Docket No.: <u>R.12-03-014</u>

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Date: September 30, 2013

Witness: William A. Monsen

TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM A. MONSEN ON BEHALF OF THE INDEPENDENT ENERGY PRODUCERS ASSOCIATION CONCERNING TRACK 4 OF THE LONG-TERM PROCUREMENT PLAN PROCEEDING

Table of Contents

I.	Introduction and Summary of Testimony	1
П.	Overarching Policy and Planning Recommendations	8
Α.	For local reliability assessment, a conservative approach such as that proposed	
by	V CAISO is appropriate	9
В.	The Commission should encourage competition among resource types to ensure	
rat	tepayers receive the lowest-cost service consistent with reliability and policy goals.	
~	31	
С.	Even though assumptions will change over time, the Commission should not pu	t
cu	istomer reliability at risk by delaying procurement of critical resources	5
D.	. The Commission should reject the IOUs' site banking proposals in this	
pro	anarray parks	5
at TTT	Pagnonse to Opening Testimony	2 N
Δ	Response to the CAISO's Opening Testimony 4) N
R	Response to SCE's Opening Testimony 4	3
8 No. 1	1. Additional procurement is needed but SCE's proposal is too conservative4	6
	2 The Living Dilot is Untested and Dislay. The Commission Should Cive it	
	2. The Living Pilot is Unlested and Kisky. The Commission Should Give it	0
	Little weight	3
	3. Contingent contracting/options)
С.	Response to SDG&E Opening Testimony	2
	1. SDG&E's Interim Procurement Request is too Low	4
	2. SDG&E Should Supplement its Proposal With Cost Data	7
IV.	Conclusion	3

Table of Tables

Table 1 – Uncommitted Resource Assumptions (MW) 14
Table 2 – Past Transmission Projects 20
Table 3 - Potential Schedules for Procurement and Construction of Generation and
Transmission Projects
Table 4 – SCE Local Capacity Requirements RFO Schedule for Track 1 Procurement27
Table 5 - Recommended Phase 1 Procurement for Track 4 (MW)
Table 6 - Recommended Procurement by Resource Type (MW) 30
Table 7 - CAISO Estimate of Resource Need in SONGS Study Area
Table 8 - SCE-Identified Resource Need
Table 9 - SDG&E Modeling Results 53

I.

Introduction and Summary of Testimony

3 Q. Please state your name and business address.

A. My name is William A. Monsen. I am a Principal and Executive Vice-President at
MRW & Associates, LLC (MRW). My business address is 1814 Franklin Street,
Suite 720, Oakland, California.

7

8 Q. Please describe your professional background.

9 I have been an energy consultant with MRW since 1989. During that time, I have Α. 10 assisted independent power producers, electric consumers, financial institutions, 11 and regulatory agencies with issues related to power project development, project valuation, purchasing electricity, and regulatory matters. I have directed or 12 13 worked on projects in a number of states and regions in the United States, 14 including California, Oregon, Colorado, New England, Wisconsin, and Nevada. Prior to joining MRW, I worked at Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E). 15 16 At PG&E, I held a number of positions related to energy conservation, forecasting, electric resource planning, and corporate planning. I hold a Bachelor 17 18 of Science degree in engineering physics from the University of California at Berkeley and a Master of Science degree in mechanical engineering from the 19 University of Wisconsin-Madison. Additional 20 information about my qualifications is provided in Attachment A. 21

1	Q.	On whose behalf are you testifying?
2	А.	I am submitting testimony on behalf of the Independent Energy Producers
3		Association (IEP).
4		
5	Q.	What is the purpose of Track 4 in this proceeding?
6	А.	Track 4 was added to this Long-Term Procurement Plan (LTPP) proceeding in
7		May 2013 to address the local reliability impacts in the service areas of Southern
8		California Edison Company (SCE) and San Diego Gas & Electric Company
9		(SDG&E) in the event that Units 2 & 3 of SCE's San Onofre Nuclear Generating
10		Station (SONGS) were to remain offline for an extended period of time. ¹ On June
11		7, 2013, SCE announced that it was permanently retiring SONGS 2 & 3. At that
12		point, the focus of Track 4 changed from evaluating a hypothetical long-term
13		outage to responding to the actual shutdown of SONGS 2 & 3 and determining
14		the need for long-term resources to replace SONGS 2 & 3.
15		
16	Q.	Were local capacity requirements considered previously in this proceeding?
17	А.	Yes. In Track 1 the Commission authorized SCE to procure local capacity in two
18		local reliability areas (LRAs): 1,400 – 1,800 MW in the Los Angeles Basin Local
19		Reliability Area (LRA) and 215 – 290 MW in the Moorpark sub-area of the Big
20		Creek/Ventura LRA. ² At this point, Track 4 of this proceeding is essentially an

 ¹ "Revised Scoping Ruling and Memo of the Assigned Commissioner and Administrative Law Judge," in R.12-03-014, May 21, 2013.
 ² The Commission evaluated the need for resources in the SDG&E LRA in A.11-05-023. In that proceeding, SDG&E sought approval of power purchase tolling agreements with the Pio Pico Energy

1		expansion of Track 1 in light of the definitive closure of SONGs, except that it is
2		focusing on the need for resources in the southern part of the SCE system and in
3		the SDG&E system.
4		
5	Q.	Why has the shutdown of SONGS 2 & 3 caused a significant change in the
6		scope of the LTPP proceeding?
7	А.	SONGS is sited at a key location in the southern California electricity grid: at the
8		single point of direct interconnection between SCE's and SDG&E's transmission
9		systems. It not only provided a significant amount of capacity (over 2,200 MW)
10		and energy (it operated at an average annual capacity factor of 82 percent between
11		2001-2011), it also provided critical network services to the electric grid. ³ These
12		services included voltage support and inertia. Track 4 is now considering the
13		intermediate- and long-term resources that should be procured to replace the
14		various functions of SONGS.
15		
16	Q.	What is IEP's interest in this proceeding?
17	А.	IEP represents the interests of independent power producers (IPPs). IEP members
18		collectively own and operate approximately one-third of California's installed
19		generating capacity, which includes renewable products derived from biomass,
20		geothermal, small hydro, solar, and wind; highly efficient cogeneration; and gas-

Center, Quail Brush Power, and the Escondido Energy Center. The Commission authorized SDG&E to procure up to 298 MW of local generation capacity to come on-line beginning in 2018. ³ "Overview of Southern California Electricity Infrastructure Issues." Presentation by M. Jaske of the California Energy Commission, Joint CEC/CPUC Workshop on Southern California Electricity Infrastructure Issues in Los Angeles, California, July 15, 2013. See Attachment B for excerpt.

1		fired merchant facilities. IEP has been active in the Commission's procurement
2		proceedings for many years. IEP's interests include fostering, to the maximum
3		extent practical, truly competitive solicitations for resources in order to lower
4		consumers' costs; ensuring that a competitive, level playing field exists for
5		various technologies and ownership types (e.g., cost-of-service utility-owned
6		generation (UOG) vs. market-based IPPs); and ensuring that the products sought
7		by policy-makers and the grid operator are clearly and transparently defined so
8		that competitive markets can plan for and respond to specific resource needs in a
9		timely and cost-effective manner.
10		
11	Q.	Have you submitted testimony in this proceeding?
12	А.	Yes. I submitted reply testimony in Track 1 of this proceeding on behalf of IEP.
13		
14	Q.	What is the purpose of your testimony in this phase of the proceeding?
15	А.	There are two main parts to this testimony. First, I present broad policy and
16		planning recommendations as they relate to the current situation for southern
17		California's electric infrastructure. Second, I respond to the opening testimony of
18		the California Independent System Operator (CAISO), SCE, and SDG&E in this
19		track of the instant proceeding.
20		
21	Q.	Do you have any general concerns with the analysis and proposals contained
22		in the opening testimony of CAISO, SCE and SDG&E?

1	A.	Υ¢	es. As I will address in greater detail in my testimony below, I am concerned
2		tha	at some of the assumptions made in the analyses presented to the Commission
3		thu	as far are overly optimistic and may result in estimates of resource need that do
4		no	t fully address the reliability needs resulting from the shutdown of SONGS.
5		Sp	ecifically, my concerns are as follows:
6		٠	There is a great deal of uncertainty in the "net" load forecasts in the local
7			areas affected by the SONGS closure;
8			There is a large reliance on "uncommitted" energy efficiency, demand
9			response, distributed generation, and storage resources to meet identified
10			resource needs;
11		۲	There is a similar reliance in the utility assessments of resource need on
12			"uncommitted" transmission projects that face significant development risks;
13			The consequences to ratepayers of either having too many resources or too
14			few are highly asymmetric, with under-procurement potentially leading to
15			curtailment of firm load;
16			If handled incorrectly, the addition of Track 4 procurement has the potential to
17			sidetrack the ongoing procurement through the Track 1 authorization, at a
18			time when it is essential to promptly secure new resources;
19		۲	Potentially relying on SCE's "Living Pilot" program as a critical piece of
20			SCE's efforts to meet its resource needs is highly risky; and
21			There is no evidence that the contingency plans proposed by SCE and
22			SDG&E, which could involve the utilities "pre-permitting" certain sites, are
23			necessary and they may be counterproductive.

- 1
- 2 Ο. Please summarize your recommendations. 3 In this testimony, IEP makes the following recommendations regarding the Α. assessment of need for new resources to replace SONGS 2 & 3 and specific 4 proposals made by the CAISO, SCE and SDG&E: 5 6 1) When considering the need for new resources to replace SONGS 2 & 3, the 7 Commission should rely on the following conservative planning assumptions 8 9 to avoid potentially being in the position of having to order "just in time 10 procurement" to ensure grid reliability: Rely on the CAISO's reliability criteria to determine local area resource 11 . 12 need: 13 Recognize the risks associated with uncommitted resources: ۲ 14 Assume long lead-times for transmission projects; and 15 Do not assume that new generation projects can come online sooner than ۲ proposed, or that existing plants will operate beyond the deadlines for 16 compliance with once-through cooling (OTC) regulations. 17 2) Procurement by SCE and SDG&E should proceed as follows: 18 Continue with LTPP Track 1 procurement activities that are already 19 . 20 underway. Authorize interim procurement under Track 4 (i.e., Phase 1 procurement 21 0 22 from Track 4) based on current analysis and assumptions; and

1		• After the CAISO completes its updated transmission assessment as part of
2		the 2013/2014 TPP, potentially provide additional procurement authority
3		to the IOUs (Phase 2 procurement from Track 4).
4	3)	The Commission should employ a "no regrets" policy for the Track 4 Phase 1
5		interim procurement authorizations:
6		• This "no regrets" level of procurement should be procured through an all-
7		source solicitation, which would allow all resource categories to compete
8		on a level playing field to meet a portion of the expected need for
9		resources in the local area;
10		• The utilities should be ensured full cost recovery for reasonable resource
11		costs resulting from this initial procurement; and
12		• The authorized level of procurement should not be reduced as a result of
13		future analyses.
14	4)	The Commission should reject SCE's and SDG&E's site banking proposals in
15		this proceeding or, at a minimum, exclude utility affiliates or "build-own-
16		transfer" projects from bidding to develop projects at energy parks or utility
17		substations.
18	5)	To satisfy CAISO reliability criteria, the Commission should order SCE to
19		procure a total of 2,506 MW of local capacity between its Track 1 solicitation
20		and any interim "no regrets" procurement authorized in the first phase of
21		Track 4.
22		• SCE should be allowed to pursue its proposed "Living" Pilot, but only as a
23		test project to measure potential impacts. Absent empirical results, the

1		Pilot should not be relied upon as a critical component of SCE's plan to
2		ensure local grid reliability; and
3		• The Commission should modify SCE's proposal for contingent
4		procurement of gas-fired resources to explicitly include that option as part
5		of the competitive solicitation of resources.
6	6)	The Commission should authorize SDG&E to procure an additional 820 MW
7		in the initial phase of Track 4 based on CAISO reliability criteria and to
8		reflect more conservative transmission addition assumptions than proposed by
9		SDG&E:
10		• Given the significant risks associated with building a transmission line
11		from Imperial Valley to the SONGS Mesa substation, the SDG&E
12		resource need should, at most, be based on assuming just the addition of a
13		line from Devers to a substation in the North County of San Diego;
14		• If the Commission does not authorize SDG&E's Pio Pico application or
15		there are problems with the approved Wellhead project, then the
16		Commission should increase SDG&E's interim procurement by up to 308
17		MW; and
18		• The Commission should order SDG&E to supplement its testimony to
19		provide cost estimates of different scenarios, to provide a basis for
20		deciding among the various options.

II. Overarching Policy and Planning Recommendations 22 23

1	Q.	What are the policy and planning issues that you address in this section of
2		your testimony?
3	А.	I discuss five broad policy and planning issues in this section:
4		1. For local reliability assessment, a conservative approach that does not risk
5		placing the Commission in the position of ordering "just in time" procurement
6		is reasonable. Accordingly, an approach based on CAISO's reliability
7		requirements is appropriate.
8		2. The Commission should encourage fair competition among resource types to
9		ensure ratepayers receive the lowest-cost service consistent with reliability
10		and policy goals.
11		3. Planning assumptions will change over time. The Commission should not put
12		customer reliability at risk by delaying procurement of needed resources while
13		it awaits updated information.
14		4. The Commission should reject SCE's and SDG&E's site banking proposals in
15		this proceeding or, at a minimum, exclude utility affiliates from bidding to
16		develop projects at energy parks.
17		5. The Commission should ensure fair procurement by relying on market power
18		mitigation measures adopted in the Commission's decision in Track 1 of this
19		proceeding.
20		
21		I discuss each of these issues in turn below.
22 23 24		A. For local reliability assessment, a conservative approach such as that proposed by CAISO is appropriate

Q. Why is a conservative planning approach appropriate in this track of the proceeding?

3 There is an immediate and critical need for action to ensure the reliability of A. electric service to the customers of SCE and SDG&E. When it became clear that 4 SONGS would not be online during the peak summer months in 2012, the state's 5 energy agencies (i.e., the Commission, the California Energy Commission (CEC), 6 7 and the CAISO) took immediate steps to ensure the reliability of service in southern Orange County and SDG&E's service area. These steps included 8 9 bringing Units 3 and 4 of the Huntington Beach plant out of retirement to provide 10 replacement power; approving new demand response programs for SDG&E and SCE;⁴ and promoting energy conservation and energy efficiency programs 11 through targeted communication campaigns.⁵ Peak demands in 2012 were 12 somewhat lower than expected and that helped to avoid load curtailments in the 13 areas around SONGS. SCE, SDG&E, and the state's energy agencies took 14 15 additional steps to prepare for 2013, such as converting the Huntington Beach units from steam generators to synchronous condensers. Also, some new 16 17 generation has come online in the LA Basin. Nevertheless, load has continued to grow, and the region faces the shutdown of several once-through cooling (OTC) 18 19 units over the next seven years as a result of current state regulations. In order to ensure continued reliable electric service in the area, more steps need to be taken 20 21 soon.

