

BEFORE THE PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION  
OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA


Order Instituting Rulemaking on the  
Commission's Own Motion to Adopt New  
Safety and Reliability Regulations for Natural  
Gas Transmission and Distribution Pipelines  
and Related Ratemaking Mechanisms.

Rulemaking 11-02-019  
(Filed February 24, 2011)

MOTION OF THE UTILITY REFORM NETWORK  
TO SET ASIDE SUBMISSION AND REOPEN THE RECORD FOR  
THE TAKING OF ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE



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November 16, 2012

**MOTION OF THE UTILITY REFORM NETWORK  
TO SET ASIDE SUBMISSION AND REOPEN THE RECORD FOR THE  
TAKING OF ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE**

Pursuant to Rule 13.14(b), the Utility Reform Network (TURN) submits this Motion to Set Aside Submission and Reopen the Record in order to take into evidence a portion of the October 2, 2012 Reporter's Transcript of PG&E's oral testimony in the Joint Evidentiary Hearings conducted in I.12-01-007 and I.11-02-016 concerning valve automation. This portion of the transcript, including pages 194-214 of the joint evidentiary hearing transcript, is attached as Appendix A.

TURN explains below how this evidence, which was unavailable prior to the submission of the record on May 31, 2012, constitutes admissions by PG&E witnesses concerning the response times of remote controlled valves (RCVs) and automatic shut-off valves (RCVs). These admissions are directly relevant to the scope of the valve automation program proposed in R.11-02-019, and specifically to the choice between RCVs versus ASVs, which was a primary issue in dispute.

NATURE AND RELEVANCE OF EVIDENCE

The evidence consists of the oral testimony, in response to cross-examination by Ms. Strotzman from the City of San Bruno, of PG&E expert witnesses Kazimirsky and Slibsager. These witnesses submitted testimony in Investigation 11-12-007 concerning "PG&E's SCADA System and the Milpitas Terminal." Mr. Slibsager is the Manager of Gas System Operations, and has been with PG&E for 29 years. Mr. Kazimirsky is a Principal Engineer in charge of SCADA and Controls Group, and has been with PG&E for over 32 years.

During cross examination, these witnesses (primarily Mr. Slibsager) discussed the differences between RCVs and ASVs and the amount of time required to initiate closure of these valves by a control room operator (RCV) or an automated signal (ASV). Of particular relevance are pages 201, 202 and 206 of the Reporter's Transcript; however, TURN submits the entire 20-page section of cross-examination by Ms. Strottman (2 RT 194 to 2 RT 214) for completeness.

Mr. Slibsager testified that depending on the amount of SCADA information they were receiving, a control room operator would initiate closure of an RCV in "as short as 25 or 30 minutes and as, you know, as long as maybe an hour and a half." Mr. Slibsager further explained that given the conditions on September 9, 2010, a gas control operator might never have initiated closure without on-site assistance.

PG&E has proposed its automated valve program in this proceeding as a tool to achieve gas flow shut-off within 30 minutes of a rupture. Mr. Slibsager's testimony is directly relevant to assessing the efficacy of using RCVs, rather than ASVs, to accomplish this goal. In particular, Mr. Slibsager's testimony is directly relevant to the testimony PG&E submitted in this proceeding contending that gas shut off after a rupture can be achieved with an RCV within 30 minutes.<sup>1</sup>

The choice between RCVs and ASVs is no small matter. It is the primary issue in dispute concerning the scope of PG&E's valve automation program.

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<sup>1</sup> See, Exh. 1, p. 4-24, Menegus/PG&E.  
TURN Motion to Reopen 2  
R.11-02-019  
November 16, 2012

WHY EVIDENCE WAS NOT PREVIOUSLY ADDUCED

The record in this proceeding was submitted on May 31, 2012. The oral testimony in the Joint Evidentiary Hearings in I.12-01-007 and I.11-02-016 was taken on October 2, 2012, more than four months after submission of the record in this proceeding. The Proposed Decision in this proceeding was issued on October 19, 2012. TURN is moving for the admission of this evidence, which we have cited in our comments on the Proposed Decision.

