

**REBUTTAL TESTIMONY OF RICHARD KUPREWICZ  
EVALUATING PG&E'S PIPELINE SAFETY ENHANCEMENT  
PLAN**

**CALIFORNIA PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION  
PIPELINE SAFETY RULEMAKING  
R. 11-02-019**

**Submitted on behalf of  
THE UTILITY REFORM NETWORK (TURN)**

**By**

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1 **Rebuttal Testimony of Richard Kuprewicz**

2

3 **1) Response to DRA regarding Manufacturing Threats Decision Tree**

4 The testimony of DRA witness Rondine concerning manufacturing threats recommends that for  
5 any pipe with a post -1955 strength test, the operator conduct a fatigue analysis prior to any  
6 decision to replace. (DRA-04, p. 2 and 11).

7

8 While I am in general agreement with the thrust of Mr. Rondine's recommendation that  
9 additional testing or fatigue analysis should be performed prior to any decision to replace, I  
10 cannot concur that the existence of any post-1955 strength test is sufficient to support reliance on  
11 fatigue analysis for manufacturing threats. There should be additional information showing that  
12 the test was conducted at sufficiently high pressures to support fatigue analysis.


13

14 Low-pressure, low % SMYS, hydrotesting can leave very large imperfections in the  
15 manufactured pipe seam welds that are much more susceptible to further growth to rupture  
16 failure in a relatively short time from pressure cycling than the much smaller imperfections left  
17 in high-pressure hydrotesting. This is especially true on many gas transmission pipelines that  
18 undergo considerable variations in their operating pressure, which occurs on most gas  
19 transmission pipelines. It is a myth that gas transmission pipelines do not pressure cycle. Figure  
20 1 below is an example of a gas transmission pipeline pressure cycle spectrum (MAOP of 975

1 psig) in the public domain whose pipe ruptured from time -delayed damage many years after the  
2 damage occurred.<sup>1</sup>

3  
4

5 Figure 1: Pressure Cycling, MAOP = 975 psig



6  
7

8 The NTSB Report on San Bruno cited an important pressure cycle industry study,<sup>2</sup>

9 “the risk of pressure -cycle-induced fatigue can be dismissed if and only if the pipeline has  
10 been subjected to a reasonably high-pressure hydrostatic test. Therefore, it would seem that  
11 eliminating the risk of failure from pressure -cycle-induced fatigue crack growth of defects  
12 that can survive an initial hydrostatic test of a pipeline requires that the test pressure level  
13 must be at least 1.25 times the maximum operating pressure.”

14

<sup>1</sup> NTSB, “Texas Eastern Transmission Corporation Natural Gas Pipeline Explosion and Fire, Edison, New Jersey March 23, 1994 Addendum stamped May 18, 2001, p. 11.

<sup>2</sup> NTSB San Bruno Report p. 38; citing to John F. Kiefner and Michael Rosenfeld, “Effects of Pressure Cycles on Gas Pipelines,” prepared for: Process Performance Improvement Consultants, LLC and Gas Research Institute, September 17, 2004.

1 This NTSB citation did not mention that the cited study fatigue or pressure cycling analysis  
2 supporting the 1.25 times the maximum operating pressure was based on a hydrotest performed  
3 at a minimum test pressure of 100% SMYS.

4  
5 Accufacts concurs with fatigue or pressure cycling analysis for manufacturing threats on gas  
6 transmission pipelines only if a proper high-pressure hydrotest, usually performed at a minimum  
7 pressure of 90% SMYS, a requirement not defined in Subpart J or other federal minimum  
8 regulatory requirements related to hydrotesting of at-risk seam pipe, has been performed prior to  
9 the fatigue analysis. The minimum and maximum % SMYS for the hydrotest as well as the pipe  
10 grade, minimum toughness, diameter, thickness, as well as pressure cycle spectrum play an  
11 important role in any such fatigue analysis. Given many uncertainties associated with  
12 transmission pipelines, such fatigue analysis should incorporate very large safety margins.

13

## 14 **2) Response to UA Locals 246 and 342**

15 I strongly concur with much of the technical testimony submitted by Mr. Royce Don Deaver on  
16 behalf of the United Association of Plumbers, Pipe Fitters and Steamfitters Local Unions 246  
17 and 342 (UA Locals). However, I need to highlight two differences in our interpretation of the  
18 data.

### 19 **a) Not All EW Pipe Needs to Be Replaced**

20 Mr. Deaver discusses the safety problems associated with pre-1980 electric weld (“EW”) pipe.  
21 He first notes that “[a] pressure test to 90% of SMYS would have identified those pipes that had

1 cold weld problems, but pipes were often only tested to 75% of SMYS.”<sup>3</sup> He then discusses  
2 adequate testing levels for different Class locations, and concludes that “[i]t may be more  
3 efficient to simply replace existing EW pipe than to test it to sufficiently high levels, experience  
4 failure, and then replace the failed pipe.”<sup>4</sup>

5  
6 While I agree with much of Mr. Deaver’s testimony, I do not believe the field data support the  
7 conclusion that it is more “efficient” to go directly to replacement for EW pipe.