 ⁴ California Public Utilities Commission Resolutions E-4502 (May 24, 2012) and E-4511 (July 12, 2012).
 ⁵ "Compliance Report for Meeting the Needs of Customers Most Affected by Emerging Energy Needs for Summer 2012," filed by Southern California Edison in A.11-03-002, July 2012.

- 1
- 2

Q. What are some of the options being considered to meet the local reliability concerns arising from the shutdown of SONGS?

- A. All resource options are on the table: energy efficiency (EE), demand response
 (DR), behind-the-meter distributed generation (DG), grid-connected renewable
 and efficient gas-fired generation, and storage technologies. Aside from these
 resource options, various transmission upgrades and improvements, including
 construction of new transmission facilities and synchronous condensers, are under
 consideration. Finally, even curtailment of firm load has been discussed.⁶
- 10

11 Q. How does uncertainty in load forecasting complicate resource planning?

- A. If electricity demand is under-forecast, then the need for resources will be underforecast as well. If the system has significant excess resource capacity, then an under-forecast of need does not pose a substantial risk to reliability and the ability to meet demand. However, because the local areas in the LA Basin and San Diego are short of resources, under-forecasting resource need could result in having to take extreme measures to ensure system reliability. Such measures might include emergency authorization of new generation facilities or curtailment of firm load.
- 19

Q. What are the critical factors driving uncertainty in forecasting the need for resources and the online date for new generation?

⁶ "Track 4 Testimony of Southern California Edison" (SCE Track 4 Testimony), filed by Southern California Edison in R.12-03-014, August 26, 2013, p. 27.

A number of factors drive uncertainty in forecasting, which can result in under-1 Α. estimating the need for new resources and threaten future grid reliability. First, the 2 "net" load forecasts in the local area are subject to significant uncertainty.⁷ There 3 are two main sources of uncertainty in net load forecasts: (1) uncertainty in 4 measures to either reduce the end-use level of energy usage or to promote self-5 supply electricity behind the meter and (2) uncertainty in the underlying demand 6 for electricity at the end-use level. It is difficult to know how much energy 7 efficiency and distributed generation will occur in the local areas since, 8 9 historically, energy efficiency and distributed generation programs were not targeted at small geographic areas but were aimed at the overall service territory 10 11 of an investor-owned utility (IOU). Because of this past approach to program 12 design, it is not known with certainty how much energy efficiency and behindthe-meter distributed generation will result from statewide programs in the local 13 14 areas of concern.

15

16 Second, the uncharacteristically slow economic rebound from the recession could 17 accelerate and the economy could grow faster than expected, which would 18 increase the demand for electricity.⁸ In the 2002-2006 timeframe, before the 19 recession, statewide electricity demand was increasing on average by 2,755 MW

⁷ Net load is the gross demand for electricity less energy efficiency, demand response, and behind-themeter DG.

⁸ Arns, Christopher. "U.S. Economy Somewhat Stagnant, but California, Not So Much," Sacramento Business Journal, August 1, 2013. <u>http://www.bizjournals.com/sacramento/news/2013/08/01/us-economy-stagnant-california-not-affec.html</u>. See Attachment C.

per year.9 Under current conditions, the CEC forecasts annual demand growth in 1 the LA Basin of only 200-300 MW.¹⁰ In light of state and federal policies to spur 2 economic growth, 200-300 MW/year may not underestimate future demand. 3 4 Third, some of the preferred resources¹¹ may not prove as viable as hoped. 5 Currently, the amount of "uncommitted" resources assumptions embedded in the 6 net load forecasts being used in the Track 4 analyses for the total SONGS study 7 area (LA Basin and SDG&E) total about 1600 MW (see Table 1), and 8 9 policymakers are pushing to significantly expand the procurement of EE, DG, and storage resources. If these uncommitted resources fail to deliver as planned, the 10 11 CAISO will not be able to rely on the level of load reductions expected in the area and system reliability could be affected. 12

⁹ Adopted Energy Demand Forecast Report 2012-2022, Mid-Form 1.4, "Peak Demand (MW)," California Energy Commission, updated on November 6, 2012. See Attachment D for excerpt.

¹⁰ Adopted Energy Demand Forecast Report 2012-2022, Mid-Form 1.5b, "1 in 2 Net Electricity Peak Demand by Agency and Balancing Authority (MW)," California Energy Commission, updated on November 6, 2012. See Attachment E for excerpt.

¹¹ Preferred resources typically refer to those identified at the top of the Loading Order described in Energy Action Plan II:

The loading order identifies energy efficiency and demand response as the State's preferred means of meeting growing energy needs. After cost-effective efficiency and demand response, we rely on renewable sources of power and distributed generation, such as combined heat and power applications. (*Energy Action Plan II*, California Energy Commission, September 21, 2005, p. 2. See Attachment F for excerpt.)

	CAISO & SCE ¹²	SDG&E ¹³
LA Basin		
Incremental Uncommitted EE	787	787
Demand Response at Most Effective Locations	181	181
Distributed Generation Net Qualifying Capacity	247	247
Total Uncommitted Preferred Resources	1,215	1,215
SDG&E		
Incremental Uncommitted EE	196	318
Demand Response at Most Effective Locations	17	0
Distributed Generation Net Qualifying Capacity	210	136
Total Uncommitted Preferred Resources	423	454
Total SONGS Study Area (LA Basin + SDG&E)		
Incremental Uncommitted EE	983	1,105
Demand Response at Most Effective Locations	198	181
Distributed Generation Net Qualifying Capacity	457	383
Total Uncommitted Preferred Resources	1,638	1,669

Table 1 – Uncommitted Resource Assumptions (MW)

2

1

Fourth, the completion and availability of new or upgraded transmission facilities might be delayed. As a result, grid-connected resources might not come online in the expected timeframe.

6

7 Overall, there are significant factors that suggest economic demand may 8 accelerate over the 10-year planning horizon, while state policy is increasing the 9 state's reliance on uncommitted and emerging technologies to meet demand. 10 These countervailing forces suggest the need to consider the significant 11 uncertainties on both the demand- and supply-side of the load-resource balance.

¹² Sparks Track 4 Testimony, p. 5-9.

¹³ "Prepared Track 4 Direct Testimony of SDG&E" (Anderson Track 4 Testimony), Robert B. Anderson on behalf of San Diego Gas & Electric Company, filed in R.12-03-014, August 26, 2013, p. 12 for SDG&E values; LA Basin values are assumed to be unchanged from values presented in the Sparks Track 4 Testimony, p. 5-9.

- 1
- 2

0.

Are the consequences to ratepayers and the overall economy the same if the electric system has too much supply as opposed to too little?

No. The consequences to ratepayers are highly asymmetric. An over-capacity 4 Α. 5 condition might result in slightly higher costs to electric customers. An under-6 capacity condition would likely result in curtailment of firm load, which has a very high social cost.¹⁴ In this respect, procuring sufficient capacity to meet 7 conservative assumptions of supply and demand is akin to buying insurance. The 8 9 hedging *cost* is known annually, but the hedging *value* is only known when the 10 catastrophic events (i.e., firm load curtailments) occur. Prudent planners buy 11 insurance in order to mitigate against the financial/economic hardship associated 12 with the catastrophic event.

13

14 Q. Given the asymmetric damages that might result, what do you recommend?

A. I believe that the Commission should take a conservative approach when
developing its authorized levels of procurement in this proceeding. This approach
would likely result in a lower overall expected cost to ratepayers and society.
Such an approach is consistent with that proposed by CAISO.

- 19
- 20 Q. Why do you say that the CAISO has used a "conservative" approach to 21 planning in this proceeding?

¹⁴ For example, E3 calculated a cost penalty of \$40,000 per MWh for unserved energy. See E3's presentation on Renewable Energy Flexibility (REFLEX) Results presented at the August 26, 2013, Commission workshop, p. 30. See Attachment G for excerpt.

1	А.	The CAISO develops reliability standards for its Balancing Area. At a minimum,
2		the CAISO must conform to the standards established by the North American
3		Electricity Reliability Council (NERC). However, the CAISO can propose and
4		implement standards that are more stringent than those required by NERC. In the
5		CAISO's testimony, Mr. Sparks uses the CAISO's current reliability standards
6		based on the applicable WECC voltage stability criteria when assessing the need
7		for resources in the local area. ¹⁵
8		
9	Q.	Aside from the reliability standards being applied to determine need for
10		resources, are there other areas in which the Commission should recognize
11		the somewhat optimistic assumptions being used in the initial analyses in
12		Track 4?
13	А.	Yes. The Commission should understand that the underlying net load forecasts
14		that were used in the initial Track 4 analyses included significant levels of
15		uncommitted resources. ¹⁶ These uncommitted resources are inherently less certain
16		than committed generation or approved transmission projects. ¹⁷
17		

¹⁵ "Track 4 Testimony of Robert Sparks on Behalf of the California Independent System Operator Corporation," (Sparks Track 4 Testimony) filed by the California Independent System Operator Corporation in R.12-03-014, August 5, 2013, p. 18.

¹⁶ Uncommitted demand-side resources include energy efficiency and demand response resources that are expected but have not yet been funded by the Commission. Other uncommitted resources include behind-the-meter generation resources (e.g., rooftop photovoltaics or combined heat and power) that have not been fully authorized by the Commission. Finally, potential transmission lines that have not been approved by the CAISO should also be considered uncommitted.

¹⁷ In addition, some preferred resources (e.g., energy efficiency) are not flexible and likely cannot provide ancillary services as can certain generating resources.

1	Q.	What uncommitted resource assumptions have been used in the initial Track
2		4 analyses presented by the CAISO, SCE, and SDG&E?
3	А.	Table 1 above summarizes the uncommitted resource assumptions embedded in
4		the net load forecasts being used in the Track 4 analyses.
5		
6	Q.	Do you contend that these forecasts are unreasonable?
7	А.	Not necessarily. However, it is important to note that a 25% reduction in the
8		availability of these uncommitted resources (e.g., from 1,669 MW to 1,252 MW
9		in the case of the analysis performed by SDG&E) would result in an increase in
10		need of 303 MW and 114 MW for SCE and SDG&E, respectively.
11		
12	Q.	What do you conclude about the potential risks ratepayers face because of
13		the uncertainty about the forecast of uncommitted resources?
14	А.	Because of the very tight load-resource balance in the LA Basin and in San
15		Diego, if uncommitted resources do not appear as expected, then there is a real
16		
		risk of resource shortages. To mitigate this risk, the Commission should ensure
17		risk of resource shortages. To mitigate this risk, the Commission should ensure that any interim procurement authorization is toward the high end of the range of
17 18		risk of resource shortages. To mitigate this risk, the Commission should ensure that any interim procurement authorization is toward the high end of the range of potential procurement levels. I discuss my recommended levels for interim
17 18 19		risk of resource shortages. To mitigate this risk, the Commission should ensure that any interim procurement authorization is toward the high end of the range of potential procurement levels. I discuss my recommended levels for interim procurement below.
17 18 19 20		risk of resource shortages. To mitigate this risk, the Commission should ensure that any interim procurement authorization is toward the high end of the range of potential procurement levels. I discuss my recommended levels for interim procurement below.
 17 18 19 20 21 	Q.	risk of resource shortages. To mitigate this risk, the Commission should ensure that any interim procurement authorization is toward the high end of the range of potential procurement levels. I discuss my recommended levels for interim procurement below. Are there other uncommitted resources that the IOUs have used in their

A. Yes. The IOUs have presented planning scenarios that rely on "uncommitted"
 transmission projects.

3

4 Q. Why do you call the transmission projects "uncommitted?"

5 I consider these transmission projects uncommitted since they have not yet been Α. 6 approved by the CAISO through its Transmission Planning Process (TPP). 7 Moreover, the CAISO has committed to study non-conventional alternatives to new transmission projects in the current transmission planning cycle and will be 8 applying this approach specifically to the LA Basin and San Diego areas.¹⁸ Thus, 9 10 there is no firm commitment to construct the projects, the environmental attributes 11 of the projects have not been tested, and the economic costs of the projects are 12 unknown.

13

In addition, the siting of new transmission projects in California has historically been fraught with controversy. This tendency toward controversy poses a real risk that at least some proposed transmission projects (expansion and/or upgrades) may not be built or completed within an expected time frame. Given this history, the Commission should be conservative when assuming that specific transmission projects will be online and available to help meet local reliability requirements.

20

21 Q. What are these uncommitted transmission projects?

¹⁸ CAISO. Consideration of Alternatives to Transmission or Conventional Generation to Address Local Needs in the Transmission Planning Process. September 4, 2013, pp. 3-4. See Attachment H for excerpt.

1	А.	There are a number of transmission projects being discussed in this proceeding or
2		in public forums discussing the electric infrastructure needs of the LA Basin and
3		San Diego areas. These include:
4		• Alamitos to South Bay undersea High Voltage (HV) Direct Current (DC) line;
5		• Imperial Valley to SONGS HVDC;
6		• Alberhill-Suncrest 500 kV Alternating Current (AC) line; and
7		• Talega/Escondido – Valley/Serrano (TE-VS) – New Case Springs 500 kV
8		line.
9		
10	Q.	Can you give examples of past transmission projects that have experienced
11		delays coming on-line relative to the initial project on-line dates?
12	А.	Yes. Table 2 below lists specific projects that did not meet their initial projected
13		on-line dates or have never been built.

Project	Proponent	Discussion of Proposed and Actual Development
		Timeline
Sunrise Powerlink	SDG&E	Sunrise Powerlink began operations two years later than initially proposed by SDG&E in its permitting application to the CPUC. SDG&E initially proposed an on-line date of 2010 in its CPCN application. The actual on-line date was 2012.
Devers-Palo Verde 2 /	SCE	AZ Corp. Commission denied project in AZ. Required
West of Devers		alternative route west of Devers substation due to inability
Upgrades		to obtain right-of-way from Morongo.
Tehachapi Renewable SCE		SCE filed the first CPCN application (Segments 1-3) in
Transmission Project		2004 and the second CPCN application (Segments 4-11) in
		2007. Segments 1-3A were completed in 2009 (i.e., 5
		years). The entire project is expected to be completed by
		2015 (i.e., 6 years after CPCN filed for Segment 4-11).
Valley-Rainbow 500 kV	SDG&E	This project was never built. The CPUC denied SDG&E's application for a CPCN in 2002.
TE-VS	Nevada	Originally proposed in 2004. Remains a proposed project
	Hydro	only.
British Columbia to	PG&E	This project was never built. PG&E studied a BC to
Northern California		Northern CA transmission line in the 2007-2008 timeframe
Transmission Project		and proposed an in-service date of 2015.

Table 2 – Past Transmission Projects

2

1

As the table shows, major transmission projects often experience delays in the permitting and regulatory approval phase or never get past the design and permitting phase. Even SDG&E admits that there is significant uncertainty about "how quickly transmission projects can be licensed and built."¹⁹

7

8 Q. How should the Commission assess the likelihood that some of the proposed
 9 transmission projects will ultimately reduce need for new resources in the
 10 LA Basin and San Diego areas?