November 16, 2012

Respectfully submitted,

By: \_\_\_\_\_/s/\_\_\_\_\_

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**Appendix A:**

Joint Evidentiary Hearing in I.12-01-007 / I.11-02-016

October 2, 2012

2 RT 194-214

1 MS. STROTTMAN: Yes, thank you.

2 CROSS-EXAMINATION

3 BY MS. STROTTMAN:

4 Q Good afternoon. My name is Britt  
5 Strottman and I represent the City  
6 of San Bruno.

7 Can you hear me?

8 WITNESS KAZIMIRSKY: A Yes.

9 WITNESS SLIBSAGER: A Yes.

10 Q So I am going to ask you a few  
11 questions about your automated valve program  
12 and automated valves in general. So to whom  
13 should I direct that question -- those  
14 questions to?

15 WITNESS KAZIMIRSKY: A I guess it  
16 depends on the question.

17 Q Well, I'll direct turn your  
18 attention to page 8-17 of your testimony,  
19 lines 12 through 14. Who could speak to  
20 that?

21 WITNESS SLIBSAGER: A I think I would  
22 speak to that.

23 Q Okay. Can you please take a minute  
24 just to read it?

25 A Then that was, I'm sorry, lines 12  
26 through 14?

27 Q Lines 12 through 14.

28 A (Reviewing document) Okay.

1           Q    So it says PG&E has embarked on an  
2 aggressive program to increase SCADA  
3 visibility and control capability on its  
4 transmission pipelines, focusing on the most  
5 densely populated areas in our service  
6 territory; is that correct?

7           A    That is correct.

8           Q    So does this aggressive program,  
9 quote, unquote, aggressive program include  
10 the automated valve program you testified to  
11 later on?

12          A    That is what it's referring to,  
13 yes.

14          Q    Is the program aggressive because  
15 of the problems PG&E had with its control  
16 capabilities on September 10, 2010?

17          MR. WEED:  Objection, assumes facts not  
18 in evidence.

19          MS. STROTTMAN:  Your Honor, I don't  
20 think it assumes.  I'm just asking a question  
21 if the aggressive program is because of  
22 the problems from September 10th.

23          ALJ WETZELL:  Overruled.

24          MS. STROTTMAN:  I'm sorry.  
25 September 9.

26          WITNESS SLIBSAGER:  So I think it's  
27 actually a response to process improvement  
28 related to the events of September 9th that

1 PG&E has been moving forward on and has been  
2 a recommendation by the National  
3 Transportation Safety Board that's been  
4 issued to PG&E and the industry.

5 Q So is that a yes to my question?

6 A Well, those are the activities  
7 we're undertaking as a result of those  
8 process improvements. I'm --

9 Q To answer my question --

10 A So --

11 Q -- is the program aggressive  
12 because of what happened on September 9,  
13 2010?

14 A In response to it being a process  
15 improvement to what occurred, yes.

16 I'm not sure I understand  
17 the question. I mean, aggressive -- I mean  
18 it's process improvement related to  
19 the incident and the accident that happened  
20 on September 9, 2010.

21 Q So the program -- I'm using your  
22 words, an aggressive program.

23 A That's right. Installation of this  
24 number of valves and this amount of work is  
25 really quite, quite large.

26 Q And it's because of the events of  
27 September 9, 2010?

28 A In respect of it being process



1 improvements associated with that event, yes.

2 Q I'm sorry. I don't think you're  
3 answering my question. I'm sorry. I'm  
4 asking --

5 A Well, we undertook this activity as  
6 a result of our -- of the NTSB  
7 recommendations and PG&E's review of  
8 the incident and installing these valves as  
9 part of the our PSEP program.

10 Q Is the program labeled aggressive  
11 because of the problems PG&E had with its  
12 control capabilities?

13 A Maybe I misunderstood then. I  
14 think aggressive, it's such a large amount of  
15 work that's being done in such a short period  
16 of time.

17 Q Okay. So could you please explain  
18 to me in layman's terms how an automated  
19 valve with an automated capability works?

20 A An automatic valve with automatic  
21 capability, installing an automated valves  
22 that have both either automatic or remote  
23 capability.

