ATTACHMENT 8 RESPONSES TO ACR 143 STATUS REPORT QUESTIONS In 1994, the Legislature passed Assembly Concurrent Resolution (ACR) 143 relating to the CPUC's proceedings on restructuring the electric utility industry. ACR 143, among other things, directed the Commission to report to the Legislature by January 31, 1995 on its restructuring efforts and identify policies to address a number of issues. To this end, the CPUC issued its January 24, 1995 Status Report on Restructuring California's Electric Services Industry and Reforming Regulation. In this Report, we identified six concerns that were reflected in the ACR 143 reporting criteria. Here we summarize how our proposal addresses these concerns. 1. How are the market benefits of increased competition best realized and equitably distributed among all customer class? All customers would gain the benefits of competition in the generation market, through the lower energy costs gained from the competitive energy pool. The monopoly distribution utility, as the sole purchaser of energy in its territory, would pass on these lower energy costs to all customers. Further, all customers, regardless of customer class, would be able to negotiate financial contracts for virtual direct access (sometimes called "contracts for differences") directly with energy suppliers, or intermediaries, for their power needs. All that is needed is the proper meter to measure the power. We expect a variety of marketers, brokers and aggregators to enter the market over time to facilitate these transactions. 2. How can a restructured market best provide safe and reliable service to its customers? The utility would remain as an electric distribution monopoly for the physical delivery of power to customers. The utility would continue to be responsible for safety and reliability, and the CPUC would oversee and regulate this responsibility. Energy suppliers would also be certificated and regulated by the CPUC, in terms of safety and consumer protection, and the CPUC would have the authority to revoke a firm's certification if the firm fails to perform adequately. If an entity fails to provide sufficient power to the pool, the pool operator would procure alternate power to serve the customers. This action would be transparent to the customers. 3. How should nondiscriminatory access to the market be assured for all power producers in a restructured environment? How should restructuring ensure that market power in generation is not overly concentrated? The utility ultimately would not own any generation assets, except for nuclear and hydroelectric plants (which could be placed into an affiliate). The pool operator would be charged with allowing any and all producers to supply power through the grid in a non-discriminatory manner. Market power would be avoided by disaggregation of utility generation assets other than nuclear and hydroelectric plants. 4. How should responsibilities for uneconomic assets and obligations be allocated among industry participants, and over what period of time? Compensation for uneconomic assets and obligations would be provided through a competitive transition charge (CTC) which would be imposed on all customers of the monopoly utility as a surcharge. The surcharge would be a percentage of the total utility bill. The CTC would be imposed in a manner so as not to increase rates over what they would have been without restructuring, and so as to allow customers to benefit from any lower rates they can derive from energy suppliers. 5. How can a restructured industry adequately accommodate environmental concerns and recognize the benefits of cost-effective demand-side management and resource diversity? 6. How should cost recovery for certain public policy programs, such as low-income rate assistance, economic development research, development and demonstration, and low-emission vehicles be addressed in a restructured industry? In response to questions 5 and 6, we propose short term strategies which require the utility to continue to implement these important legislative requirements. We would identify costs for various programs as line items on customer bills as part of distribution charges. The utility would meet its resource diversity mandate by meeting minimum resource mix requirements. In the long term, we plan to work with the Legislature to initiate legislation that provides for alternate means to meet many of these public policy goals. This effort may involve reassigning responsibility for implementing these programs to entities other than regulated utilities. In our proposal, we suggest specific approaches that we believe will best accomplish these Legislative policies in a more competitive industry structure for each of the programs identified in ACR 143. (END OF ATTACHMENT 8)