A. The Commission should use conservative assumptions to assess when various
 transmission projects might be online in evaluating the magnitude of any interim
 procurement.

¹⁹ Anderson Track 4 Testimony, p. 2.

1		
2	Q.	What do you assume is a reasonable yet conservative estimate of the time
3		needed to design, permit, and construct the large transmission projects being
4		discussed by the IOUs?
5	А.	The Commission estimates the three phases - planning, permitting, and
6		construction – could last between 7 and 13 years. ²⁰ For the proposed projects, a
7		reasonable estimate is 7 years for permitting and construction. ²¹
8		
9	Q.	Why is your recommended timeline reasonable for these transmission
10		projects?
11	А.	The risk of delay in a transmission project can occur during design, permitting, or
12		construction. However, the greatest uncertainty in the schedule occurs during the
13		process for receiving permits and approval for cost recovery. Depending on the
14		route initially proposed for the project, it might even become necessary for the
15		Proponent to develop new alternatives (e.g., undergrounding). Since the
16		permitting and regulatory approval process could occur one or more years after a
17		project is initially approved by the CAISO and included in resource assessment
18		studies, a delay in that permitting might preclude other long-lead time resources
19		from replacing the delayed transmission project (e.g., to meet a 2022 online date).

²⁰ With planning taking 3-4 years; permitting taking 3-4 years; and construction taking 1-5 years. See the presentation "General Information on Permitting Electric Transmission Projects at the California Public Utilities Commission," June 2009, p.8, available at <u>http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/puc/energy/environment/</u>. See Attachment I for excerpt.

Attachment I for excerpt. ²¹ 7 years = 3.5 years for permitting and 3.5 years for construction. This assumes that projects are fully planned and ready to start preparing applications and permitting documents. If this is not the case, project lead times would be longer.

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Thus, making conservative planning assumptions for the timing of transmission projects is prudent.

3

4 Q. What other ways should the Commission be conservative in this proceeding?

5 While some IPP generation has shown an ability to come online quickly when Α. 6 needed, the Commission should acknowledge that generation projects can be 7 delayed by the same type of opposition that I discussed previously with regards to transmission projects. As a result, the Commission should make conservative 8 9 assumptions about the time it takes to develop, permit, and construct new generation projects. As IEP has noted previously, it can take 6-8 years or more to 10 bring new generating facilities online.²² It is telling that at least one opponent to 11 12 the repowering of an existing unit has already presented testimony in this proceeding about why that project should not move ahead due to lack of need.²³ 13 14 Therefore, the Commission should not assume that developers will be able to 15 bring on new generation projects faster than expected.

16

17 Q. How might the uncertainty in assumptions regarding uncommitted resources 18 affect the timing for authorization of interim procurement?

A. Table 3 presents hypothetical development schedules for resources authorized in Track 1 and Track 4 (Phase 1). The table also shows potential schedules for transmission projects that might result from CAISO's 2013/2014 TPP.

²² Monsen Testimony, p. 13

²³ "Testimony of Jaleh Firooz and Analysis of Local Capacity Requirements in the Western Los Angeles (LA) Basin Sub-Area Submitted on Behalf of the City of Redondo Beach" (Firooz Track 4 Testimony), filed by the City of Redondo Beach in R.12-03-013, August 25, 2013, p. 13.

Table 3 - Potential Schedules for Procurement and Construction of Generation and Transmission Projects

Action	Expected Completion Date	Extended Completion Date
SCE Track 1 Procurement		
Issue RFO	Sep-13	Sep-13
Receive offers	Dec-13	Dec-13
Assemble Short List	Jan-14	Jan-14
Negotiate Agreements	May-14	May-14
Commission Approval	Aug-14	Oct-14
Permitting projects	Aug-16	Oct-17
Construct projects	Feb-19	Oct-20
Commission and testing	Apr-19	Dec-20
Duration (years)	5.6	7.2
Track 4 Phase 1 Decision	Jun-14	Jun-14
Issue Track 4 Interim RFO	Jul-14	Jul-14
Receive offers	Sep-14	Sep-14
Assemble Short List	Oct-14	Oct-14
Negotiate Agreements	Apr-15	Apr-15
Commission Approval	Jun-15	Aug-15
Permitting projects	Jun-17	Aug-18
Construct projects	Dec-19	Aug-21
Commission and testing	Feb-20	Oct-21
Duration (years)	5.7	7.3
Track 4, Phase 2		
CAISO TPP Approval	Jun-14	Jun-14
Prepare CPCN and PEA	Dec-15	Dec-15
Approve CPCN and issue permit	Jun-18	Jun-19
Construct project	Jun-21	Dec-22
Duration (years)	7.0	8.5

4

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The schedules presented in Table 3 assume reasonable ranges for development schedules for generation and transmission projects.

1 Q. What do you conclude from these schedules?

2	А.	If we assume that resources must be online by July 1, 2021^{24} , then the Track 1
3		projects should all be online in time and the Track 4 (Phase 1) generation projects
4		should be online either in time or only slightly after July 2021. However, for
5		transmission assets, it is clear that any delays would put the online date for the
6		project well after the date needed to meet need resulting from the expected dates
7		for OTC compliance.

8

9

Ο.

10use when considering the need for new resources to replace SONGS 2 & 3?11A.The Commission should adopt the following conservative assumptions:

In summary, what type of conservative assumptions should the Commission

- Rely on the CAISO's reliability criteria when determining resource need
 in the local area;
- Recognize the risks associated with uncommitted resources;
 - Assume seven year lead-times for transmission projects; and
- Do not assume that new generation projects can come online sooner than
 proposed by project proponents, or assume that existing OTC regulations
 fostering generation retirements will be amended or compliance deadlines
 extended.
- 20

²⁴ I use June 2021 as the target date since the State Water Resources Control Board's Compliance Dates for Alamitos, El Segundo, Huntington Beach, Redondo Beach, and Encina are all on or before the end of 2020.

Together, these assumptions would ensure that the final determination of need is conservative and will not put the Commission in the position of ordering "just in time procurement" to ensure grid reliability.

4

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5 Q. Aside from ordering the use of conservative assumptions in studies that 6 follow Track 4, how should the Commission mitigate the risks of higher-7 than-expected loads, delays in transmission projects, and long development 8 periods for generation?

9 A. The Commission should hedge the risk of resource shortfalls by authorizing SCE 10 and SDG&E to procure local resources above and beyond the level already 11 authorized in Track 1 of this proceeding for SCE and in A.11-05-023 for 12 SDG&E.²⁵ Both SCE and SDG&E recommend some form of interim procurement 13 and the CAISO does not object to some amount of interim procurement.²⁶ This 14 interim procurement authorization would ensure that some long lead-time 15 resources are procured quickly.

16

17 Q. What are your specific recommendations regarding procurement from
18 Track 4 of the proceeding?

A. The Commission should account for the overlapping schedules of the Track 1
 RFO and procurement activities that result from Track 4 of this proceeding. As
 discussed below, the Commission should authorize interim procurement based on

 ²⁵ For convenience, I refer to both of these initial procurement decisions as Track 1 decisions.
 ²⁶ SCE Track 4 Testimony, pp. 3-4; Anderson Track 4 Testimony, pp. 4-5; "Comments of the California Independent System Operator Corporation on Proposed Track 2 and Track 4 Procedural Schedules," filed in R.12-03-014, September 10, 2013, p. 6.

1		the identified need from this proceeding. Because SCE's Track 1 procurement
2		authorization is a range (i.e., 1,400 – 1,800 MW), there is some uncertainty about
3		how much local capacity will ultimately be procured from the SCE RFO. For that
4		reason, I recommend the Commission determine the overall amount of
5		procurement needed to meet both the Track 1 and interim Track 4 needs and then
6		adjust the interim Track 4 procurement levels based on the results of the Track 1
7		procurement.
8		
9	Q.	What is your specific proposal?
10	А.	I propose a three-part procurement program for SCE and SDG&E. These three
11		parts are:
12		1. Continue with Track 1 procurement activities that are already underway.
13		2. Authorize interim procurement under Track 4 (i.e., Phase 1 procurement from
14		Track 4) based on current analysis and assumptions;
15		3. After the CAISO completes its updated transmission assessment as part of the
16		2013/2014 TPP, potentially provide additional procurement authority to the
17		IOUs (i.e., Phase 2 procurement from Track 4).
18		I discuss each part of the procurement program below.
19		
20	Q.	Please explain the first part of your proposed process.
21	А.	The Commission, in its Track 1 decision, authorized SCE to procure between
22		1,400 MW and 1,800 MW in the western LA Basin. SCE issued a Request for
23		Offers (RFO) on September 12, 2013 to begin that procurement process. The

2

following schedule itemizes key dates in SCE's Local Capacity Requirements

RFO:²⁷

3 4 Table 4 – SCE Local Capacity Requirements RFO Schedule for Track 1 Procurement

Date:	Event:	
December 2, 2013	Deadline to submit non-binding notice of intent to offer	
December 16, 2013	Deadline to submit indicative offer and complete offer	
	submittal package	
January 30, 2014	Shortlist notification	
May 22, 2014	Deadline to complete negotiations of agreement	
May 29, 2014	Deadline to submit final offer	
June 26, 2014	Last date for notification of successful offers and to sign	
	agreements	

5

6 While it is unclear exactly how much capacity will be procured in this RFO, the 7 Commission should allow SCE to continue its procurement efforts pursuant to the 8 Track 1 authorization.

9

10 Q. Please explain the second part of your proposed process.

- 11 A. As part of Track 4, the Commission should authorize interim procurement for
- 12 SCE and SDG&E and direct both utilities to procure local capacity from all
- 13 sources. I refer to this as a Track 4, Phase 1 procurement authorization.

14

15 Q. When would this interim procurement take place?

²⁷ "Local Capacity Requirements ('LCR') RFO," available from SCE's Energy Procurement website, accessed September 25, 2013. See Attachment J. Available from: <u>https://www.sce.com/wps/portal/home/procurement/LCR-</u> <u>RFO/!ut/p/b1/rVJNb4JAFPwr9NAj2YfL1x7XSHCtoSo2FS5kXReKgQURm_rvi5SrWhP39D5mJ28mg2K</u> <u>0QbHi33nG27xSvLj0sZ3M2IQavjlivulhoDAP7bHIG5Q4HSDqAHDIUej_G65PpywEBs6cABsvVh5ZE2y</u> <u>GegTxSgWqq3bLxQdhUxEpVqp2kSqVxjqV5BKNtlZq5tKnBpZ9rOiErzQBK-</u> <u>5yNuz1sjDKf_bHbVCNFqTVhfummdyJ495pvpO5DsUYY7N0U5sdWtrgW4awtUJTrFOuM1NQvDWGB</u> <u>mDshun33GmV3adwR1bdwAOHgDEB286ewfmr5cYGF5CEFKKAewBcMP-</u> <u>YFqVEkWdFufqsQuMwgfNuU10mc8mtB8mnP0jufn-</u> clhpl79Lzn5atHI6AOvyo3T36dxeeelknZZIEgR6HL38AvEOjmU!/dl4/d5/L2dBISEvZ0FBIS9nQSEh/

1	А.	I expect a Phase 1 proposed decision in Track 4 by December 2013 or the first
2		quarter of 2014. After the Commission issues its decision in Phase 1 of Track 4,
3		the IOUs should be given approximately 30 days to issue a new RFO for all
4		source capacity located in the local areas. Thirty days should be sufficient since
5		the IOUs should be preparing their RFOs in parallel with Phase 1 of Track 4. The
6		Track 4, Phase 1 solicitation under this schedule should occur no later than mid-
7		2014.
8		
9	Q.	Should losing bidders in the Track 1 solicitations be allowed to participate in
10		the solicitation resulting from Phase 1 of Track 4?
11	А.	Yes. However, to simplify bidding rules and to ensure bidders provide their most
12		current proposal, I recommend that projects that bid in the Track 1 RFO be
13		required to submit a new bid in the Phase 1 RFO from Track 4.28
14		
15	Q.	Please explain the third part of your proposal.
16	А.	I refer to this part as Track 4, Phase 2. The primary purpose of Phase 2 would be
17		to enable the IOUs and the CAISO to refresh their resource need analyses. This
18		would include evaluation of possible transmission projects (through the CAISO's
19		TPP). Based on these updated analyses (and stakeholder testimony and hearings,
20		if needed), it may be necessary for the Commission to provide additional

²⁸ If the final contracts from the Track 1 solicitations are not sent to the Commission prior to the due date for offers in the RFO for Phase 1 of Track 4, bidders from Track 1 should be allowed to submit bids in both RFOs. If a project with bids in both RFOs is ultimately selected as a winning bidder in the Track 1 RFO, then the bidder must withdraw its bid from consideration in the solicitation for Phase 1 of Track 4.

1		procurement authorization to the IOUs (i.e., authorize a Phase 2 procurement in
2		Track 4).
3		
4	Q.	Should the results of resource need analyses finalized in Phase 2 of Track 4
5		affect the procurement authorization from Track 1 or Phase 1 of Track 4?
6	А.	No. Suggesting that bidders might have winning projects terminated based on
7		additional information would have a chilling effect on participation in the Track 1
8		and Track 4, Phase 1 solicitations.
9		
10	Q.	What types of resources should be procured in the Phase 1 procurement in
11		Track 4?
12	A.	The Commission should authorize procurement of all resource types. The all-
13		source solicitation would allow project proponents to propose a range of resources
14		including EE, DR, DG, storage, and grid-connected generation (both renewable
15		and clean gas-fired). ²⁹
16		
17	Q.	How much capacity should each utility procure in Phase 1 of Track 4?
18	А.	Table 5 presents the amount of all-source capacity that the IOUs should procure.
19		As explained above, the amount of capacity procured in Phase 1 of Track 4
20		ultimately depends on the amount procured in Track 1.
21		

²⁹ This would include both conventional and Combined Heat and Power (CHP) resources.

Table 5 - Recommended	Phase	1 Procurement	for Track 4 (MW)
		A A O O OAA O AAAO AAO		

	SCE (LA Basin)	SDG&E	Total
Track 1	1,400 - 1,800	0*	1,400 - 1,800
Phase 1 of Track 4	706 - 1,106	820	1,526 - 1,926
Overall Procurement	2,506	820	3,326
from Track 1 and			
Phase 1 of Track 4			

* Assumes SDG&E's Pio Pico Application is approved.³⁰

3

2

- 4 Table 6 presents IEP's recommended procurement levels by resource type for
- 5 Track 1 and Phase 1 of Track 4:
- 6

Table 6 - Recommended Procurement by Resource Type (MW)

	SCE (LA Basin)	SDG&E	Total
Storage	50	0	50
Preferred	150	0	150
Gas	1,000 - 1,200	308*	1,308 - 1,508
Additional Storage and Preferred	0 - 600	0	0 - 600
All-Source	706	820	1,526
Total	2,506	1,128	3,634

* Pio Pico and Wellhead

8

9

7

Q. Do you have additional specific recommendations?

10 A. Yes. The Commission should employ a "no regrets" policy to these initial 11 procurement authorizations. Under this policy approach, the utilities are ensured 12 full cost recovery for reasonable resource costs utilized for this initial 13 procurement. This "no regrets" level of procurement would allow all resource 14 categories to compete on a level playing field to meet a portion of the expected 15 need for resources in the local area.