24 The automatic function is intended  
25 to be a functionality we're using where we  
26 have the pipeline crossing earthquake faults  
27 and the automatic nature of it, it will  
28 actually activate and close the valves based

1 on thresholds and triggers without operator  
2 intervention in my control room.

3 Q What other triggers besides  
4 earthquakes?

5 A It's increased flow through  
6 the pipeline that may signify that a pipeline  
7 is ruptured or broken as a result of  
8 an earthquake occurring.

9 Q And could you please explain to me  
10 in layman's terms how an automated valve with  
11 a remote control capability works?

12 A It would be a valve in my control  
13 room. It would be actually operated by my  
14 control room, meaning that my control room  
15 operators would send a signal to open or  
16 close the valve.

17 Q So how do you make the decision to  
18 place -- or how does PG&E make the decision  
19 whether to place an -- can I call it an  
20 automatic or automated valve with automatic  
21 capability an ASV?

22 A Yes.

23 Q Is that fair?

24 A That's fine.

25 Q Can I call an automated valve with  
26 remote control capability an RCV?

27 A That would work.

28 Q So how does PG&E make the decision

1 to place an ASV or an RSV on a line?

2 A The ASVs were determined as  
3 a result of the fault process and the thought  
4 that if there were an earthquake that we  
5 would want a quick shutoff of those pipelines  
6 without intervention from the control room to  
7 make that happen. And the RCVs were intended  
8 to be a decision made in the control room to  
9 close those valves.

10 Q So that an RCV, you said a control  
11 room operator makes the decision to close --

12 A That's right.

13 Q -- the valve?

14 A (Nods.)

15 Q And what training does that control  
16 room operator have in making that  
17 determination?

18 A One of the operator OQs or operator  
19 qualifications my operators hold is  
20 the remote operation of valves. So they are  
21 trained on how to use the SCADA system to  
22 make that control valve close based on  
23 analysis of upstream and downstream  
24 conditions relative to the pipeline  
25 conditions. So it's an operator  
26 qualification that they hold that allows them  
27 to do that.

28 Q So does the control room operator

1 have to check in with the supervisor to make  
2 that decision?

3 A The senior transmission coordinator  
4 on shift is a control room operator that's  
5 there 24 by 7, part of my control room staff  
6 has the authority to issue those orders and  
7 have the control room operators activate  
8 those valves to close.

9 Q So if there was an RSV on Line 132  
10 placed upstream from the break in Segment  
11 180, how long would it have taken to shut off  
12 the gas?

13 A So a remote control valve if it had  
14 existed, it would have, the time it would  
15 have taken to make the decision would have  
16 depended on the amount of information the  
17 operator could have gleaned from the SCADA  
18 system before they made that decision.

19 So I don't have precise answer in  
20 the respect of they didn't exist on  
21 September 9. As we are installing these  
22 across our system, we're adding a number --  
23 great number of these, 220 of them in  
24 the first phase between now and 2014. So  
25 with that comes a lot of increased  
26 visibility.

27 So, it's hard for me to give you  
28 a precise number but I mean the actual

1 activation of the valve once the person sends  
2 the signal is about two to five minutes. But  
3 it's all about the analysis and the amount of  
4 data they have available to them to make that  
5 decision to send the signal. That would  
6 require time.

7 Q Could you give me a range?

8 A You know, every situation's  
9 different. Depends on how much information  
10 they're getting. But I mean I think it could  
11 be -- it could be I think as short as 25 or  
12 30 minutes and as, you know, as long as maybe  
13 an hour and a half. Depends on the amount of  
14 information they're getting to make that  
15 decision.

16 Q And what about an ASV. What if an  
17 ASV was placed upstream from the break in  
18 Segment 180, how long would it have taken to  
19 turn off the gas?

20 A ASV automated -- actuated  
21 automatically so it would have closed as soon  
22 as it got the signal from the valve.

