

Hence, for this example no reward can be earned above a limit of \$15.3 million. The dollar limit will vary from year to year, even though the performance standards remain the same, due to fluctuations in the oil cost : coal cost ratio.

The first term in the incentive equation is the contribution of the capacityfactor performance to the total incentive. The second term is the heat-rate performance contribution, while the third term is their joint product. Thus, in the above example, pure capacity-factor performance accounts for \$13.2 million out of the total \$15.3 million, which is over 35% of the incentive. In succeeding years, if coal cost rises faster than oil cost, heat rate performance will become significant in determining the dollar value of the limit.

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2, 00.1 1,000	C+10					
	G_OSSARY OF SY	MBOL S				
cc	- Average annual (dollars/105 Bt	purchase cost of coal uts)-				
со .	Average annual purchase cost of pil . (dollars/105 Btu's).					
GCF (or GCF)	Four-year Average gross capacity factor (0 <gcf<1.0).< td=""></gcf<1.0).<>					
GCFS	Gross capacity	factor standard ($0 < GCF_S < 1.0$).				
CFMAX	Maximum capaci basis.	ty factor attainable over a long-term .				
F1 ·····	Factor require annual megawat	d to convert from kilowatt hours to t hours.				
SMC	Gross maximum	generating power (megawatts).				
GHRC	Plant_average	annual coal gross heat rate (Btu/KWH).				
GHR 0	System averag	e annual gross oil heat rate (Btu/KWH).				
GHRS	Gross heat ra	ste standard (Btu/KWH).				
· I	Annual incent	tive (dollar reward or penalty).				
^k 1. ^k 2. ^k 3	Proportional average annu	ity constants in the calculation of al change in fuel costs.				
^K 1. ^K 2. ^K 3	Proportionality constants in the calculation of annual incentive.					

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GLOSSARY OF SYMBOLS (Continued)

SHR	Edison's promated share of plant.
uf.	Weighting factor used in incentive equations.
Y	Average annual fuel cost (dollars).
AGCF	Deviation in gross capacity factor from its standard (GCF - GCF _S).
△ GHR	Deviation in gross heat rate from its standard (GHR - GHR _S).
AY	Change in average annual fuel-cost (dollars).

(END OF APPENDIX E)