³⁰ "Prepared Track 4 Direct Testimony of San Diego Gas & Electric Company" (Jontry Track 4 Testimony), John M. Jontry on behalf of San Diego Gas & Electric Company, filed in R.12-03-014, August 26, 2013, p. 11. (N-1-1)

1 2 3		B. The Commission should encourage competition among resource types to ensure ratepayers receive the lowest cost service consistent with reliability and policy goals.
4 5	Q.	Under your "no regrets" procurement approach, what resource types should
6		be allowed to bid to meet the incremental needs identified in Track 4?
7	А.	As noted above, I believe that procurement should take place through an all-
8		source solicitation. This would allow project proponents to propose a range of
9		resources, including EE, DR, DG, storage, and grid-connected generation (both
10		renewable and clean gas-fired).
11		
12	Q.	Why do you believe that your approach is reasonable?
13	А.	Resources selected to serve load would count against individual utility portfolio
14		mandates and provide a means by which the utilities may exceed those mandates
15		based on the cost-effectiveness of the resource as generally prescribed by the
16		California Legislature.
17		
18	Q.	Why will an all-source procurement result in the lowest-cost resource mix
19		consistent with reliability goals?
20	А.	Allowing the IOUs to compare and contrast different resources to meet their
21		needs will allow the IOUs to finally optimize their resource procurement
22		activities, rather than having to optimize different pieces of the procurement plan
23		but to never know that the final portfolio is, in fact, the least-cost and best-fit set
24		of resources. It is important to note that "least-cost/best-fit" should also attempt to

2

account for as many quantifiable attributes as possible as well as to qualitatively factor in externalities.

3

4 Q. How should the IOUs proceed with such an all-source procurement?

5 I proposed an all-source solicitation in Track 1 of this proceeding. Consistent with Α. 6 that proposal, the Commission will need to provide the IOUs with guidance about 7 the characteristics of the resources that they should procure. These characteristics might include preferred locations, ramping speed, ability to cycle, energy density 8 for the resource,³¹ emissions, and other factors. Ideally, the IOUs would assign a 9 10 value to each attribute to ensure that all attributes are valued in the various 11 proposals that the IOUs may receive. The IOUs should also provide form 12 contracts to bidders to ensure that each resource type understands the delivery 13 obligations associated with making a bid. The Requests for Offers (RFOs) should 14 also clearly spell out any online date requirements and penalties for failure to 15 meet those dates.

16

17 Q. Should the requirements for online dates, performance, and persistence of 18 the resource be consistent across resource types?

A. The CAISO must be able to rely on the delivery of energy, capacity, ancillary
services, and other attributes from the resources being procured. If a resource
cannot provide all of those attributes, then the scoring of that bid should reflect
that fact.

³¹ Energy density refers to the amount of energy that can be supplied by an energy-limited resource such as storage.

- 1
- 2 Ο. Do you have other recommendations? 3 A. Yes. IEP recommends that the Commission should institute an expedited process to further develop an appropriate least-cost/best-fit methodology for valuing a 4 combination of attributes given the diversity of technologies that will fill out the 5 21st century grid. 6 7 С. Even though assumptions will change over time, the Commission should not put customer reliability at risk by 8 delaying procurement of critical resources. 9 10 11 Would it make sense to delay the Track 4. Phase 1 interim procurement until 0. 12 after the CAISO has completed the 2013-2014 TPP cycle? 13 Α. No. It is enticing to believe that a delay might help resolve key uncertainties such 14 as the type and level of resource need. But other uncertainties are likely to persist beyond the completion of the CAISO's TPP cycle. 15 16 17О. Why do you believe that? 18 Α. Completion of the CAISO's TPP is not going to resolve uncertainties such as the 19 future levels of local net loads, the operational characteristics of certain preferred 20 resources, the pace at which emerging technologies move into the market and 21 become accepted, future fuel prices, and the time to permit, construct, and energize high-voltage transmission projects. Furthermore, the CAISO TPP study 22 23 is expected to evolve throughout 2014. The Assigned Commissioner has
| 1 | | recognized that it would not be prudent to delay action on long-lead-time |
|----|----|---|
| 2 | | resources until 2015 or beyond. ³² |
| 3 | | |
| 4 | Q. | Would it make sense to delay the interim procurement until after the |
| 5 | | Commission updates its least-cost/best-fit (LCBF) methodology as proposed |
| 6 | | by IEP? |
| 7 | А. | IEP does not believe that a delay is warranted or necessary. Any updates of the |
| 8 | | LCBF methodology should be completed on an expedited basis but the Phase I |
| 9 | | interim procurement, however, should not be delayed beyond mid-2014 as |
| 10 | | recommended by IEP. |
| 11 | | |
| 12 | Q. | Do you have specific reasons for supporting an interim procurement now? |
| 13 | А. | Yes. The loss of SONGS means the loss of over 2,000 MW of baseload capacity. |
| 14 | | In addition, approximately 7,000 MW of OTC units are scheduled to shut down. |
| 15 | | An interim procurement now, supplemented by additional procurement as needed |
| 16 | | based on further studies, is a low-risk, high-value strategy for securing the |
| 17 | | resources necessary to ensure grid reliability. |
| 18 | | |
| 19 | Q. | Are there additional reasons that an interim Track 4 procurement |
| 20 | | authorization incrementally above that already authorized in Track 1 |
| 21 | | ultimately reduces risk for utility customers? |

³² "Assigned Commissioner and Administrative Law Judge's Ruling Regarding Track 2 and Track 4 Schedules," filed in R.12-03-014, September 16, 2013, p. 3.

1	А.	Yes. First, it would provide the lead-time needed by project developers to
2		develop, permit, and construct cost-effective resources with relatively longer lead
3		times. Second, it would also allow the IOUs and the Commission to determine
4		whether forecasted amounts of uncommitted resources will be developed in local
5		resources in a timely and cost-effective manner. Third, it would allow the IOUs
6		and the Commission to understand the operational and delivery flexibility that
7		preferred resources might provide (e.g., can renewable resources provide certain
8		ancillary services?) in order to help maintain overall grid reliability. It is better to
9		start to resolve these uncertainties soon, rather than wait until there is insufficient
10		time to develop and construct backstop resources.
* *		
11		
11 12 13 14		D. The Commission should reject the IOUs' site banking proposals in this proceeding or, at a minimum, exclude utility affiliates from bidding to develop projects at energy parks
11 12 13 14 15 16	Q.	 D. The Commission should reject the IOUs' site banking proposals in this proceeding or, at a minimum, exclude utility affiliates from bidding to develop projects at energy parks Please describe some of the approaches being proposed to reduce the time to
11 12 13 14 15 16 17	Q.	 D. The Commission should reject the IOUs' site banking proposals in this proceeding or, at a minimum, exclude utility affiliates from bidding to develop projects at energy parks Please describe some of the approaches being proposed to reduce the time to bring on new conventional resources.
11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	Q. A.	 D. The Commission should reject the IOUs' site banking proposals in this proceeding or, at a minimum, exclude utility affiliates from bidding to develop projects at energy parks Please describe some of the approaches being proposed to reduce the time to bring on new conventional resources. Both SCE and SDG&E have proposed novel approaches that they claim will
11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	Q. A.	 D. The Commission should reject the IOUs' site banking proposals in this proceeding or, at a minimum, exclude utility affiliates from bidding to develop projects at energy parks Please describe some of the approaches being proposed to reduce the time to bring on new conventional resources. Both SCE and SDG&E have proposed novel approaches that they claim will reduce the time between when the need for a new conventional power project is
111 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	Q.	 D. The Commission should reject the IOUs' site banking proposals in this proceeding or, at a minimum, exclude utility affiliates from bidding to develop projects at energy parks Please describe some of the approaches being proposed to reduce the time to bring on new conventional resources. Both SCE and SDG&E have proposed novel approaches that they claim will reduce the time between when the need for a new conventional power project is identified and when the project can be online. SCE proposes to "prepare GFG"
11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	Q.	 D. The Commission should reject the IOUs' site banking proposals in this proceeding or, at a minimum, exclude utility affiliates from bidding to develop projects at energy parks Please describe some of the approaches being proposed to reduce the time to bring on new conventional resources. Both SCE and SDG&E have proposed novel approaches that they claim will reduce the time between when the need for a new conventional power project is identified and when the project can be online. SCE proposes to "prepare GFG [Gas-Fired Generation] sites near its Johanna and Santiago substations as a
11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	Q. A.	 D. The Commission should reject the IOUs' site banking proposals in this proceeding or, at a minimum, exclude utility affiliates from bidding to develop projects at energy parks Please describe some of the approaches being proposed to reduce the time to bring on new conventional resources. Both SCE and SDG&E have proposed novel approaches that they claim will reduce the time between when the need for a new conventional power project is identified and when the project can be online. SCE proposes to "prepare GFG [Gas-Fired Generation] sites near its Johanna and Santiago substations as a backstop[] to preserve local reliability should [its proposed "Living"] Pilot not

	exploring the feasibility of developing an energy park that would be made available to independent generators in future RFOs to meet local resource need. The goal of the energy park would be to reduce the time between a finding of generation need and the in-service date of generating plants necessary to meet that need. ³⁴ Both proposals hope to develop fully licensed locations that would have
	available to independent generators in future RFOs to meet local resource need. The goal of the energy park would be to reduce the time between a finding of generation need and the in-service date of generating plants necessary to meet that need. ³³⁴ Both proposals hope to develop fully licensed locations that would have
	The goal of the energy park would be to reduce the time between a finding of generation need and the in-service date of generating plants necessary to meet that need." ³⁴ Both proposals hope to develop fully licensed locations that would have
	generation need and the in-service date of generating plants necessary to meet that need. ³³⁴ Both proposals hope to develop fully licensed locations that would have
	need." ³⁴ Both proposals hope to develop fully licensed locations that would have
	transmission and natural gas available for new generation projects to utilize.
Q.	What evidence do the IOUs present to support their requests to develop these
	energy parks?
А.	The IOUs claim that this approach is needed because it would allow new
	generation to come online much more quickly than under the traditional
	development model for IPPs.
Q.	Do you have concerns about the IOUs' recommended approaches?
А.	Yes. The IOUs present no evidence that the traditional project development
	process, in conjunction with a rational planning and procurement program, cannot
	bring on generating capacity in time to meet identified resource needs.
	Are there risks associated with reliance on the "energy park" proposals?
Q.	Yes. First, while the CEC staff appears to believe that it could obtain authority to
Q. A.	
	2. 4.

 ³³ SCE Track 4 Testimony, p. 61.
 ³⁴ Anderson Track 4 Testimony, p. 16.

the approval process under the traditional siting procedures), it is not at all clear that the CEC currently has the authority to provide pre-approval of projects that are not really projects.³⁵ If the CEC needed to obtain new siting authority from the Legislature, this could delay project development at a time when the need for action is immediate.

6

Second, siting power plants is a very time-intensive process. It involves extensive
environmental review of the proposed project as well as review of alternatives to
the project. It is not exactly clear how the proponents of the energy park would
address all of the siting issues that might come up without having a specific
project in mind.

12

13 Q. What other concerns do you have?

14 Α. Aside from the need for legislative action before the CEC can embark on 15 contingency permitting of potential sites, there are even greater policy concerns to consider. First, utility ownership of project sites could give the IOUs a much 16 greater level of market power when negotiating price, terms, and conditions than 17 if project developers brought fully independent projects to the IOUs through 18 19 RFOs. Second, if IOUs are competing with developers for the few locations that are suitable for gas-fired generation, this competition would increase the cost of 20 sites for IPPs, making them less competitive with projects located at energy 21

³⁵ "Presentation at Workshop on Southern California Electricity Infrastructure and Reliability Issues, "Southern California Reliability: Preliminary Plan," September 9, 2012, p. 20. See Attachment K for excerpt.

1		parks. ³⁶ Third, self-dealing concerns will arise if the IOUs' affiliates attempt to
2		develop projects at the energy park owned by their affiliate. Fourth, even if the
3		IOUs provide access to the energy parks at "market-based" prices, if the IOU is
4		setting the market price for land and is also evaluating the proposals it receives,
5		any hope of a transparent market transaction is unlikely at best. Fifth, the energy
6		park proposals would give the IOUs additional leverage in California's hybrid
7		market structure. It would firmly place the IOUs in the middle of many (if not all)
8		of the gas-fired power projects that would be needed to meet local needs.
9		
10	Q.	Is there evidence that there is a shortage of IPP projects being developed in
10 11	Q.	Is there evidence that there is a shortage of IPP projects being developed in the LA Basin or San Diego?
10 11 12	Q. A.	Is there evidence that there is a shortage of IPP projects being developed in the LA Basin or San Diego? No. There are projects under development in both regions today. For example, the
10 11 12 13	Q. A.	Is there evidence that there is a shortage of IPP projects being developed inthe LA Basin or San Diego?No. There are projects under development in both regions today. For example, theCarlsbad Energy Center in northern San Diego County is a fully permitted project
10 11 12 13 14	Q. A.	Is there evidence that there is a shortage of IPP projects being developed in the LA Basin or San Diego? No. There are projects under development in both regions today. For example, the Carlsbad Energy Center in northern San Diego County is a fully permitted project that appears to be ready to begin construction once it obtains a Power Purchase
10 11 12 13 14 15	Q.	Is there evidence that there is a shortage of IPP projects being developed in the LA Basin or San Diego? No. There are projects under development in both regions today. For example, the Carlsbad Energy Center in northern San Diego County is a fully permitted project that appears to be ready to begin construction once it obtains a Power Purchase Agreement. There are also projects in the LA Basin that have submitted
10 11 12 13 14 15 16	Q.	Is there evidence that there is a shortage of IPP projects being developed in the LA Basin or San Diego? No. There are projects under development in both regions today. For example, the Carlsbad Energy Center in northern San Diego County is a fully permitted project that appears to be ready to begin construction once it obtains a Power Purchase Agreement. There are also projects in the LA Basin that have submitted applications to the CEC for permits, including Huntington Beach and Redondo
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	Q.	Is there evidence that there is a shortage of IPP projects being developed in the LA Basin or San Diego? No. There are projects under development in both regions today. For example, the Carlsbad Energy Center in northern San Diego County is a fully permitted project that appears to be ready to begin construction once it obtains a Power Purchase Agreement. There are also projects in the LA Basin that have submitted applications to the CEC for permits, including Huntington Beach and Redondo Beach. Based on this, it does not appear that there is a significant shortage of

18 Independent Power Projects that have sites and can move quickly to meet need.

³⁶ Presumably, the IOUs would request cost recovery for any land acquired for the energy parks. If this were the case, then the IOUs would have little incentive to control its costs for acquiring sites. This is completely different than IPPs, which have to obtain site control even though they are not guaranteed cost recovery for their investments in land.