23 Q So it's fair to say that if an ASV  
24 was on Line 132, the gas would have been cut  
25 off right away?

26 A Providing the valve operated  
27 appropriately as it was designed to, yes.

28 Q And what about an RCV?

1           A    That's back to the answer I gave  
2 a minute ago.  Depends on how much analysis  
3 and how quickly my folks could have  
4 assimilated information.  And based on  
5 the level of information they received on  
6 that day, I think it would have taken them  
7 a considerable amount of time to make  
8 the decision to close that valve.

9           Q    Wouldn't a prudent operator install  
10 an RCV to shut off the gas in an event of  
11 a catastrophic failure?

12          A    Remotely controlled valve?

13          Q    Yes.

14          A    Well, PG&E had at the time over 300  
15 remotely controlled valves in their system.  
16 We just didn't have one at that location.

17          Q    So is it your answer then that --  
18 so I guess the answer to my question wouldn't  
19 a prudent operator install an RCV to shut off  
20 the gas in a high pressure gas line like Line  
21 132 an event of a catastrophic failure?

22          MR. WEED:  Objection.  It's an  
23 incomplete hypothetical, calls for  
24 speculation.

25          MS. STROTTMAN:  I don't think it does.  
26 We can just say the hypothetical is the exact  
27 situation of what happened on September 9,  
28 2010, which I'm sure you're familiar with.

1           MR. WEED:  It's still objectionable as  
2  it's just those two valves or is it every  
3  valve on 5000 miles of pipe or --

4           MS. STROTTMAN:  Segment 180.

5           MR. WEED:  -- which is it?

6           MS. STROTTMAN:  Q  Actually, just Line  
7  132.

8           WITNESS SLIBSAGER:  A  Well, PG&E like  
9  I said, we had over 300 remotely controlled  
10 valves on the system.  So we actually over  
11 time, we installed them where we thought it  
12 was prudent and necessary, and that's just  
13 the process we've had in place.

14                        So I think we've been doing  
15 the prudent thing by installing them as we  
16 retrofitted facilities and as we saw need for  
17 them.  Just didn't -- we did not have them at  
18 that location on September 9.

19           Q  And is it fair to say that a fire  
20 fueled by gas makes the fire more dangerous?

21           A  I'm not sure I know that.

22           Q  You do not know that?

23           A  Well, I mean --

24           Q  A fire fueled by gas, doesn't that  
25 make a fire more dangerous?

26           A  That's something else.  I'm --

27           Q  Is a fire fueled by gas a dangerous  
28 situation?

1 A Of course, yes.

2 Q And that can contribute to property  
3 damage; correct?

4 A Yes, of course.

5 Q And put people's lives at risk;  
6 correct?

7 A Yes, it could.

8 Q And if I could please direct your  
9 attention to it's CPSD-9 which is the NTSB  
10 report. Do you have that with you?

11 A The NTSB report?

12 Q Yes. Sorry.

13 A So did you give us a page number?

14 Q Yes. It's small Roman numeral X.  
15 Top of the page it says Executive Summary.

16 A Okay.

17 Q If you could please read to  
18 yourself the first line and the last  
19 paragraph. It starts with "However."

20 A (Reading document).

21 Q I'll just read it out loud: .  
22 However, PG&E took 95 minutes to stop  
23 the flow of gas and to isolate  
24 the rupture site, a response time that  
25 was excessively long and contributed to  
26 the extent and severity of property  
27 damage and increased the life-  
28 threatening risk to the residents and



1 emergency responders.

2 Do you agree with that statement  
3 from the NTSB in the Executive Summary?

4 A So, I'm not sure I agree that it  
5 was an excessive long period of time that it  
6 took us to shut off the flow of gas. But  
7 I guess I agree that had it been shut off  
8 faster, that potentially some of those things  
9 would not have happened.

10 Q If I can could please have you look  
11 at page 125. And it's NTSB finding No. 13,  
12 the first finding -- well, it's the first  
13 paragraph on page 125.

14 A It's you said No. 13?

15 Q Yes.

16 A (Reviewing document) Okay, I read  
17 it.

18 Q And that states:  
19 Use of automatic shut-off valves or  
20 remote control valves along the length  
21 of Line 132 would have significantly  
22 reduced the amount of time taken to  
23 stop the flow of gas and to isolate  
24 the rupture.