8  
9 I concur with Mr. Deaver’s testimony warning to avoid treating EW pipe with a seam factor of 1  
10 and his further testimony cautioning about EW failures associated with low-pressure  
11 hydrotesting to just 1.25 MAOP ratios , especially if the federal minimum ratios or test Factors  
12 are cited out of context.<sup>5</sup> I do not concur, however, with related testimony and the conclusion to  
13 replace all EW pipe. The science of EW failure has progressed considerably in the past several  
14 decades since the Office of Pipeline Safety’s issued the 1989 Report on which Mr. Deaver relies  
15 for his data analysis. Many thousands of miles of EW pipe in California , including almost two  
16 thousand miles in PG&E’s system ,<sup>6</sup> have operated decades without leak or rupture failure . EW  
17 pipe can be successful utilized provided the pipe has been high-pressure hydrotested and  
18 prudently operated . Much of the EW pipe in PG&E’s system should be able to operate m any  
19 more decades without failure, provided a high -pressure, high % SMYS , hydrotest has been

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<sup>3</sup> UA Locals Exhibit B, Testimony of R. D. Deaver, p. 14. Mr. Deaver apparently agrees with this conclusion from a Kiefner 2002 paper.

<sup>4</sup> UA Locals Exhibit B, Deaver, p. 19.

<sup>5</sup> UA Locals Exhibit B, Testimony of R. D. Deaver, pp. 14 - 15.

<sup>6</sup> PG&E’s PSEP database indicates that 46 miles (out of 185.5 miles) scheduled for Phase 1 replacement is ERW pipe, and 175.1 miles (out of 783 miles) scheduled for Phase 1 testing is ERW pipe. The Phase II work includes 1,616.5 miles (out of 4,845.9 miles) of ERW pipeline.

1 performed. Accufacts would concur with Mr. Deaver, however, that if a prudent high -pressure  
2 high % SMYS hydrotest cannot be successfully completed , the next step of replacing the EW  
3 pipe should be taken.

4

5 **b) The Number of Pipeline Incidents at Pressures Below 30% SMYS Do Not Necessarily**  
6 **Reflect Pipeline Ruptures**

7 Mr. Deaver extensively analyzes DOT incident data and concludes that about half of all  
8 “incidents” occurred at a hoop stress of less than 20% SMYS. <sup>7</sup> Mr. Deaver concludes that there  
9 should be no distinctions based on operating hoop stress, using either the 20% SMYS defining a  
10 gas transmission pipeline or 30% SMYS criteria based on pipe fracture mechanics.

11

12 I greatly appreciate Mr. Deaver’s attempt to inject real world data into this discussion. However,  
13 I would caveat his conclusions in at least two significant ways. First, as he explains in Exhibit C,  
14 the DOT “incident” data includes both leaks and rupt ures and the definition of rupture has not  
15 been well defined in such Office of Pipeline Safety databases. His Table A2 shows that for the  
16 1970-1973 data, about 38.3% of ruptures occurred at below 9 ksi hoop stress, while Table A3  
17 shows that about 54.3% of leaks occurred at below 9 ksi hoop stress. Mr. Deaver does not  
18 provide any similar break down between leaks and ruptures for the later data presented in Tables  
19 B1, B2 and C1. While some leaks are hazardous , many leaks are not. Ruptures are always very  
20 dangerous as ruptures are the high mass rate of release associated with pipe fracture mechanics  
21 causing the very high rate of gas release, such as the San Bruno failure. I would strongly caution  
22 against any decisions to replace pipe based on reported leak incidents.

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<sup>7</sup> UA Locals Exhibit B, Testimony of R. D. Deaver, p. 10.

1 While PHMSA has worked to improve its pipeline failure or incident reporting database in the  
2 past decade, it is not unusual for historical pipeline databases to be incomplete and inaccurate.  
3 These are industry numbers that cannot be audited. Accufacts has often cautioned about  
4 recognizing the limits of such historical databases. I further believe that a more fracture  
5 mechanics based analysis of the OPS/PHMSA database will support a  $n$  equal to or greater than  
6 30 % SMYS threshold for pipeline rupture dynamics.

7

8 However, I would agree with Mr. Deaver that the hoop stress should not be used as a decision  
9 criterion in the Fabrication and Construction Threats decision tree (PG&E's Step 2D). For the  
10 majority of the construction threats identified in Step 2E, the hoop stress is not a proper  
11 screening parameter.<sup>8</sup> For example, poor acetylene girth welds and other older pipe segment  
12 joining methods, in unstable soils or earthquake faults, can fully separate under external load  
13 regardless of their % SMYS level and exhibit gas release rates that technically may qualify as  
14 leaks because of the lower hoop stresses. However, such a leak would be a high mass rate of  
15 release, characteristic of a rupture mass rate of release, for such full girth weld connection or  
16 separation failures.

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<sup>8</sup> PG&E proposed IP, "Implementation Plan Pipeline Modernization Decision Tree," Attachment 3A, filed August 26, 2011.