Q. Would the traditional independent power project development model
 mitigate some of the risks you have identified with the IOUs' energy park
 proposals?

Yes. Rejecting the "energy park" model and retaining the traditional project 4 Α. 5 development model would mean there is no need to rely on legislative action. It would also help to mitigate the significant market power that the energy park 6 proposals would give to the IOUs. It would allow the continuation of the current 7 power procurement program, which at least provides a degree of transparency. 8 9 Project developers would have a known path forward for siting, permitting, and 10 obtaining a commercial agreement, which would reduce the perceived risk associated with a new and unknown process. All of these benefits clearly 11 12 outweigh the highly uncertain benefits of the "energy park" proposals.

13

14

Q. What do you recommend?

15 Α. The Commission should not support the energy park proposals presented by SCE and SDG&E. The proposals provide little or no details.³⁷ They likely require 16 17 legislative action before being implementable, meaning that there is a significant risk that they will take a great deal of time to put in place. The energy park 18 19 proposals skew the delicate market balance between independent generators and the IOUs. The proposals raise concerns about self-dealing. Furthermore, they 20 21 likely will undermine transparency and belief by the power project developers in 22 the procurement process. In sum, the Commission should not rely on the ill-

³⁷ In fact, the IOUs both indicate that they would plan to bring separate applications forward associated with their energy park concepts.

	formed energy park proposals to help meet local reliability needs identified in this
	proceeding.
Q.	What do you recommend if the Commission decides to consider the energy
	park proposals?
А.	In order to avoid any appearance of self-dealing, the Commission must exclude
	utility interests from any opportunity to develop projects at energy parks
	developed by the parent utility. In addition, the Commission should exclude
	"build-own-transfer" projects from using these locations.
III.	Response to Opening Testimony
Q.	What is the purpose of this section of your testimony?
А.	In this section, I respond to certain parts of the opening testimony of the CAISO,
	SCE, and SDG&E.
	A. Response to the CAISO's Opening Testimony
Q.	Please describe the CAISO's testimony.
А.	Mr. Sparks evaluated a number of scenarios based on assumptions specified by
	the Commission. He evaluated resource need for two years: 2018 and 2022. He
	examined resource need under different assumptions about the location of new
	resources (e.g., 80% of new resources in the LA Basin versus 67% of new
	resources in the LA Basin).
	Q. А. ПП. Q. А.

- 1 Q. What are the key conclusions from Mr. Sparks' testimony?
- A. Mr. Sparks identified the following resource need in the "SONGS Study Area"
 for 2022:
- 4

Table 7 - CAISO Estimate of Resource Need in SONGS Study Area

		Scenario	Track 1 De	cisions (MW)		Residual Resource Need
			LA Basin	San Diego	Resource Need without SONGS	Need Net of Track 1 Procurement
			(1)	(2)	(3)	(4) = (3) - (1) - (2)
	8	0%/20% LA/SD)	1,800	308	4,642	2,534
	6	7%/33% LA/SD)	1,800	308	4,507	2,399
5 6 7		As can be seen baseline need fo	from Table 7	7, the CAISO' rces of betwee	s preliminary resul en 2.399 and 2.534	ts show that there is a MW by 2022. This is
8		in addition to	the 1,800	MW that	have been previo	ously authorized for
9		procurement by	SCE and SI	DG&E in the p	rior Commission 7	Track 1 decision.
		1 5		X		
10						
11	Q.	Does the CAI	SO's testim	iony recomm	end that the Co	mmission authorize
12		procurement b	based on the	se results?		
13	А.	No. The CAIS	O recommen	ds that the Co	mmission should	wait until the CAISO
14		has completed	its transmis	ssion studies	as part of the 20	13/2014 TPP before
15		authorizing incl	remental proc	curement for 2	.022.	
16						
17	Q.	Has the CAIS	SO modified	l its position	since it submitt	ted its testimony in
18		Track 4?				
19	А.	Yes. In comm	ents filed or	n September	10, 2013, the CA	ISO indicated that it
20		"would not ob	pject" to an	interim Con	mission decision	regarding SCE and

1 SDG&E's interim procurement proposals. However, the CAISO also notes that 2 the amount of capacity authorized in the interim decision could either increase or decrease based on the results of the CAISO's ongoing transmission studies.³⁸ 3 Hence, the CAISO apparently suggests that an interim procurement decision by 4 5 the Commission be contingent and subject to reversal.

- 6
- 7

Do you agree with the CAISO's updated recommended approach for interim Ο. procurement? 8

9 Α. No. Contingent procurement decisions would prove completely unworkable from 10 the perspective of project developers. Viable developers would be highly unlikely 11 to devote time, personnel, and development capital to participate in a competitive 12 solicitation that might well be declared null and void as the result of future 13 CAISO transmission studies. SCE also agrees that the CAISO's proposal is untenable.39 14

15

How would you modify the CAISO's proposal to make it more workable for 16 Q. 17 project developers?

I recommend that the Commission authorize a "no regrets" amount of 18 Α. 19 procurement for both SCE and SDG&E. As discussed above, the level of procurement authorized in this proceeding should not be reduced as the result of 20

³⁸ "Comments of the California Independent System Operator Corporation on Proposed Track 2 and Track 4 Procedural Schedules," R.12-03-014, September 10, 2013, p. 4.

³⁹ "Opening Comments of Southern California Edison," filed in R.12-03-014, September 10, 2013, p. 3.

1		future analysis. Also, the IOUs would be granted cost recovery associated with
2		their no regrets procurement.
3		
4 5 6		B. Response to SCE's Opening Testimony
7	Q.	Please summarize SCE's testimony.
8	А.	SCE presented studies that were slightly different than the studies presented in the
9		CAISO's opening testimony. In addition to a scenario using gas-fired generation
10		to meet resource need, SCE examined two other sets of scenarios: transmission
11		upgrade scenarios and an aggressive Preferred Resource scenario. SCE's analysis
12		relied on NERC reliability criteria that are less stringent than assumptions used by
13		the CAISO in its Local Capacity Technical studies. SCE acknowledges that the
14		level of reliability assumed in its studies is not the same level of reliability that the
15		CAISO deems necessary. SCE claims that it needs to procure approximately
16		1,000 MW of resources beyond the Track 1 authorization, while the CAISO
17		recommends procurement of about 1,922 MW.
18		
19		SCE believes that construction of the Mesa Loop-In Transmission Project plus a
20		very aggressive development of strategically placed Preferred Resources could
21		eliminate the need for all but 500 MW of gas-fired generation using the CAISO's
22		reliability standards (and that there would be no need for additional gas-fired

23

generation resources using the NERC reliability standards.) As a result, SCE

proposes an interim procurement of 500 MW to ensure meeting the CAISO's

estimate of LCR under its assumed plan with the Mesa Loop-In and an aggressive Preferred Resource acquisition program (i.e., the "Living Pilot Program".)

3

1

2

4 SCE estimated the "net indicative cost" of four different resource procurement 5 scenarios: (1) a scenario relying primarily on incremental gas-fired generation 6 scenario, (2) a scenario with gas-fired generation and the Mesa Loop-In project, 7 (3) a scenario relying on an aggressive build-out of Preferred Resources plus gas-8 fired generation, and (4) a scenario relying on extensive development of new 9 transmission projects. The following table summarizes the amount of new gas-10 fired generation as well as SCE's estimated cost of each scenario:

11

Table 8 - SCE-Identified Resource Need

Scenario		Gas Generation ⁴⁰	Indicative Cost ⁴¹
Number		(MW)	(2013 Billion \$)
1	LA Basin Generation	2,802	1.25
2	LA Basin Transmission (Mesa Loop-In)	1,606	1.55
1S	Case 1 without SDG&E Load Shed	3,240	n/r/a
28	Case 2 without SDG&E Load Shed	2,506	n/r/a
3	Preferred Resources	1,055	1.9
4	Regional Transmission	1,198	2.5
	n/r/a = Not Readily Available		

12

13This table presents the amount of new gas-fired generation assumed in each14scenario. There are several important points to note about this table:

⁴⁰ SCE Track 4 Testimony, p. 32.

⁴¹ Estimated from SCE Track 4 Testimony, Figure IV-7, p. 42.

The table presents results using both the CAISO's reliability standards (i.e.,
 Scenarios 1S and 2S) and SCE's assumed level of reliability based on NERC
 standards (i.e., all other Scenarios).⁴² As can be seen, the level of gas-fired
 generation required under the CAISO reliability standards (Scenarios 1S and
 2S) is between 440 MW and 900 MW higher than assumed by SCE in its
 modeling for Scenarios 1 and 2, respectively.

- The gas-fired procurement levels in the table include the Track 1 procurement
 authorization (e.g., Scenario 1 requires an additional 1,002 MW 1,402 MW
 beyond the 1,400 MW 1,800 MW of Track 1 procurement to meet the
 assumed NERC reliability standards).
- The net cost of the Preferred Resource Plan option is about \$650 million
 greater than Scenario 1, which relies on clean in-basin gas-fired generation.
 The regional transmission scenario costs about twice what Scenario 1 costs
 (\$2.5 billion versus \$1.25 billion).
- Although SCE did not provide cost data for Scenarios 1S and 2S, presumably
 they would be several hundred million dollars more expensive than Scenarios
 1 and 2, respectively, since they would require greater levels of incremental
 resources.
- 19

20 Q. How do you respond to SCE's testimony?

A. There are several issues in SCE's testimony that require response. First, it appears
that SCE's recommended 500 MW for its interim procurement in Track 4 is not

⁴² The scenarios without load shedding use the CAISO reliability standards.

1		sufficient. Second, the untested "Living Pilot" places ratepayers at risk and should
2		not be the cornerstone of SCE's procurement program. Finally, SCE's "contingent
3		procurement" proposal needs clarification. I address each issue below.
4		1. Additional procurement is needed but SCE's proposal is too conservative
0 7	Q.	What does SCE propose for its interim procurement?
8	А.	SCE proposes to supplement its Track 1 procurement with an additional 500 MW
9		of procurement from all sources. Thus, for the LA Basin, SCE proposes to
10		procure 1,900 - 2,300 MW, with the breakdown of technologies as follows ^{43} :
11		• 50 MW of storage
12		• 150 MW of Preferred Resources
13		• 1,000 MW of gas-fired generation
14		• Up to 400 MW of additional Preferred Resources and storage
15		• A minimum of 700 MW from an all-source procurement
16		
17	Q.	Do you agree that SCE should pursue incremental resources through an
18		extension of its Track 1 procurement?
19	А.	Not exactly. Instead of extending SCE's Track 1 procurement authorization, the
20		Commission should ensure that SCE continues with its Track 1 procurement
21		efforts (which are now underway)44, and order SCE to hold an additional

⁴³ SCE Track 4 Testimony, p. 56.
 ⁴⁴ "Local Capacity Requirements ('LCR') RFO," available from SCE's Energy Procurement website, accessed September 25, 2013. See Attachment J. Available from: https://www.sce.com/wps/portal/home/procurement/LCR-RFO/!ut/p/b1/rVJNb4JAFPwr9NAj2YfL1x7XSHCtoSo2FS5kXReKgQURm_rvi5SrWhP39D5mJ28mg2K

1 solicitation as a result of Phase 1 of Track 4. As noted above, there is a clear need 2 for additional resources in the local area, and delaying the Track 1 solicitation 3 would potentially put the local area at risk. At the same time, it is reasonable to authorize an interim procurement based on the facts now before the Commission 4 (i.e., before the CAISO completes its 2013/2014 TPP). 5

- 6
- 7

Ο. Why do you believe that separating the Track 1 procurement from the Track 4 procurement is necessary? 8

9 Α. Melding the two procurement authorizations increases litigation risk. As I 10 understand the proposal, SCE is suggesting that projects selected in the Track I 11 solicitation should be considered for Track 4 in order to expedite decision-12 making. Potentially, this raises a host of issues that may result in delay. It is much cleaner procedurally to conduct any Track 4 solicitations separately from 13 14 the Track 1 solicitation, so that the RFOs, the responsive bids, and the 15 determination of winners of the two solicitations are contemporaneous.

16

17 0. Do you agree with SCE's proposed level of incremental procurement?

18 No. SCE has understated the amount of incremental procurement that should be Α. 19 authorized in Phase 1 of Track 4. SCE claims that it recommends procurement of 20 500 MW in Track 4 in order to "assure sufficient resources available to meet

0QbHi33nG27xSvLj0sZ3M2IQavjlivulhoDAP7bHlG5Q4HSDqAHDlUej G65PpywEBs6cABsvVh5ZE2y GegTxSgWqq3bLxQdhUxEpVqp2kSqVxjqV5BKNtlZq5tKnBpZ9rOiErzQBK-5yNuz1sjDKf_bHbVCNFqTVhfummdyJ495pvpO5DsUYY7N0U5sdWtrgW4awtUJTrFOuM1NQvDWGB mDshun33GmV3adwR1bdwAOHgDEB286ewfmr5cYGF5CEFKKAewBcMP-YFqVEkWdFufqsQuMwgfNuU1omc8mtB8mnP0jufnclhp179Lzn5atHl6AOvyo3T36dxeeelknZZIEgR6HL38AvEOjmU!/dl4/d5/L2dBISEvZ0FBIS9nQSEh/

1		CAISO expectations of need."45 However, as SCE readily admits, the proposed
2		shedding of firm load in the SDG&E area in case of an outage on the Southwest
3		Powerlink, system adjusted, and then an outage on the Sunrise Powerlink is not
4		acceptable to the CAISO as a means to address this set of outages. ⁴⁶ Thus, it is
5		unreasonable for SCE to count on using load shedding in the SDG&E area when
6		it assesses need from Track 4.
7		
8	Q.	What should the amount of procurement be for the recommended interim
9		procurement?
10	А.	The "no regrets" procurement should ultimately result in SCE procuring 2,506
11		MW of local capacity between its Track 1 solicitation and any procurement
12		authorization from this Phase 1 of Track 4. In other words, the Commission
13		should authorize SCE to procure between 706 MW and 1,106 MW in the decision
14		on Phase 1 of Track 4. ⁴⁷ This is what SCE finds that it needs using the CAISO's
15		reliability requirements.48
16		
17 18 19 20		2. The Living Pilot is Untested and Risky. The Commission Should Give it Little Weight
21	Q.	How has SCE described its "Living Pilot" to procure Preferred Resources?

⁴⁵ SCE Track 4 Testimony, p. 7.
⁴⁶ SCE Track 4 Testimony, p. 27.
⁴⁷ 706 MW = 2,506 MW (Scenario 2S) - 1,800 MW (upper bound on Track 1 procurement)
1,106 MW = 2,506 MW (Scenario 2S) - 1,400 MW (lower bound on Track 1 procurement)
⁴⁸ This level of procurement assumes that the Mesa Loop-In is approved by the CAISO in the 2013/2014 TPP and that SCE decides to pursue the project. If this does not occur, then the Commission may need to give SCE additional procurement authorization in Phase 2 of Track 4.