25 Do you agree with that finding?

26 A Not in respect to remote control  
27 valves because I think remote control valves  
28 still would have taken the operator's

1 analysis to make a decision to activate those  
2 remote control valves.

3 I'm not so sure looking at what  
4 transpired on that day that they would have  
5 had enough knowledge to have done that or how  
6 fast they would have been able to do that.

7 Q But you agree that the automatic  
8 shut-off valves would have significantly --  
9 the use of it would have significantly  
10 reduced the amount of time taken to stop  
11 the flow of gas and to isolate the rupture?

12 A No, not -- I think that that's  
13 a conclusion one could draw, but I think it  
14 depends on how they were set, what thresholds  
15 were automated into the valves to send  
16 the signals to shut them off, and whether  
17 the valves acted properly on that day, if  
18 they actually existed. ]

19 Q If they hadn't worked properly?

20 A Well that, and if they had been,  
21 you know, programmed properly. I mean, you  
22 know, an automatic shutoff valve would  
23 activate based on the amount of flow it was  
24 registering, something about a threshold. It  
25 would have had to have been programmed  
26 correctly and designed correctly.

27 Q Assuming they worked properly,  
28 designed -- were designed properly, would

1 that ASVs have reduced the amount of time  
2 taken to stop the flow of gas?

3 WITNESS KAZIMIRSKY: A This location  
4 was not suitable for the ASV, because the  
5 automatic shutoff valve would need to detect  
6 the rupture in line. So far up to now  
7 technology for that is not really reliable.  
8 Technology is not available. That is why we  
9 installed the automatic valve only at the  
10 fault lines. Location like San Bruno would  
11 call for -- would be more for remote control  
12 valve, not automatic valve. Remote control  
13 valve, like Keith said, would still require  
14 operator involvement to make decision to  
15 close the valve.

16 Q So I guess I don't understand why  
17 an ASV is not, could not be properly placed  
18 in San Bruno. Could you please explain that?

19 A Because the ASV, the valve that  
20 could close automatically without any human  
21 intervention, would require exact means of  
22 detecting line rupture. And currently there  
23 is no reliable technology available for such  
24 application. For the earthquake faults the  
25 technology is available. Valve can detect  
26 the earth movement. Sensors can detect earth  
27 movement or acceleration, and they can act  
28 upon that. On a straight line like we have

1 in San Bruno, the technology is not reliable.

2 Q Does PG&E have any plans to place  
3 an RSV on Line 22?

4 A We have. We already implement it.  
5 We already have several valves on Line 132.

6 Q How many?

7 WITNESS SLIBSAGER: A We've installed  
8 50 of these remote control -- approximately  
9 50 in our system. The majority of those have  
10 been on the San Francisco Peninsula.

11 Q But no, you have not installed any  
12 ASVs on Line 132?

13 A You know, I don't know the answer  
14 to that. They are in the -- they are in the  
15 automated valve program wherever we have  
16 fault crossings on the Peninsula. I don't  
17 know if they've been installed at this time.

18 Q Do you know how I can find that  
19 out?

20 WITNESS KAZIMIRSKY: A How to find it  
21 out?

22 Q How to find out that information  
23 and --

24 A That information is available; but  
25 not here, not now.

26 Q Do you know from whom?

27 A Probably from the Pipeline Safety  
28 Enhancement Program.

1           Q    So if I could please direct your  
2 attention to the CPSD report that has been  
3 marked 1. Do you have that in front of you?

4           A    I believe it is the testimony?

5           Q    Yes.

6           A    1 is probably the very beginning of  
7 it?

8           Q    I'm sorry, I just have one more  
9 question to ask you about RSVs. Assuming all  
10 the facts that SCADA had on September 9th,  
11 had there been an RSV upstream of Segment  
12 180, Line 132, how long would it have taken  
13 to taken shut off the flow of gas?

14           WITNESS SLIBSAGER: A So is your  
15 question how long would it have taken my  
16 operators to analyze the situation to shut  
17 off the flow of gas?