1	А.	SCE's Track 4 testimony provides a general description of the Living Pilot.
2		SCE's testimony describes the general location for the Living Pilot, how the pilot
3		does not, at this point, have any specific MW target, that SCE will rely on
4		contingent development of sites for gas-fired generation, and that the Living Pilot
5		should be developed through a collaborative process.49
6		
7	Q.	Do you think that SCE's proposal to initiate a pilot program to test the
8		ability of Preferred Resources to meet LCR is reasonable?
9	А.	Yes. A small-scale pilot program to test the capabilities of Preferred Resources to
10		deliver capacity in the appropriate location at the appropriate time is warranted.
11		Such a pilot would provide the Commission with useful information regarding
12		future resource procurement efforts. ⁵⁰
13	Q.	Is it prudent to rely on the Living Pilot to meet LCR at this time?
14	А.	No. First, as discussed above, SCE's proposal is not fully formed. SCE even
15		admits that it would rely on an open, collaborative process to develop the pilot.
16		That hardly sounds like a fully-formed project that is ready to deliver capacity to
17		meet the immediate local reliability requirements resulting from the shutdown of
18		SONGS.
19		

 ⁴⁹ SCE Track 4 Testimony, pp. 49-54.
 ⁵⁰ It might be appropriate for SCE to bring such a pilot to the Commission through an application, rather than proposing it during the LTPP proceeding. This would force SCE to fully describe the Living Pilot and allow all interested parties to help SCE vet the proposal.

1		Second, SCE has linked its Living Pilot with contingent development of sites for
2		generation. If the Living Pilot is not successful, then SCE apparently would then
3		turn to developers to propose to build gas-fired generation at SCE's contingent
4		generation sites. As noted above, SCE's contingent development program (as well
5		as SDG&E's energy park proposal) has serious flaws. Because of those flaws, the
6		Commission should not adopt the IOUs' proposals as a tool to meet local area
7		reliability needs at this time.
8		
9		To the extent that the Commission finds value in the Pilot Project, IEP
10		recommends treating it as a pilot test project subject to empirical analysis of the
11		results over the next several years. Absent the ill-conceived contingent
12		development proposal, the Living Pilot places ratepayers at too much risk of
13		resource shortages when the OTC units come offline.
14		
15 16	0	3. Contingent contracting/options
17	Q.	What has SCE proposed regarding using contingent contracts or options for
18		the solicitation resulting from Track 4?
19	А.	SCE proposes to enter into contingent contracts for development of gas-fired
20		generation. These contracts would allow SCE to terminate the agreement and
21		make a payment to the counter-party (i.e., the developer). SCE contends that since
22		these contingent contracts would be very heterogeneous, "a competitive

1		solicitation will not be conducive for selecting and contracting for such a					
2		commercial arrangement." ⁵¹					
3							
4	Q.	Do you have concerns about SCE's proposal?					
5	А.	Yes. First, the proposal is even less clearly explained than SCE's proposal to					
6		develop contingent sites for gas-fired generation projects. While the proposal may					
7		be reasonable, it is very difficult to know since SCE's description of the option is					
8		so limited.					
9							
10		Second, I am concerned about how SCE proposes to pursue this product. Rather					
11	than asking bidders in its RFOs to bid on providing optional off-ramps (and the						
12	costs for SCE to exercise those off-ramps), SCE proposes to use a bilater						
13		procurement approach for these contingent contracts. Such an approach could					
14		limit the supply of potential offers. It would also make determining the					
15		reasonableness of the option contracts very difficult.					
16							
17	Q.	Why do you say that a bilateral approach might limit the supply of offers?					
18	А.	The success of a bilateral approach hinges on the level of effort that SCE makes					
19		to obtain a broad set of proposals. Unless SCE publicizes its efforts and is willing					
20		to accept a wide variety of proposals, it is possible that some developers might not					
21		provide SCE with an option to decide if a project is better suited for full					
22		development or as a back-up option.					

⁵¹ SCE Track 4 Testimony, p. 59, note 35.

- 2 Q. Why do you say that SCE's proposal will make it difficult to test the 3 reasonableness of the selected offers?
- A. If SCE only receives a small set of option offers, then it will have only a small
 sample of potential options to compare and present to the Commission and the
 Independent Evaluator (IE). This could put the Commission and IE in the position
 of having to opine on the reasonableness of SCE's actions without having an
 extensive set of offers to serve as comparables.
- 9

10

Q. What do you recommend?

11 SCE's proposal might be a reasonable approach but it requires some modification. Α. 12 First, in its Track 4 RFOs, SCE should allow developers to provide an option to 13 have their projects considered as contingent development/termination options. 14 The option should allow the developer to specify the payments that it would need 15 in order to terminate development of its project at different points (e.g., after submitting its application for a siting permit, after obtaining its permits, before 16 17 purchasing major equipment). The scoring of the option offer should then be part of the RFO's bid evaluation. SCE's actions should be reviewed by the IE as part 18 19 of the IE's evaluation of the RFOs.

- 20
- 21 C. Response to SDG&E Opening Testimony
 22
 23

Please summarize SDG&E's testimony.

24 Q.

1	А.	SDG&E, like SCE, presented studies that were slightly different than the studies
2		presented in the CAISO's opening testimony. In addition to a scenario using gas-
3		fired generation to meet resource need, SDG&E examined two other scenarios:
4		(1) a transmission upgrade scenario in which SDG&E would construct a new 500
5		kV Direct Current (DC) regional transmission project from Imperial Valley to
6		SONGS Mesa and (2) a transmission upgrade scenario in which SDG&E would
7		construct a 500 kV Alternating Current regional transmission project from Devers
8		substation to a new 230 kV substation in north San Diego County. SDG&E
9		analyzed the scenarios using two different reliability criteria: (1) an N-1-1 criteria
10		(as used by CAISO) and (2) a N-1/G-1 criteria (which SDG&E claims meets
11		NERC and CAISO requirements). SDG&E's analysis is relatively consistent with
12		the CAISO's when SDG&E uses the same reliability criteria. However, when
13		SDG&E uses the N-1/G-1 reliability standard, it projects about 150 MW less need
14		than the CAISO (when the CAISO uses the N-1-1 standard).

16

Table 9 presents SDG&E's modeling results (using an N-1-1 reliability criteria):

17

Table 9 - SDG&E Modeling Results

		Gas
		Generation
Scenario		(MW)
1	Conventional Generation	1,470
2	Imperial Valley-SONGS DC Line	620
3	Devers-North County AC line	820

18

As can be seen from the above results, SDG&E sees a potential need of between
620 and 1,470 MW, depending on whether or not a major transmission project

1		(that SDG&E has yet to submit to the CAISO's Reliability Project Window for
2		the 2013/2014 TPP ⁵²) can come online by 2022.
3		
4		Based on these modeling results, SDG&E proposes an interim procurement of
5		500-550 MW from all sources "to account for possible growth in demand
6		response with the characteristics needed to address local grid reliability needs."53
7		Apparently, SDG&E believes that one of its proposed regional transmission
8		projects will be approved by the CAISO, planned, permitted, granted a Certificate
9		of Public Convenience and Necessity, and constructed by 2022.
10		
11	Q.	How do you respond to SDG&E's testimony?
12	А.	There are several issues in SDG&E's testimony that require response. First,
12 13	А.	There are several issues in SDG&E's testimony that require response. First, SDG&E's recommended 500-550 MW for its initial procurement is not sufficient.
12 13 14	Α.	 There are several issues in SDG&E's testimony that require response. First, SDG&E's recommended 500-550 MW for its initial procurement is not sufficient. Second, SDG&E presents absolutely no information regarding the relative costs
12 13 14 15	А.	 There are several issues in SDG&E's testimony that require response. First, SDG&E's recommended 500-550 MW for its initial procurement is not sufficient. Second, SDG&E presents absolutely no information regarding the relative costs of its various scenarios, making it impossible to develop even an order of
12 13 14 15 16	Α.	 There are several issues in SDG&E's testimony that require response. First, SDG&E's recommended 500-550 MW for its initial procurement is not sufficient. Second, SDG&E presents absolutely no information regarding the relative costs of its various scenarios, making it impossible to develop even an order of magnitude estimate of the cost-effectiveness of the various scenarios. I address
12 13 14 15 16 17	Α.	There are several issues in SDG&E's testimony that require response. First, SDG&E's recommended 500-550 MW for its initial procurement is not sufficient. Second, SDG&E presents absolutely no information regarding the relative costs of its various scenarios, making it impossible to develop even an order of magnitude estimate of the cost-effectiveness of the various scenarios. I address each of these issues below.
12 13 14 15 16 17 18	Α.	There are several issues in SDG&E's testimony that require response. First, SDG&E's recommended 500-550 MW for its initial procurement is not sufficient. Second, SDG&E presents absolutely no information regarding the relative costs of its various scenarios, making it impossible to develop even an order of magnitude estimate of the cost-effectiveness of the various scenarios. I address each of these issues below.
12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	Α.	There are several issues in SDG&E's testimony that require response. First, SDG&E's recommended 500-550 MW for its initial procurement is not sufficient. Second, SDG&E presents absolutely no information regarding the relative costs of its various scenarios, making it impossible to develop even an order of magnitude estimate of the cost-effectiveness of the various scenarios. I address each of these issues below. 1. SDG&E's Interim Procurement Request is too Low

 ⁵² Jontry Track 4 Testimony, p. 9.
 ⁵³ Anderson Track 4 Testimony, p. 12. This assumes that SDG&E's Pio Pico application is approved.

- 1 Α. SDG&E requests approval to procure 500-550 MW of all sources as an interim procurement step. SDG&E makes this request because it realizes that gas-fired 2 generation can take more than 7 years to develop.⁵⁴ 3
- 4
- 5

Is this a reasonable level for procurement for SDG&E? 0.

6 No. SDG&E's proposed procurement level assumes that a major regional Α. 7 transmission project will come online by 2022. If this does not occur and all of SDG&E's other assumptions are correct (e.g., both the Pio Pico and Wellhead 8 9 projects are successfully developed and brought online), then SDG&E would 10 need to procure 1,470 MW of additional capacity. If SDG&E only procures 500-11 550 MW in the Phase 1, Track 4 solicitation, then SDG&E would still have a resource need of 920 – 970 MW.55 12

What are your concerns regarding SDG&E's Transmission Proposal. 13 Ο.

14 Α. While SDG&E has been successful at developing major transmission projects in 15 the past, it is far from clear that it will be successful with these projects given the time constraints. The proposed DC line from Imperial Valley to SONGS Mesa 16 17 would almost certainly run into similar opposition and challenges that the Sunrise Powerlink faced during siting and construction. However, unlike the Sunrise 18 19 Powerlink, this DC line would have to avoid the Sunrise Powerlink, meaning that it might be necessary to find a new corridor for the DC line. Given the difficulties 20 21 in finding an acceptable corridor for Sunrise, this could prove very challenging. In 22 addition, the western end of the Sunrise Powerlink faced very stiff opposition

 ⁵⁴ Anderson Track 4 Testimony, p. 16.
 ⁵⁵ 920 MW = 1,470 MW - 550 MW; 970 MW = 1,470 MW - 500 MW.

from local community groups and, as a result, that final link was not part of the approved project. It is certainly possible that the DC line would face similar types of opposition, especially in regions that are relatively built up.

4

3

1

2

It is possible that the AC line from Devers to the North County substation might 5 face less opposition. However, routing to the west from the Devers substation has 6 been a challenge, as was seen when the Devers-Palo Verde 2 line ran into 7 challenges when trying to gain approval for routing across the Morongo tribal 8 lands.⁵⁶ Assuming that the AC line is constructed, SDG&E's own analysis shows 9 10 that it needs 820 MW of additional generation by 2022. Thus, SDG&E's proposed 11 500-550 MW interim procurement would be about 300 MW short of SDG&E's 12 own estimate of need.

- 13
- 14

Q. What do you recommend?

A. The Commission should authorize an interim procurement of 820 MW for SDG&E.⁵⁷ This is the level of need identified by SDG&E using the CAISO's reliability criteria and assuming that the Devers-North County regional transmission project comes online. This is the appropriate level of procurement based on the CAISO's reliability standards. If the Commission does not authorize SDG&E's Pio Pico application or there are problems with the Wellhead project, then the Commission should increase SDG&E's interim procurement.

⁵⁶ After 5 years of negotiations, SCE and the Morongo Band finally reached agreement on a route.

However, it appears clear that SCE plans to use that route for its proposed West of Devers upgrades.

⁵⁷ Jontry Track 4 Testimony, p. 11.

1		It is important to note that the recommended level of procurement would not be
2		sufficient if SDG&E fails to get any major transmission projects online by 2022.
3		If the CAISO determines in its 2013/2014 TPP that neither of the transmission
4		projects should be pursued, then the Commission should immediately increase
5		SDG&E's procurement level to approximately 1,470 MW.
6		
7	Q.	How should these resources be procured?
8	А.	As part of Track 4, Phase 1, SDG&E should be authorized to conduct an initial
9		"all-source" solicitation for 820 MW in mid-2014.
10		
11	Q.	Do you have any other suggestions regarding how these resources should be
12		procured?
13	А.	Yes. Similar to IEP's recommendations regarding SCE's interim Track 4
14		procurement, SDG&E should plan to conduct a Track 4, Phase 2 procurement.
15		The Track 4, Phase 2 interim procurement would reflect any additional need for
16		SDG&E determined by the Commission based on updated TPP studies from the
17		CAISO (expected first quarter 2014).
18 19		
20 21		2. SDG&E Should Supplement its Proposal With Cost Data
22 23	Q.	Has SDG&E presented any cost data associated with the various scenarios
24		that it presented in its opening testimony?
25	А.	No. Unlike SCE, SDG&E did not provide any sort of estimate of the cost of each
26		of its scenarios.

2 Q. What do you recommend?

A. As part of Track 4, Phase 1, the Commission should order SDG&E to supplement its testimony to provide indicative estimates of the net costs of its different scenarios. Without this information, the Commission cannot make a rational decision about the level of interim procurement that is reasonable. This is especially important since SDG&E's entire interim procurement strategy hinges on the approval of a major regional transmission project that would likely cost billions of dollars.

- 10 IV. Conclusion
- 11

12

- 13 Q. Does this conclude your opening testimony?
- 14 A. Yes.

ATTACHMENT A

Table of Attachments

Attachment A: Resume of William A. Monsen

- Attachment B: M. Jaske, "Overview of Southern California Electricity Infrastructure Issues," presented July 15, 2013.
- Attachment C: Christopher Arns, "U.S. Economy Somewhat Stagnant, but California, Not So Much," August 1, 2013.
- Attachment D: California Energy Commission, *Adopted Energy Demand Forecast Report 2012-2022,* Mid-Form 1.4, "Peak Demand (MW)," Updated November 6, 2012.
- Attachment E: California Energy Commission, Adopted Energy Demand Forecast Report 2012-2022, Mid-Form 1.5b, "1 in 2 Net Electricity Peak Demand by Agency and Balancing Authority (MW)," Updated November 6, 2012.
- Attachment F: California Energy Commission, "Energy Action Plan II," September 21, 2005.
- Attachment G: E3, "Renewable Energy Flexibility (REFLEX) Results," presented August 26, 2013.
- Attachment H: California Independent System Operator, *Consideration of Alternatives to Transmission or Conventional Generation to Address Local Needs in the Transmission Planning Process*, September 4, 2013.
- Attachment I: California Public Utilities Commission Transmission and Environmental Planning Team, "General Information on Permitting Electric Transmission Projects at the California Public Utilities Commission," presented June 2009.
- Attachment J: Southern California Edison, "Local Capacity Requirements ('LCR') RFO," issued September 12, 2013.
- Attachment K: Edward Randolph (CPUC), Sylvia Bender (CEC), and Phil Pettingill (CAISO), "Southern California Reliability: Preliminary Plan," presented September 9, 2013.