18           Q    Yes. Assuming all the facts that  
19 SCADA had on September 9th, yes.

20           A    I don't have a precise answer. It  
21 probably would have taken as long as having  
22 somebody on site to tell us the precise  
23 location of the line break to understand  
24 which valve to actually upstream and  
25 downstream of the break.

26           Q    So then somebody would have to be  
27 onsite?

28           A    At least to allow us to understand

1 precisely where the break was in the system.

2 Q And I'm sorry, why is that?

3 A Because then we would have to know  
4 the proximity of the nearest upstream and the  
5 nearest downstream valve to that location.

6 Q Is that common practice within  
7 PG&E?

8 A That is what we really were doing  
9 that day when we were dispatching our  
10 employees, our field employees to go out  
11 there and be our eyes and ears. Because we  
12 didn't have that information available to us  
13 on SCADA.

14 Q So I'm sorry, if I could have you  
15 go back to the CPSD report, page 167. It has  
16 been marked 1.

17 A It is 167?

18 Q Yes, CPSD Recommendation No. 27.

19 A That is in regards to RCV  
20 performance study.

21 Q Yes, did you have a chance to read  
22 it?

23 A Yes, I did.

24 Q So just for the record it says,  
25 it's Recommendation No. 27:

26 RCV/ACV- PG&E should  
27 perform a study to provide  
28 Gas Control with a means of

1           determining and isolating  
2           the location of a rupture  
3           remotely by installing  
4           RCVs, ASVs, and  
5           appropriately spaced  
6           pressure and flow  
7           transmitters on critical  
8           transmission line  
9           infrastructure and  
10          implement the results.

11          Did I read that correctly.

12          A    Yes.

13          Q    Has PG&E performed that study?

14          A    That is the study I referred to  
15          earlier this morning that we are performing  
16          at this point in time.

17          Q    How long -- I assume you can't tell  
18          us any conclusions yet to that study?

19          A    I really can't. It is looking at  
20          basically the spacing of our transmitters to  
21          determine the effectiveness of the tool, to  
22          whether it can tell us -- what site it could  
23          tell us had occurred. At this point I don't  
24          have the results back.

25          Q    Excuse me, one minute.

26          MS. STROTTMAN: Thank you, I have  
27          nothing further.

28          ALJ WETZELL: Mr. Yang.

1           MR. YANG: No questions for these  
2 witnesses, your Honor.

3                           EXAMINATION

4 BY ALJ WETZELL:

5           Q I have just one question to  
6 follow-up on the very last question asked by  
7 Ms. Strottman regarding Recommendation 27  
8 that we just looked at.

9                           You mentioned that -- you talked  
10 about this morning a study that PG&E is  
11 conducting. Does that study include whether  
12 to install ASVs?

13           WITNESS SLIBSAGER: A The study is  
14 actually to look at the use of leak detection  
15 on the system to pinpoint where a leak would  
16 have occurred so then we could effectively  
17 use RSVs on our system.

18           Q I guess I would follow-up on the  
19 question she asked. Is PG&E or has PG&E  
20 performed a study with regard to ASVs?

21           A So the whole -- I mean it is sort  
22 of the premise of the whole PSEP program with  
23 automated valves. It is that response to  
24 PG&E's effort to install those ASV and RCVs  
25 on system. We are embarked upon a program to  
26 install 20 of them so we make that  
27 determination to do that in the Class 3,  
28 Class 4 locations which are the highly



1 populated areas.

2 ALJ WETZELL: Thank you. Redirect?

3 MR. WEED: Nothing really. Just one  
4 question to follow up on Recommendation 27.

5 REDIRECT EXAMINATION

6 BY MR. WEED:

7 Q If I understand correctly,  
8 Mr. Slibsager, PG&E has installed numerous  
9 RSVs and ASVs; is that correct?

10 WITNESS SLIBSAGER: A That is correct.

11 Q And that is related to  
12 Recommendation 27?

13 A Yeah, through our PSEP program.

14 MR. WEED: Thanks.

15 ALJ WETZELL: Anything further on that  
16 one question?

17 MR. REIGER: One point, your Honor.

18 RECROSS-EXAMINATION

19 BY MR. REIGER:

20 Q Prior to installing the -- you make  
21 the decisions for these installations based  
22 upon on a study or plan?

23 WITNESS SLIBSAGER: A The PSE Project  
24 performed those analysis, and they make a  
25 decision on how we would actually implement  
26 the -- the precise locations of the valves we  
27 would actually automate and the distance in  
28 spacing between them. So I would have to

1 rely on their expertise how we made that  
2 decision.