Attachment A: Resume of William A. Monsen

WILLIAM ALAN MONSEN

PROFESSIONAL Principal EXPERIENCE MRW &

MRW & Associates, LLC

(1989 - Present)

Specialist in electric utility generation planning, resource auctions, demand-side management policy, power market simulation, power project evaluation, and evaluation of energy cost management options. Typical assignments include: analysis, testimony preparation and strategy development in large, complex regulatory efforts pertaining to utility mergers, independent or merchant power, renewable energy resources, and wholesale or retail electric prices; analysis of markets for non-utility generator power in the western U.S., China, and Korea; evaluation of the cost-effectiveness of onsite power generation options; advising large commercial and industrial customers on energy management and cost-reduction options; analysis of the value of incentives and regulatory mechanisms in encouraging utility-sponsored DSM; and negotiating non-utility generator power sales contract terms with utilities.

Energy Economist

Pacific Gas & Electric Company (1981 - 1989)

Responsible for analysis of utility and non-utility investment opportunities using PG&E's Strategic Analysis Model. Performed technical analysis supporting PG&E's Long Term Planning efforts. Performed Monte Carlo analysis of electric supply and demand uncertainty to quantify the value of resource flexibility. Developed DSM forecasting models used for long-term planning studies. Created an engineering-econometric modeling system to estimate impacts of DSM programs. Responsible for PG&E's initial efforts to quantify the benefits of DSM using production cost models.

Academic Staff

University of Wisconsin-Madison Solar Energy Laboratory (1980 - 1981)

Developed simplified methods to analyze efficiency of passive solar energy systems. Performed computer simulation of passive solar energy systems as part of Department of Energy's System Simulation and Economic Analysis working group.

EDUCATION Masters, Mechanical Engineering, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1980. B.S., Engineering Physics, University of California, Berkeley, 1977. Attachment B: M. Jaske, "Overview of Southern California Electricity Infrastructure Issues," presented July 15, 2013.



-

Overview of Southern California Electricity Infrastructure Issues

Joint CEC/CPUC Workshop

Los Angeles

July 15, 2013

Michael R. Jaske, PhD California Energy Commission Electricity Supply Analysis Division Mike.Jaske@energy.ca.gov / 916-654-4777



Unique Influence of SONGS

- Located within local reliability area
- Integral to system stability at the interface between SCE and SDG&E systems; especially voltage instability
- SONGS retirement has greater impacts on SDG&E and southern Orange County than SCE as a whole
- Produced baseload energy with an average 82% annual capacity factor for 2001-2011

Attachment C: Christopher Arns, "U.S. Economy Somewhat Stagnant, but California, Not So Much," August 1, 2013.

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- Local Business Directory
- <u>Book of L</u>ists
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U.S. economy somewhat stagnant, but California, not so much



Christopher Arns Staff Writer - Sacramento Business Journal

www bizjournals, com/sacramento/news2013/08/01/us-economy-stagnant-california-not-affec. html

US economy somewhat stagnan but California may not be affected - Sacramembal Business Jou Emaail <u>Twitter LiinkedIn Gologie+</u>

We dnesday was a decent day for the nations economy onof a frocomulus, e although California probably wasn't affected.

For starters, the nation<u>expadenced by 1.7</u> periment the second quarter according to <u>tube S.</u> <u>Commerce Departmetsuseau of Economic Analysis</u> beating some economist expectations. The Federal Resenveedal to peep its \$85 billion monthly bond-buying program — y phenotwn of as a strateg quantitative easing <u>-eontionue stimulating the econfor</u> the near future, according to the Wall Street Journal.

The new data doesn't necessarily mean much for Cankinny/orniaDifsfereemot reports have already forecasted the Golden<u>groStateState product will3</u> grow percent this year and 4 percent in 2014. Bortificatumtableyrs would sig outperform U.S. output.

Sacramento's regional economy probably also won'tTwobediafferented. sources indicate continued economic recovery for the theorem. The strategic Economic Research local thinker etaestiks, increased job growthby September in the center's quarterly review of the economy. The Sacramento Business Review also released his week ort predicting continued recoverno, better economic performance for the area next year.

For anyone doing business outside of California, theoretewas asmiondent the good news: the Commerce Departmentsed first quarter godownth from 1.8 percent to 1.1 percent. According outronalt, he adventhing treet J less than 2 percent growth for two consecutive quantationers recessed by is on the way. The U.S. economy has now grown heres for an there nu straight quarters.

In the story, posted before the Commerce Department erelo@Defased th numbers, the Journal reported that some economists ittendinkStatkes Un economy's growth in the second quarter would fallt.to IO.head percen described the nation as stuck in "stall speed."

Christopher Arns covers state legislation, reguladactos, anads contr well as economic news, international trade and economic develop for the Sacramento Business Journal.

Related links:

Californi & Conomic Snapshot

Industries:

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Attachment D: California Energy Commission, *Adopted Energy Demand Forecast Report 2012-2022,* Mid-Form 1.4, "Peak Demand (MW)," Updated November 6, 2012.
Form 1.4 - STATEWIDE

California Energy Demand 2012-2022 Staff Final Forecast - Mid Demand Case

Peak Demand (MW)

Year	Total End Use Load	Net Losses	Gross Generation	Non-PV Self Generation	PV	Total Private Supply	Net Peak Demand	Load Factor (%)
2000	50,803	4,346	55,149	1,445	3	1,449	53,700	58.15
2001	47,353	4,035	51,388	1,490	6	1,496	49,892	59.53
2002	50,567	4,298	54,866	1,711	13	1,725	53,141	56.95
2003	52,560	4,451	57,011	1,813	27	1,840	55,170	56.15
2004	53,552	4,530	58,082	1,835	45	1,880	56,201	57.01
2005	55,796	4,718	60,513	1,857	66	1,923	58,591	54.89
2006	60,926	5,189	66,116	1,862	92	1,954	64,162	51.74
2007	59,885	5,076	64,961	1,860	128	1,988	62,973	53.70
2008	58,809	4,995	63,805	1,923	200	2,123	61,681	54.82
2009	56,200	4,738	60,938	1,867	300	2,167	58,771	55.73
2010	59,865	5,046	64,911	1,937	411	2,348	62,564	51.38
2011	57,993	4,865	62,858	1,953	595	2,548	60,310	54.12
2012	59,570	4,985	64,555	1,998	762	2,760	61,796	53.36
2013	60,962	5,105	66,067	2,001	796	2,797	63,270	52.71
2014	61,871	5,179	67,051	2,004	855	2,860	64,191	52.58
2015	62,742	5,248	67,990	2,008	946	2,954	65,036	52.51
2016	63,668	5,319	68,987	2,011	1,063	3,074	65,913	52.43
2017	64,490	5,390	69,880	2,013	1,074	3,087	66,792	52.34
2018	65,298	5,459	70,757	2,017	1,098	3,116	67,641	52.24
2019	66,178	5,532	71,710	2,024	1,139	3,163	68,548	52.24
2020	67,068	5,603	72,671	2,034	1,218	3,253	69,418	52.24
2021	67,915	5,667	73,582	2,049	1,327	3,376	70,206	52.26
2022	68,763	5,727	74,490	2,070	1,475	3,544	70,946	52.30

Last historic year is 2011.

Attachment E: California Energy Commission, *Adopted Energy Demand Forecast Report 2012-2022*, Mid-Form 1.5b, "1 in 2 Net Electricity Peak Demand by Agency and Balancing Authority (MW)," Updated November 6, 2012.

Form 1.5b - Statewide Final California Energy Demand Forecast, 2012 - 2022 1 in 2 Net Electricity Peak Demand by Agency and Balancing Authority (MW)

Balancing Authority	Agency	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
	CCSF	128	131	135	137	140	142	143	145	146	147	148	148
	NCPA - Greater Bay Area	229	235	240	244	248	252	256	259	262	264	267	268
	Other NP15 LSEs - Bay Area PG&E Service Area - Greater	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	4
	Bay Area	7,652	7,836	8,025	8,143	8,254	8,366	8,473	8,576	8,690	8,801	8,904	8,999
	Silicon Valley Power	436	446	457	465	472	477	483	488	491	494	496	496
Greater Bay													
Area Subtotal		8,448	8,651	8,860	8,992	9,117	9,240	9,357	9,470	9,591	9,710	9,818	9,916
	CDWR-N*	234	234	234	234	234	234	234	234	234	234	234	234
	NCPA - Non Bay Area	217	223	227	231	234	237	240	243	246	249	251	253
	Other NP15 LSEs - Non Bay												
	Area	84	86	88	89	90	92	93	94	95	96	97	96
	PG&E Service Area - Non												
	Bay Area	9,175	9,396	9,621	9,763	9,897	10,030	10,158	10,282	10,419	10,552	10,675	10,790
	WAPA	227	233	237	241	244	247	249	251	253	254	255	255
Total North of Path 15		18 385	18 822	19.268	19 551	10.816	20.078	20 331	20.573	20.837	21.095	21 320	21 545
	CDWR-7P26*	270	270	270	270	270	20,070	20,001	20,070	20,007	27,000	21,020	21,070
		210	210	215	210	213	210	213	213	210	210	215	213
	PG&E Service Area - ZP26	2,202	2,255	2,309	2,344	2,376	2,408	2,439	2,469	2,502	2,533	2,563	2,591
Total Zone													
Path 26		2,482	2,534	2,588	2,623	2,655	2,687	2,718	2,748	2,781	2,813	2,842	2,870
Total Valley		12,418	12,705	12,996	13,181	13,353	13,526	13,692	13,851	14,026	14,198	14,353	14,499
Total North of Path 26		20,867	21,356	21,857	22,174	22,471	22,765	23,049	23,321	23,617	23,907	24,171	24,415
	Merced	83	85	87	89	90	91	92	93	93	94	94	93
	Turlock Irrigation District	481	492	504	510	517	522	528	534	540	546	551	555

Balancing Authority	Agency	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
Total Turlock													
Irrigation													
District Control													
Area		564	577	591	599	607	613	619	626	633	640	645	648
	City of Shasta Lake	19	20	20	21	21	21	21	21	21	21	21	21
	Modesto Irrigation District	626	641	656	666	674	681	689	696	704	712	718	723
	Redding	227	233	237	241	244	248	252	255	260	263	267	270
	Roseville	325	333	341	346	351	355	360	365	370	374	378	381
	SMUD	3,024	3,096	3,170	3,213	3,255	3,302	3,345	3,384	3,427	3,467	3,505	3,540
	WAPA (SMUD)	189	193	198	202	205	208	210	212	214	216	216	217
Total													
SMUD/WAPA		4.400	4 5 4 7	4.000	4 600	4.750	4.044	4.077	4 000	4.005	5.050	E 40E	E 450
Control Area	Amelanina	4,409	4,517	4,622	4,690	4,750	4,814	4,877	4,933	4,995	5,053	5,105	0,152
	Ananeim	554	568	582	591	598	606	614	623	631	636	641	646
		21	21		21	21	21	21	21	21	21	21	21
	Other SP15 LSEs - LA Basin	267	273	280	284	287	291	295	299	303	307	310	313
	Pasadena	287	295	302	305	308	311	314	316	320	324	327	330
	Riverside	545	560	573	581	587	596	604	614	623	630	637	643
	SCE Service Area - LA Basin	16,105	16,524	16,921	17,161	17,378	17,613	17,851	18,085	18,328	18,558	18,775	18,972
	Vernon	162	166	170	174	176	176	177	177	177	177	175	174
LA Basin													
Subtotal		17,941	18,407	18,848	19,116	19,355	19,614	19,876	20,135	20,402	20,653	20,886	21,098
	CDWR-S*	374	374	374	374	374	374	374	374	374	374	374	374
	SCE Service Area - Big	2.000	0.000	2.400	2.440	2,400	2 5 4 0	0.500	0.005	0.000	0.700	0 7 7 0	0.040
Pia	Creek ventura	3,230	3,320	3,400	3,449	3,492	3,540	3,300	0,000	3,003	3,729	3,773	3,013
Creek/Ventura													
Subtotal		3,610	3,694	3,774	3,823	3,866	3,914	3,961	4,009	4,057	4,103	4,147	4,186
	MWD	210	210	210	209	209	209	210	211	212	211	211	211
	Other SP15 LSEs - Out of LA												
	Basin	9	10	10	10	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	10
	SCE Service Area - Out of LA												
	Basin	671	689	705	714	724	733	743	753	763	773	782	789
I I OTAI SCE IAC		22.442	22.000	72510	22.972	04 165	74.490	24.902	25 110	25 115	25 750	26.027	26.204
Inica		22,442	23,009	20,040	20,072	24,100	24,400	24,002	20,110	20,440	20,102	20,007	20,284

Balancing													
Authority	Agency	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
SDG&E		(10-				((
Service Area		4,435	4,560	4,685	4,776	4,865	4,962	5,068	5,167	5,265	5,359	5,450	5,536
Total South of		00.077	07.500	00.000	00.047	00.000	00.440	00.070	00.005	00.740	24.444	04 407	04.000
Patri 20	D. J. J.	20,877	27,569	28,232	28,647	29,030	29,442	29,870	30,285	30,710	31,111	31,487	31,830
	Burbank	312	319	327	331	336	340	344	348	352	357	361	364
	Glendale	340	349	357	363	367	372	377	382	387	392	398	404
	LADWP	5,946	6,084	6,230	6,315	6,386	6,460	6,532	6,604	6,690	6,774	6,856	6,937
Total LADWP		6 508	6 750	6.01/	7 000	7 000	7 170	7 252	7 3 3 4	7 / 20	7.524	7 615	7 705
Imporial		0,080	0,102	0,814	7,009	7,080	1,112	1,200	1,004	1,425	1,024	7,013	7,705
Irrigation													
District Control													
Area		995	1,025	1,054	1,071	1,088	1,106	1,123	1,142	1,162	1,184	1,183	1,196
Total CAISO													
Noncoincident													
Peak		47,743	48,925	50,089	50,821	51,501	52,208	52,919	53,606	54,328	55,019	55,658	56,245
Total CAISO													
Coincident													
Peak		46,597	47,751	48,887	49,601	50,264	50,955	51,649	52,320	53,024	53,698	54,323	54,895
Total													
Statewide													
Noncoincident		60.240	61 706	62.070	64.104	65.000	65.040	66 700	67 6 / 4	60 E / 0	60 410	70 000	70.040
Teda		016,00	01,190	03,270	04,191	05,036	00,913	00,792	07,041	00,040	09,418	10,200	/0,940
1 OTAI Statowida													
Coincident													
Peak		58,863	60,313	61,752	62,651	63,475	64,331	65,189	66,018	66,902	67,752	68,521	69,243

* Entries for California Department of Water Resources are estimated actual peaks. Staff provides slightly higher short-run totals for California ISO/CPUC Resource Adequacy proceec Table only developed for the mid case. Table developed based on weather-adjusted 2011 peak estimates Attachment F: California Energy Commission, "Energy Action Plan II," September 21, 2005.

STATE OF CALIFORNIA





PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION

ENERGY ACTION PLAN II

IMPLEMENTATION ROADMAP FOR ENERGY POLICIES

September 21, 2005

SB_GT&S_0159650

I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

Attachment G: E3, "Renewable Energy Flexibility (REFLEX) Results," presented August 26, 2013.



Renewable Energy Flexibility (REFLEX) Results

CPUC Workshop August 26, 2013 Scope of E3 Work

-	Investigate flexibility and capacity nee for PLEXOS and other tools	eds using REFLEX
-	2012 Historical Case	
	 2012 Loads and Renewables 	1. 编制资格推动资格分词的历史表示的 1 · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
	 Test and refine REFLEX model 	
÷	TPP/Commercial Interest Case	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
	 Develop multi-year datasets with the same the deterministic case 	build assumptions as
	 Define probabilistic context for CAISO deter 	ministic case
	 Test the need for flexible capacity and deter operational solutions like economic pre-curt 	rmine the value of ailment
		化化化化化化化化化化化化化化化化
		1 化汽车市场市台市场运行管管部站的路路;
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		2
v+Fr	nvironmental Economics	

Energy+Environmental Economics

Cost Penalties Assumed for Flexibility Violations

Hourly Violation P	+ Penalties	Relative cost penalties impose flexibility mitigation strategy "loading order"
Type of Violation	Test Run Value	Best estimate of final value
Unserved Energy	\$100,000/MWh	\$40,000/MWh
Overgeneration	\$2,000,000/MWh	Linked closely to curtailment cost
Curtailment Cost	Hard constraint	\$250/MWh; Replace lost revenues
Spinning reserves	Hard constraint	Hard constraint

Intra-hourly Violation Penalties

Type of violation	Test Run Value	Best estimate of final value
Upward Ramping Violation	\$10,000/MWh	\$1,000/MWh; highly dependent on the degree of shortage experienced
Downward Ramping Violation	\$10,000/MWh	\$200/MWh ; Could result in need for curtailment
Insufficient Regulation	\$10,000/MW	\$1,000/MW; insufficient regulation likely results in CPS violations

Energy+Environmental Economics

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Attachment H: California Independent System Operator, Consideration of Alternatives to Transmission or Conventional Generation to Address Local Needs in the Transmission Planning Process, September 4, 2013.



Consideration of alternatives to transmission or conventional generation to address local needs in the transmission planning process

September 4, 2013

SB_GT&S_0159658

Table of Contents

1		Exe	ecutive summary
2		Inti	roduction4
3		Rel	ationship to ISO's DR and EE Roadmap6
4		ISO)'s past approach to assessing non-transmission alternatives7
5		ISO)'s proposed three-step methodology7
	5.	-	Step One – Development of a generic resource catalog
	5.2	2	Step Two – Determining an effective mix of resources10
	5.3	3	Step three – Monitoring development of the non-conventional solution
6		Арј	plying the proposed methodology in the 2013-2014 transmission planning process12
	6.:	1	A preliminary catalog of generic resources
	6.	2	Determining an effective mix of resources for each pilot area
7		Sta	keholder process and next steps

Consideration of alternatives to transmission or conventional generation to address local needs in the Transmission Planning Process

1 Executive summary

In this paper the ISO is presenting a methodology it has developed to support California's policy emphasis on the use of preferred resources – specifically energy efficiency, demand response, renewable generating resources and energy storage – by considering how such resources can constitute non-conventional solutions to meet local area needs that otherwise would require new transmission or conventional generation infrastructure. In addition to developing a methodology to be applied annually in the transmission planning process ("TPP"), this paper also describes how the ISO will apply the proposed methodology in the current (2013-2014) transmission planning cycle. In so doing, this initiative carries out an activity identified in the ISO's draft demand response and energy efficiency roadmap published on June 12.

The approach proposed in this paper will improve upon the ISO's past approach to considering nonconventional solutions, which was very labor-intensive, was reactive to specific proposals, and did not provide any criteria for such alternatives in advance that could serve as guidance to prospective developers of such proposals.

The general application for this methodology is in grid area situations where a non-conventional alternative such as demand response or some mix of preferred resources could be selected as the preferred solution in the ISO's transmission plan rather than the transmission or generation solution that would be avoided by implementing the non-conventional solution. This would be possible in situations where the timeline for an identified need allows time for monitoring the development of non-conventional alternatives before a conventional solution would be required to be approved. For a grid area where the ISO finds a non-conventional solution to be effective, this new approach will result in a validated non-conventional resource mix that would be selected as the preferred solution in the ISO's draft transmission plan (posted in January of any given TPP cycle), alongside the transmission or conventional generation solution that would be avoided or deferred by implementing the non-conventional solution. Once the comprehensive transmission plan, which includes identification of both the non-conventional solution and the transmission or conventional generation solution that could be avoided or deferred, is approved by the ISO Governing Board, the ISO would monitor the development of the resources that comprise the nonconventional solution to determine whether they will be in operation by the time they are needed. If the ISO determines that the non-conventional resource mix is not developing in a timely manner,

then the ISO would consider whether to reinstate the avoided transmission solution or another appropriate alternative in a subsequent TPP cycle. That is how the ISO envisions this methodology being applied in general.

In the current cycle of the 2013-2014 transmission planning process, the ISO proposes to apply this new approach to several specific local areas in southern California: LA Basin, San Diego, and to a lesser extent the Moorpark subarea of the Big Creek/Ventura area. Although the application of this methodology may be relatively straight forward for the Moorpark subarea, the main focus will be on the LA Basin and San Diego where the application of the methodology will be somewhat different in this cycle. Because of the magnitude of the projected reliability needs in the LA Basin and San Diego, transmission options will be pursued to complement non-conventional alternatives (i.e., preferred resources), to reduce the need for conventional generation to fill the gap. Thus, unlike the generic application of the methodology in future transmission planning process cycles where preferred resources are considered as an alternative to transmission, the main focus of this effort with respect to the LA Basin and San Diego is to identify the volume of non-conventional alternatives and the needed performance attributes that could effectively address the local reliability needs in these two priority areas as part of a basket of resources. This information can then inform any CPUC decisions on authorizing procurement of additional preferred resources in these areas and ultimately inform the procurement activities of Southern California Edison and San Diego Gas & Electric. The 2013-14 transmission planning process will also be evaluating various transmission options for addressing the reliability needs of the LA Basin and San Diego areas and potentially recommending certain options for ISO Board approval. The ISO will plan to coordinate this transmission evaluation effort with the ongoing CPUC 2012 LTPP Track 4 proceeding.

Following the release of this paper, the ISO intends to hold a stakeholder web conference on September 18 to discuss the proposed methodology and obtain initial stakeholder feedback. The application of the methodology will be further discussed at the ISO's TPP stakeholder session scheduled on September 25th and 26th.

2 Introduction

To maintain a reliable transmission system that meets NERC and WECC reliability standards, the ISO annually assesses the needs of the transmission system as part of its Transmission Planning Process ("TPP"). As inputs to the studies the ISO relies on the CEC 10-year electricity demand forecast which incorporates energy efficiency programs, and behind the customer load meter distributed generation. Generation under construction is also modeled in the study base cases. These studies assess both system and local needs. The ISO then develops mitigation plans identifying specific solutions to satisfy the reliability standards. Historically, these mitigation plans have predominantly consisted of transmission upgrades and, in situations where planned development

Attachment I: California Public Utilities Commission Transmission and Environmental Planning Team, "General Information on Permitting Electric Transmission Projects at the California Public Utilities Commission," presented June 2009.



General Information on Permitting Electric Transmission Projects at the California Public Utilities Commission

June 2009

Presentation created by the Transmission and Environmental Permitting Team



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8

Time Frame to Plan, Permit, and Construct a Transmission Line

Planning	Permitting	Construction
3 to 4 years	3 to 4 years	1 to 5 years

- Planning includes the IOU evaluating and identifying transmission lines that need to be upgraded or constructed, and putting a plan together for CAISO evaluation and approval.
- Permitting includes 1 to 2 years for the IOU to prepare a Proponent's Environmental Assessment (PEA) and application. Average time for CPUC decision is 18 months (includes permits from Resource Agencies).
- Construction of all segments of Tehachapi will take approximately 5 years. Average construction time is approximately 1 to 2 years.



Attachment J: Southern California Edison, "Local Capacity Requirements ('LCR') RFO," issued September 12, 2013.

9/27/13

Energy Procurement

Local Capacity Requirements ("LCR") RFO Energy Supply & Management Power and Gas

ES&M Energy Auction

Renewable & Alternative Power Contract Opportunities

RFP for Independent Evaluators

Cost Allocation Mechanism Group

Procurement Review Group

RFP

Home > Energy Procurement > Local Capacity Requirements ("LCR") RFO

Local Capacity Requirements ("LCR") RFO

In accordance with California Public Utilities Commission ("CPUC") Decision ("D.") 13-02-015, Southern California Edison Company ("SCE") issues this Local Capacity Requirements Request for Offers ("LCR RFO") for incremental capacity in the West LA Basin and Moorpark Sub-Areas. Products solicited include:

- Gas Fired Generation
- Combined Heat and Power
- Demand Response
- Energy Efficiency
- Energy Storage
- Renewable
- Resource Adequacy
- Distributed Generation

D.13-02-015 authorizing the procurement is attached below:

D.13-02-15 Authorizing Long Term Procurement for Local Capacity Requirements (PDF)

SCE's Procurement Plan submitted to Energy Division pursuant to D. 13-02-015 is attached below:

Track | SCELCR Procurement Plan Pursuant to D.13-02-15 (PDF)

LCR RFO Schedule

Timeline	Event
September 12, 2013	RFO documents issued
December 2, 2013 5:00 PM Pacific Prevailing Time	Deadline to submit Non-binding Notice of Intent to Offer
December 16, 2013 5:00 PM Pacific Prevailing Time	Deadline to submit Indicative Offer and completed Offer Submittal Package
January 30, 2014	Shortlist notification
May22, 2014	Deadline to complete negotiations of Agreement(s)
May29, 2014 5:00 PM Pacific Prevailing Time	Deadline to submit Final Offer
June 26, 2014	Last date for notification of successful Offers and to sign Agreements

LCR RFO Materials

Document	Description
Transmittal Letter	RFO products solicited, eligibility requirements, process, offer evaluation
Offer Sheet	Bidder submitted document which includes Seller and project information
CEC's California Power Plants Database	List of CEC recognized power plants
CEC's Energy Facility Status Report	List of current and historical facilities in the CEC approval process
Notice of Intent	Non-binding indication of products that Bidder intends to submit offers for
RFO Definitions	Definitions of various terms used in LCR RFO Materials
Gas FiredPower Purchase Agreement	SCE's form of Power Purchase Agreement for gas fired projects
Gas FiredPower Purchase Agreement	Excelappendixto complementSCE 's form ofPowerPurchase

Gas FiredPower Purchase Adreement

https://www.sce.com/wps/portal/home/procurement/LCR_RF01!/rZJfb4utWPWVDnvYI-nF8 q-PNFKscUzFZclLgbUWDFFEXDe3 HzL3 KJuufeq9 P f3 i 3 pOD... 1 / 2

	Local	Capacitv	Requirements	(44	LOR)	RFO	Enerav	Homeeur-enenSC
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Excel Appendix*	Agreement for gas fired projects
CHPPower Purchase Agreement	SCE's form of Power Purchase Agreement for combined heat and power projects
CHPPower Purchase AgreementExcel Appendix*	Excelappendix to complement SCE's form of Power Purchase Agreement for combined heat and power projects
Demand Response Agreement	SCE's form of Agreement for demand response projects
Demand Response Agreement Excel Appendix*	Excelappendix to complement SCE's form of Agreement for demand response projects
EnergyEfficiencyAgreement	SCE's form of Agreement for energy efficiencyprojects
EnergyEfficiencyAgreementExcel Appendix*	Excelappendix to complement SCE's form of Agreement for energy efficiencyprojects
EnergyStorage Agreement	SCE's form of Agreement for energy storage projects
EnergyStorageAgreementExcel Appendix*	Excelappendix to complement SCE's form of Agreement for energy storage projects
Renewable Power Purchase Agreement	SCE's form of Power Purchase Agreement for renewable projects
Renewable Power Purchase AgreementExcel Appendix*	Excelappendix to complement SCE's form of Power Purchase Agreement for renewable projects
Resource AdequacyPower Purchase Agreement	SCE's form of Power Purchase Agreement for resource adequacy projects
Resource AdequacyPower Purchase Agreement Excel Appendix*	Excelappendix to complement SCE's form of Power Purchase Agreement for resource adequacy projects
Distributed Generation Power Purchase Agreement Excel Appendix*	Excelappendix to complement SCE's form of Power Purchase Agreement for distributed generation projects

*Product Excel Appendices are currently provided in .pdfformat. Editable files in .xlsformat will be provided when they are available.

Should you have questions regarding the LCR RFO:

Please email LCR.RFO@sce.compr contact Gene Lee (626) 302-3081 Jesse Bryson (626) 302-3297

In accordance with D.06-05-039, SCE has retained an Independent Evaluator to oversee the preparation and administration of the LCR RFO. The I independent Evaluator must be copied on all correspondences sent by bidders to SCE, including and especially any official submittals. Sedway Consulting, Inc. is the Independent Evaluator and can be contacted at Alan.Taylor@sedwayconsulting.com.

AtSCE's discretion, answers to any questions posed to SCE will be posted on a LCR RFO "FrequentlyAsked Questions" page.

A LCR RFO Bidder's Conference will be scheduled shortly, date and venue to be determined. Conference information, as well as other information or updates, will be posted to this website as available.

Attachment K: Edward Randolph (CPUC), Sylvia Bender (CEC), and Phil Pettingill (CAISO), "Southern California Reliability: Preliminary Plan," presented September 9, 2013.



California Public Utilities Commission



California Energy Commission



Southern California Reliability

Preliminary Plan

Edward Randolph, Energy Division Director, CPUC Sylvia Bender, Deputy Director, CEC Phil Pettingill, Director of State Regulatory Strategy, CAISO

September 9, 2013



- Use CEC's Notice of Intention process to approve potential sites ahead of actual applications
- As resource needs identified and authorized, sites available for a competitive solicitation process
- SDG&E Energy Park and SCE high value reliability sites are possible examples

Page 20