3 MR. REIGER: Thank you, your Honor.

4 MS. STROTTMAN: Your Honor, I'm sorry.  
5 Now I have a question.

6 RECROSS-EXAMINATION

7 BY MS. STROTTMAN:

8 Q Just going back the RSVs, if you  
9 had to dispatch somebody to be onsite, why  
10 bother even having a RCV?

11 MR. WEED: Objection, beyond the  
12 redirect.

13 ALJ WETZELL: I have to agree.  
14 Sustained.

15 There being nothing further, that  
16 completes your testimony. You are excused.  
17 We will go off the record.

18 (Recess taken)

19 ALJ WETZELL: We are on the record.

20 Ms. Jordan, you may call PG&E's next  
21 scheduled witness.

22 MS. JORDAN: Thank you, your Honor. At  
23 this time we call Mr. David Harrison to the  
24 stand.

25 ALJ WETZELL: Thank you, Ms. Jordan.

26 DAVID HARRISON, called as a witness  
27 by Pacific Gas and Electric Company,  
28 having been sworn, testified as  
follows:

**Appendix B:**

Statement of Qualifications of Mark Kazimirsky

Statement of Qualifications of Keith Slibsager

Reproduced from Testimony in I.12-01-007

1                                   **PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY**  
2                                   **STATEMENT OF QUALIFICATIONS OF MARK KAZIMIRSKY**

3    Q 16    Please state your name and business address.

4    A 16    My name is Mark Kazimirsky. My business address is Pacific Gas and  
5            Electric Company, 375 North Wiget Lane, Walnut Creek, California.

6    Q 17    Briefly describe your responsibilities at Pacific Gas and Electric Company  
7            (PG&E).

8    A 17    I am a Principal Engineer in charge of the Supervisory Control and Data  
9            Acquisition (SCADA) and Controls Group in the Gas Transmission  
10           Engineering department.

11   Q 18    Please summarize your educational and professional background.

12   A 18    I have an engineering degree in Electromechanical Engineering from the  
13            Institute of Technology, Odessa, Ukraine. I have been with PG&E for over  
14            32 years in various engineering and management positions. I have  
15            extensive experience in gas system operations, SCADA, control systems  
16            and automation technologies for the natural gas industry.

17   Q 19    What is the purpose of your testimony?

18   A 19    I am jointly sponsoring Chapter 8.A.-F.3., PG&E's SCADA System and the  
19            Milpitas Terminal, with Keith Slibsager.

20   Q 20    Does this conclude your statement of qualifications?

21   A 20    Yes.

1                                   **PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY**  
2                                   **STATEMENT OF QUALIFICATIONS OF KEITH SLIBSAGER**

3    Q 36    Please state your name and business address.

4    A 36    My name is Keith Slibsager. My business address is Pacific Gas and  
5            Electric Company, 77 Beale St., San Francisco, California.

6    Q 37    Briefly describe your responsibilities at Pacific Gas and Electric Company  
7            (PG&E).

8    A 37    I am a Manager in the Gas System Operations department. I have  
9            responsibility for the gas control room operations including the remote  
10           monitoring and controlling function of the pipeline and management of the  
11           natural gas pipeline inventory.

12   Q 38    Please summarize your educational and professional background.

13   A 38    I have a Bachelor of Science degree in Agriculture/Plant Science from  
14            California State University of Fresno. I have worked at PG&E for 29 years,  
15            holding various positions of increasing responsibility in gas operations.

16   Q 39    What is the purpose of your testimony?

17   A 39    I am jointly sponsoring Chapter 8.A-F.3., PG&E's SCADA System and the  
18            Milpitas Terminal, with Mark Kazimirsky.

19   Q 40    Does this conclude your statement of qualifications?

20   A 40    Yes.